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Glossary of terms
Active communication  For example, TV/radio is distinct from passive communication, 
e.g. a website, where information is simply made available to 
those motivated to seek it out.
Amplification-station  A communication transmission node/that can be used to 
enhance the distribution of communication material – see 
Kasperson, 1989.
Automatic enrolment  A situation where the default arrangement is to co-opt 
individuals into a scheme, e.g. an employer pension.
Behavioural life cycle model  Individuals are aware that there are times when they must 
save to smooth their consumption stream, but they behave as 
if they have a preference for immediate gratification.
Choice architecture  The options available to people and the way they can be 
configured to impact on the decisions people make (see Thaler 
and Sunstein, 2008).
Cognitive  The mental process of knowing, including aspects such as 
awareness, perception, reasoning, and judgement.
Cognitive dissonance  Individuals’ discomfort when they hold conflicting beliefs, 
and when their motivation is to change beliefs to achieve 
consistency. 
Cognitive filter  The impact of underpinning orientations on how new 
information is perceived and reacted to (see Cognitive).
Discounting  Discounting individuals regard money received in the future 
as worth less than money received immediately (an individual 
with £100 at present is able to invest this sum to achieve 
£100(1+r) in one year, where r is the rate of interest).
Disposition bias  Individuals’ willingness to hold on to poorly performing stocks 
and shares to avoid suffering a loss, when they are far more 
willing to sell stocks and shares that are rising in value to 
realise a gain.
Endowment effect  When individuals acquire a good (e.g. either through purchase 
or as a gift) they value it more highly (the amount they require 
for the good is much greater than the amount they are willing 
to pay for the good).
Framing effects  Relates to how options/choices are perceived, e.g. as 
gains or losses; in many instances people are loss averse  
(see Heuristics). 
Fungible  Interchangeable or moveable in the sense of substitution.
Glossary of terms
xHerding  Herding individuals are strongly influenced by the behaviour 
of others.
Heuristics  Rules of thumb; mental shortcuts that amount to intuitive 
sense-making; the tendency to focus on a sub-set of what are 
believed to be key characteristics of an issue. Contrasts with 
detailed deliberative contemplation (see Rational actor).
Homo economicus  Rational economic man.
Hyperbolic discounting  Hyperbolic discounting individuals discount future costs 
and benefits at a much higher rate in the short run than in  
the long run.
Intervention  Any configurable attempt to influence or otherwise change the 
status quo, in public policy relates to attempts at engineering 
(routinely social/behavioural) change.
Intrinsic motivation The degree of fulfilment derived from the content of work, as 
discrete from financial reward (see Maslow, 1943).
Libertarian paternalism  Government intervention to paternally influence choice leaving 
individuals free to make their own choice.
Life cycle model  A model in which individuals smooth consumption over 
different periods of their lives (rather than spending excessively 
in one period and saving excessively in the next). 
Loss aversion  Loss aversion individuals are far more willing to take action to 
avoid a loss than to acquire a gain (an important element in 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s prospect theory).
Market failure price distortions  Market failure price distortions make market provision 
inefficient.
Mental accounting individuals  Mental accounting individuals divide their income into different 
mental accounts and spend differently from different mental 
accounts.
Mental models Models people’s internal representation of elements in their 
world, often impressionistic and potentially incomplete (see 
Heuristics). 
Mental models approach  Developed at Carnegie Mellon University by Baruch Fischhoff
to communication  and Granger Morgan and colleagues 
Nudges  Contextual influences that induce people to act in ways that 
feel natural to them (see Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
Organisational climate  Structural and institutional parameters; systems, practices and 
priorities that provide a defining influence on employee culture 
and behaviour. 
Glossary of terms
xi
Rational actor  Homo-economicus – the premise that people make decisions 
that maximise value, gain or benefit (classically financial).
Self-efficacy  Self-efficacy is our belief in our ability to succeed in a given 
situation.
Status quo bias  Individuals persist in following a course of action even when it 
is no longer in their best interest. 
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List of abbreviations
BSE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
DWP Department for Work and Pensions
EWL Extending working life
FSA Food Standards Agency
HSE Health and Safety Executive
MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
NAPF National Association of Pension Funds
NICE National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence
ONS Office for National statistics
SEC Socio-economic Classification
SIC Standard Industrial Classification
SOC Standard occupational Classification
SPA State Pension age
UK United Kingdom
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Summary
Background and scope
While a positive feature of the post-war period, increasing longevity brings new challenges, not least 
with respect to provision for old age. In particular, it impacts on the ratio of working to non-working 
life. Beyond public policy concerns over the long-term fiscal sustainability of current retirement 
norms (State Pension age (SPA) and earlier), recent years have witnessed interest from some 
employers, conscious of skills shortages and attracted to flexible working arrangements, as well as 
calls from the older age organised interest groups for enhanced access to paid employment in later 
life. 
Despite recently announced incremental rises in the minimum age at which State Pension is 
claimable, it is apparent that a significant proportion of the working population continue to leave the 
labour market before their SPA, either through choice, diminished health status or as a consequence 
of employer policies. Moreover, working beyond SPA represents a minority activity.
The economic and social implications surrounding the continuance of exiting custom and practice 
has resulted in the UK Government prioritising ways of encouraging individuals to remain in paid 
employment for longer. 
The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) has strategy responsibility for all aspects of older 
worker employment. A core element of its remit relates to finding ways to stimulate higher rates of 
employment amongst individuals aged 50 and over. 
Key policy objectives in this area include:
• influencing employer orientations, policies and practices pertaining to the employment of older 
workers;
• enhancing opportunities for older individuals to return to paid employment;
• encouraging employees to remain in paid employment for longer;
• encouraging employees to make enhanced financial provision for retirement.
The DWP has funded extensive research on the attitudes, knowledge and information preferences of 
older workers, as well as their broader orientations to extending working life (see Appendix B). 
Informed by insights from cognitive psychology, behavioural economics, social psychology and 
socio-cultural on motivating behaviour change we were asked to: 
• interpret and distil the amassed UK and international findings (over the period 2000–10); and 
• make recommendations regarding policy intervention options that will stimulate higher rates 
of employment amongst older people and enhance levels of retirement income following 
withdrawal from the labour. 
In particular, the DWP wished to enhance its insight into the array and relative importance of 
individual, social and cultural variables that influence retirement orientations and decision-making, 
referenced to contemporary insights on motivating behaviour change, in order to enhance its 
delivery of an evidence-based approach in the design of policies that encourage extending working 
life (EWL). 
2Objectives
• Review and distil established research evidence on variables impacting on people’s orientations to 
work in later life and retirement planning behaviour.
• Interpret the above with reference to the social science evidence base on motivating behavioural 
change.
• Produce theoretically informed recommendations for public policy intervention strategy on EWL 
and retirement planning.
Main findings
Public orientations to extended working life
There are significant challenges to finding ways to encourage people to extend their working lives 
(EWL) and make effective financial provision for retirement. There are strong social norms amongst 
both employers and employees surrounding retirement at and before SPA. 
There is evidence that a significant proportion of individuals are disposed to extend their working 
lives, but many desire a change in working hours, and place a high value on choice and flexibility 
over hours worked. 
People are more disposed to reacting to options they are presented with, e.g. by employers or 
by Government, in terms of pensions choices over their date/manner of retirement, i.e. most are 
passive rather than active decision-makers. 
Most people are not active planners or information seekers with regard to EWL options, pension 
investment choices or retirement planning. They are more disposed to react to events, options 
and opportunities when they are tabled by others. This suggests that situational influences play 
an important role in decision-making. People are susceptible to an array of contextual influences 
(nudges1), some of which may motivate early withdrawal from work, while others may encourage 
working longer. This would suggest that public policy interventions that lead to changes in the 
choice architecture2 are of key relevance in the EWL and pension investment domains. Government 
is not the only choice architect. Employers play a key role in defining employee EWL, pension and 
retirement decision architecture. 
Theories of behaviour change
Psychology behaviour change models that are widely used in public health and some other policy 
delivery contexts are of limited use in the EWL and pension investment domains, principally because 
they rest on the following assumptions:
• individuals are actively engaged with making rational decisions over these issues (it seems that 
most are not); 
• change is vested within the gift of individuals (notable externally imposed ‘push’ and ‘pull’ 
influences also play a role);
1 Contextual influences that induce people in ways that feel natural to them (see Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008). 
2 The options available to people and the way they can be configured to impact on the decisions 
people make (see Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).
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3• the primary point of resistance to EWL rests with individuals (potentially underplays structural, 
institutional and cultural effects);
• cultural change arises from the sum of individual actions (underplays structural and institutional 
normative influences, e.g. workplace climate3). 
The nudge (decision architecture) concept is quite distinct from established (health) psychology 
behaviour change approaches4. Rather than aiming to help individuals to become more rational in 
their decision-making, the nudge perspective focuses on ways of configuring options to take account 
of human irrationality, i.e. essentially, it advocates policy intervention that makes changes to the 
context in which individuals make decisions, rather than attempting to change how individuals 
feel about/react to contexts, e.g. automatic-enrolment5 in pensions, rather than (routinely via 
communication media) stressing the pitfalls of failing to invest in a pension.
Communicating with the public
Turning to public knowledge and understanding of EWL, it is apparent that there are widespread 
misunderstandings over even basic elements such as SPA. People also find the complexity of the tax 
and pension systems daunting, to the extent that few actively attempt to calculate the impact of 
alternative options on income in older age. 
It is unlikely that education initiatives aimed at enhancing financial literacy would significantly 
redress this. An approach which is more likely to be effective rests with building on people’s, 
generally partial and impressionistic mental models6, e.g. ‘you	need	to	save	for	retirement’, ‘pensions	
are	a	good	idea’, ‘it’s	not	worth	working [post SPA] as	I	will	lose	it	all	[additional income] in	tax’, 
etc., reinforcing those that are substantively accurate and addressing gaps and misconceptions. 
We therefore recommend the mental models7 approach8 to communication as a tried and tested 
audience-focused framework for developing message content that meets the informational needs 
of target groups – for both EWL and pensions issues. There are synergies between the mental 
models and nudge approaches in so far as both aim to capitalise on extant public understanding 
and decision behaviour rather than attempting to educate people in the hope of making them  
more rational.
Effective communication in this area requires a broader perspective than incorporating insights 
on enhancing comprehension and techniques for filling gaps in public knowledge. Rises in SPA, 
3 Organisational climate – structural and institutional parameters; systems, practices and 
priorities that provide a defining influence on employee culture, and behaviour. 
4 An array of theoretical (health) psychology models of behaviour that draw on rational actor 
assumptions (see footnote 5) that view change as the product of recognition of personal 
vulnerability and belief in the capacity to change.
5 Where the default arrangement is to co-opt individuals into a scheme, e.g. an employer 
pension.
6 Heuristics – rules of thumb; mental shortcuts that amount to intuitive sense-making; the 
tendency to focus on a sub-set of what are believed to be key characteristics of an issue. 
Contrasts with detailed deliberative contemplation. 
7 People’s internal representation of elements in their world, often impressionistic and 
substantially incomplete (also see footnote 6). 
8 The mental models approach to communication – developed at Carnegie Mellon University by 
Baruch Fischhoff and Granger Morgan and colleagues (for a summary see Weyman A.K. and 
Kelly C.J., 1999; Weyman and Williamson, 2006).
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4employer and public pensions failures, combined with the spectre of broader failures in the banking 
and investment sectors have significantly eroded public trust in the motives of certain stakeholders, 
notably Government and its departments and agencies responsible for delivering this agenda. The 
impact of even the best technically crafted message is at risk of being significantly blunted if it is 
perceived as emanating from a source that is not trusted.
Most DWP communication activity with the public on EWL and State Pension issues is indirect, via 
surrogates. In view of the above, we would recommend that this continues. However, it is important 
for the DWP to take account of the public trust profile of these surrogates. Importantly, the trust 
profile of surrogates interacts with the issue under consideration, e.g. one source may be more 
trusted for advice over EWL; another for pension investment options; and another for pension value 
estimates, and so on. Critically, it is apparent that any surrogate with a close (actual or perceived) 
linkage to Government interests is likely to have a low trust profile on the EWL issue.
Choice architecture
It is important that the policy intervention portfolio in this area extends beyond media-based 
communication output to impacting on structural and normative influences, in particular the 
choices employers offer employees over EWL and pension investment/draw-down. 
We are aware that the DWP has undertaken work with stakeholders aimed at impacting on 
employer practices since the late 1990s. This has the potential to offer a firm foundation for 
further intervention to impact on the EWL and pensions decision architectures. The Government’s 
automatic-enrolment pension initiative (scheduled to commence October 2012) offers a promising 
example of the potential for behaviour change via the employer decision-architecture route. 
Implications for public policy intervention strategy
A comprehensive intervention strategy on EWL and pensions should necessarily embody elements 
that address knowledge gaps, individual motivation and the decision architecture, the latter relating 
to the broader agenda of employer policies and practices towards older workers. 
We would conclude that higher rates of impact on individuals’ choices are likely to accrue from 
a primary public policy intervention focus on addressing elements that impact on the decision 
architecture; notably the key role played by employers in configuring the options available to 
employees and underpinning human resource practices that have the potential to change cultural 
norms in the workplace, e.g. working beyond SPA, remaining enrolled in the State sponsored 
automatic-enrolment and, where available, auto-enrolling in the employer’s pension scheme, 
becomes part of the natural order of things. 
The scope for partnership-working interventions with employers is twofold: 
• for employers to act as a conduit/amplification station9 for transmitting EWL and pension 
investment messages to employees, i.e. via DWP initiated interventions that impact on employers 
to elicit their co-operation to communicate key messages/information to employees; 
• in medium and large organisations, to propagate the adoption of good EWL practice in human 
resource management10, via DWP initiated interventions that motivate its adoption.
9 A transmission node that can be used to increase the consumption of communication material 
(see Kasperson, 1989). 
10 This activity could usefully build on established DWP activity with employers on managing 
diversity in the workplace.
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5While a voluntary code of practice on Age and Diversity in Employment (1999) was established, this 
does not seem to embody an operationalisable definition or vision of the types of human resource 
practices that should be propagated to encourage employee EWL (or those that discourage it). 
Defining this would seem to be a prerequisite, to configuring future EWL policy intervention activity 
aimed at employers. 
There is a need to plug the notable gap in the evidence base regarding barriers to change in 
employer practices and the array of existing employer configured nudges that motivate early 
withdrawal from the labour market.
There is strong evidence of social differences in terms of employment opportunities, the availability 
of flexible working arrangements, people’s capacity to work and the degree of cultural engagement 
with work in later life. A key implication of this is that a segmented approach to intervention is likely 
to yield higher returns than an undifferentiated (whole population) approach. 
An arising implication for intervention relates to the need to map and profile the demographics 
and pathways to influence for the primary employment sectors and develop bespoke intervention 
packages that meet the needs of each11. For example, the fluidity of employment arrangements in 
the construction sector significantly limits the scope for influence via the employer. By contrast, the 
employer route is likely to offer the more fruitful avenue for influence within the public sector.
Relative to other social groups, there are grounds for concluding that rates of behaviour change 
are likely to be highest from targeting individuals who are more intrinsically12 engaged with work; 
who work in sectors where flexible employment is available and whose preference is to continue 
working for their current employer. There are concentrations of these individuals, who we have 
characterised as ‘the	receptive	middle’ within certain occupations/employment sectors, and there 
may be a case for apportioning intervention resources to take account of this, i.e. the underpinning 
logic is that policy interventions aimed at impacting on this strata, via employers in sectors in which 
they are concentrated, will potentially realise higher rates of behaviour change than interventions 
aimed at segments that do not possess these features. Establishing change within these groups also 
embodies the potential to produce a ripple effect that impacts on the retirement norms of other 
social groups. 
Turning to elements of the decision architecture that lie beyond the employer, intuitively, there 
is scope to configure tax, benefit and other fiscal arrangements in ways that motivate behaviour 
change13. However, again we would recommend that any proposed change in incentives or 
disincentives should be tested on the public(s) to see how they impact on their mental models 
and arising decisions. As Thaler and Sunstein14 highlight, it would be unwise to make assumptions 
over the extent to which such nudges might inspire rational choices. On the basis of the available 
evidence, we would suggest that nudges of this type would need to be highly intuitive and simply 
configured headlines such as ‘a	tax	holiday	for	working	for	two	more	years’, or ‘a	lump	sum	after	
three	extra	years’, or ‘emphasising	the	loss	of	income	from	early	retirement’ rather than being buried 
in the detail of fiscal arrangements.
11 Bespoke packages for different segments should not be interpreted as promoting 
discrimination, rather it is to counter discrimination due to structural and cultural differences. 
12 Intrinsic motivation – degree of fulfilment derived from the content of work, as discrete from 
financial reward (see Maslow, 1943).
13 For an articulation of the scope for fiscal intervention see Winning	the	Generation	Game 
(Cabinet Office, 2000). 
14 Thaler, R.H. and Sunstein, C.R. (2008). Nudge:	Improving	decisions	about	health,	wealth	and	
happiness. Yale University Press.
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6Conclusions
• Individual, cultural and structural influences impact on the likelihood of working in later life. 
Some of these variables are more amenable to public policy influence than others. Their relative 
importance is also prone to vary between different population segments. Policy intervention 
strategy needs to take account of this.
• Policy intervention to address situational influences on behaviour regarding retirement, disposition 
to EWL and pensions investment/draw-down would appear to offer a the potential for higher 
rates of behaviour change than approaches aimed at changing people’s attitudes.
• A bespoke approach to intervention is needed that takes account of different employment 
arrangements, practices and personnel profiles in different employment sectors. There is a need 
for research to map and characterise the sectors to support this. The mapping might usefully 
include a characterisation of employer perspectives on barriers to change and how these are 
prone to vary by employment sector.
• For medium and large enterprises – the DWP should build on its established stakeholder 
engagement activity with employers and other stakeholders to develop and define a model of 
good human resource practice that establishes a positive decision architecture that permissions 
and motivates employees to extend their working lives.
• Consideration should be given to engaging a small sample of organisations (large, medium and 
small) to serve as case-study examples of good practice for motivating extended working life. 
Provision of support to participating organisations (plausibly via an action research approach) 
could be used to derive insight on configuring materials and tools that would support employers, 
for wider roll-out. 
• The adoption of a mental models approach is recommended to enhance the content of 
communication material and aspects relating to its transmission, e.g. the trust profile of 
surrogates. There would be benefit from further research on public(s) mental models of EWL.
• There is a gap in the evidence base regarding employee beliefs, interpretations of employer 
practices on EWL and impacts on work/retirement behaviours. People’s beliefs (accurate and 
inaccurate) have important behavioural impacts. There is a gap in the evidence base on what 
constitutes a nudge towards/away from EWL. Findings might usefully be combined with findings 
on employer perspectives on barriers to change. 
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1.1  Scope
This report discusses options for developing public policy interventions to promote extending 
working life (EWL) up to and beyond State Pension age (SPA). It aims to combine social science 
insights on behaviour and cultural change with the evidence arising from our review of the research 
evidence relating to public attitudes towards the extension of working life and retirement planning 
(see Appendix B). 
The intervention theories, tools and techniques that are considered have been drawn from a 
range of social science paradigms, perspectives and application contexts. A pragmatic, practical 
realist, perspective has been adopted in considering their applicability to the EWL agenda, to a 
lesser degree, related retirement planning/pension investment issues. This report aims to provide a 
pragmatic approach which is theoretically informed, rather than being constrained by a particular 
paradigm, model or theoretical perspective. 
A limitation of many behaviour change reviews is that their focus has tended to be limited to 
theoretical elements surrounding the theory of change, to the extent that they underplay key 
elements relating to the intervention logic, i.e. the process of policy delivery or ‘making it happen’. 
This imbalance is also a characteristic of the wider social science literature on behaviour change. 
We have attempted to address this by focusing on empirical evidence on the cultural profile of EWL/
pensions15; the characteristics of target groups and pathways to influence. 
The consideration of intervention options extends beyond the development of communication 
media to addressing deeper cultural and structural influences. 
The objective of devising public policy interventions that motivate people to behave differently 
intuitively implies the need to focus on individuals. However, it is also important to consider the 
contextual drivers of behaviour, in particular cultural norms and structural influences. Different 
social science perspectives place different degrees of emphasis on the extent to which behaviour 
change is best achieved through a focus on the individuals or the context in which they operate. 
This debate is central to the public policy intervention context on EWL, retirement planning and pension 
investment, and more widely. It is essential to keep in mind that decisions over the relative focus on 
individuals or context varies between different public policy agendas, e.g. for addressing public health 
priorities such as inoculation or obesity, the scope for influencing situational variables tend to be 
modest. By contrast, there is significantly greater scope in the world of work and employment.
1.2 Theory of change – individuals versus situations 
A key finding of our review of (see Appendix B) was that most people are relatively disengaged 
from active consideration of options regarding extending their working life or personal pension 
investment. People are more disposed to react to options tabled before them, rather than actively 
seeking them out. 
This suggests that the impact of policy interventions, such as the production of communication 
material, particularly that which requires people to be motivated to search it out on websites or 
request literature, is likely to be modest. 
15 Employer, personal and State pensions.
Introduction
8It highlights the need to devise public policy interventions that impact on the employment and 
pension investment options that people are presented with, i.e. the evidence highlights a primary 
need for policy-makers to find ways to influence situational variables; most pertinently, as a means 
of impacting on those people who are currently in paid employment.
Before progressing to the consideration of intervention options and evidence of what works it is 
necessary to consider some of the fundamental differences in approaches to influencing public 
behaviour. 
All public policy behaviour change agendas embody the need to consider the relative impact of 
cognitive16 and situational17 influences on behaviour, the scope for influencing both, the relative 
emphasis on each and how this varies with different population segments. It is also important 
to keep in mind that there is notable consensus that public policy interventions18 that address 
attitudinal and knowledge elements alone, e.g. health-labelling of foods in supermarkets, or 
road safety advice routinely realise modest impacts (see National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE), 2007). 
Any public policy portfolio of interventions on EWL, employer and personal pension investment/
retirement planning will necessarily involve a package of complementary activity, aimed at 
influencing individuals directly, e.g. via communication media aimed at enhancing knowledge/
changing attitudes and influencing the context in which individuals operate, employer practices, 
fiscal arrangements and other situational drivers of behaviour. Critically, the balance of activity 
needs to vary to maximise impacts on different segments of the population (see Section B.3). 
Policy decisions over the type of intervention(s) selected must consider the interplay between: 
• options relating to the theory of change (how change is hypothesised to occur); 
• the intervention logic (how the pathways to influence will work) referenced to the issue (in the 
current context EWL or pension investment); and 
• the characteristics of the target group(s) (see Chapter 2 and Table 2.1). 
The need to consider this interaction is key, and its importance cannot be over-emphasised, e.g. 
for individuals who are not in paid employment configurable interventions may be limited to 
the provision of informational material. For those in stable employment, there may be scope to 
supplement this through working with employers to shift cultural norms. For example, it is noted 
that the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) has already undertaken a substantial body of 
activity aimed at working with and influencing employers, including sector-based work, in areas 
related to the EWL agenda, e.g. aspects of the ‘Age positive’ initiative (2006)19. 
These elements are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
16 The mental process of knowing, including aspects such as awareness, perception, reasoning 
and judgment.
17 Structural, e.g. design of work or pension choices, and cultural – established ways of viewing 
the world and behaving that meet with peer approval.
18 Any configurable attempt to influence or otherwise change the status quo. Examples within 
the EWL domain might include producing information to help people make better pension 
investment choices, or recruiting employers to sign-up to adopt human resource practices that 
encourage EWL.
19 As part of the Age Positive campaign the DWP has sought to work with nine leading sector 
bodies aimed at stimulating change in employer culture and practices relating to the removal 
of the default retirement age and increasing retention rates of older employees. Activities 
include: articles in trade publications, workshops and case study examples.
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target groups
Segmenting the target population is based on identifying sub-groups with shared characteristics to 
enable the development of bespoke engagement strategies with greater impact. 
2.1 Segmented versus non-segmented approaches
There are coherent arguments for both segmented (sub-population) and non-segmented (whole 
population) approaches to public policy delivery. 
Proponents of a whole population approach (e.g. Rose, 1985) hold that even if only a small 
proportion of people are influenced, this can equate to a relatively large net gain, e.g. 2% of  
70 million people is 1.4 million individuals. The counter-argument is that an undifferentiated 
approach offers partial, generalised, solutions, rather than solutions that are well focused on 
meeting the needs of priority20 sub-groups. In particular, they highlight the potential for wastage 
due to directing resources at non-relevant individuals and groups (see, for example, Adams and 
White, 2005; Rockhill, 2004, 2006). 
A non-segmented approach also tends to restrict the scope for intervention, typically limiting this 
to a default orientation around education and awareness-raising, e.g. television and other media 
advertising campaigns, rather than more innovative organic approaches. The high financial cost of 
TV/radio communication21 also tends to restrict the frequency of transmission. 
2.2 Segmentation and intervention logic
Segmentation analysis aims to assess and characterise public understandings and disposition 
to extending working life (EWL) and personal pension investment, with a view to identifying any 
significant differences between sub-populations. However, when doing this it is necessary to keep 
in mind the scope for a segmented approach to intervention. If there is a dislocation between the 
approach to segmenting population characteristics and the scope for a segmented approach to 
intervention then the segmentation analysis is of little value (see Table 2.1).
An effective segmented approach relies upon deriving a clear understanding of the causes of 
the behaviours of interest, mapping points of commonality and, in particular, variability between 
identifiable and characterisable sub-populations. The more complete this knowledge base is, 
the greater the scope for an informed and strategic approach to intervention. Advantages over 
an undifferentiated, one size fits all, approach surround the potential for higher rates impact on 
behaviour for a given resource allocation, and a broader array of intervention options, i.e. beyond 
knowledge and awareness-raising communication material aimed at individuals. 
20 A priority group might be defined in terms of it being a high risk group(s); a highly resistant 
group(s) or a group(s) that is most receptive to engage. Choices are informed by political 
expediency and scientific consideration surrounding the theory of change and intervention logic.
21 Active communication is distinct from passive communication, e.g. a website, where 
information is simply made available to those motivated to seek it out.
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Segmentation analysis can be useful, not only to typify different social groups but also to enhance 
the focus on pathways to influencing priority sub-populations, e.g. high risk/vulnerable groups22, 
or more receptive groups. The capacity to identify employment sectors, geographical regions or 
locales where concentrations of these sub-populations exist offers further potential to concentrate 
resources to maximal effect.
However, when making decisions over relative resource allocations, it needs to be kept in mind that 
‘high risk’ groups may share the characteristic of being ‘high-resistance’ groups, that may yield lower 
per-capita influence rates than other sub-populations. Relatedly, net gain to the Exchequer, in terms 
of reductions in the costs of benefit payments, may accrue from concentrating resources on sub-
populations that are more receptive to EWL, pension deferral and private pension investment. For 
example, the review evidence suggests higher rates of impact amongst those who are currently 
in work, particularly where there is scope for a migration to flexible working hours with the current 
employer. 
This should in no way be interpreted as a call for the abandonment of high risk/high resistance 
groups to their destiny, but offers insight into the size of the impact on different social groups, 
combined with the recognition that alternative approaches are needed for different sub-populations. 
The planned (October, 2012) State administered automatic enrolment pension scheme, designed 
to enhance retirement income amongst those with little or no alternative pension provision, is an 
example of developing bespoke solutions by social group. 
2.2.1 Who are they?
The purpose of segmentation is to examine and characterise social diversity to enable a strategic 
approach to intervention. Critically, the approach to characterising different population segments 
needs to take account of the scope for a segmented approach to intervention. 
For example, there is limited value in characterisations of the type ‘spenders’, ‘apportioners’, 
‘money	growers’ (Thomas, et	al., 2009), or ‘jugglers’, ‘survivors’	and ‘choosers’ (McNair et	al., 2007) 
‘...	attitudinal	types	that	suggested	where	individuals	differed	in	terms	of	their	money	management	
behaviour	…’ (Thomas et	al., 2009, p.2). Put simply, this is because it is not possible to configure 
policy interventions that can be directed to impact on the identified segments23 (see Table 2.1). The 
policy evidence need is for segmented characterisations that can be used to develop pathways to 
influence. 
Of potentially greater utility is evidence that highlights that people’s disposition to engage with 
planning for the future varies, not just in terms of chronological age (the under 25s being least 
disposed), but also aligns with key life events, e.g. preparedness to engage with planning for the 
future appears to be greater at the point of marriage; the commencement of (first) home ownership 
and following the birth of a (probably first) child (Thomas et	al., 2009). These insights suggest that 
targeting individuals at these points in their life cycle may yield higher rates of impact on behaviour 
than at other times.
A key conclusion, however, is that the amassed segmentation evidence highlights the fact that 
there is scope for tailoring interventions to appeal to/meet the needs of different sub-populations. 
We believe that it is possible to add to and refine the typologies identified to date. Necessarily this 
requires a shift of focus, away from broad demographic and attitudinal descriptions, towards a more 
focused analysis on the scope for influence. 
22 High risk groups, e.g. those with insufficient or no pension provision, or people with disabilities.
23 At best, typologies of this nature are only of use to inform the content of whole-population-
based communication material, through including messages designed to appeal to ‘jugglers’, 
‘survivors’, etc. This does not really constitute a segmented approach to intervention.
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Table 2.1 Segmentation evidence
Q42 Reasons for starting saving [for retirement] (prompted). All actively saving (multiple answers 
possible) 
Response % Our assessment of the scope for policy-led intervention
You are the sort of person that thinks 66 Effectively zero – in terms of cognitive styles or personality 
about these things. traits. Requires linking to social class/social grade evidence.
Having a bit more spare cash. 54 Effectively zero. 
Your employer organised it. 52 Attempt to influence employer practice.
Getting to a certain age. 51 Effectively zero – in the absence of evidence of age cohort 
differences.
Seeing what retirement was like for 42 Effectively zero – in the absence of impacting on employer to 
others. change workplace norms.
Advice from family or friends. 37 Effectively zero.
Advice from a financial adviser. 37 Attempt to influence financial adviser practice – via 
professional associations.
Finishing paying off other debts. 31 Effectively zero.
Buying a house. 30 Consider using mortgage lenders/advisers as surrogates.
Getting a new job. 30 Attempt to influence employer practice at point of recruitment 
– via established sector-based networks.
Having children. 28 Link to unsolicited mail shot to register of births.
Getting married. 19 Link to unsolicited mail shot to register of marriages.
Source: Thomas et al. (2009).
The assimilation of relevant segmentation evidence derived from our review identified an array of 
variables that motivate early or delayed retirement. Primary variation of these was apparent by 
employment status (in or seeking work) and social grade. 
Of those in work three broad groups were identified (see Figure 2.1 and Section B.5). Those in 
professional/managerial roles are likely to have greater financial independence and choice over 
when and how to retire. In intervention terms, this group arguably requires least attention. At the 
other end of the social spectrum are the low/unskilled, with restricted employment options and very 
modest retirement income arrangements. They also tend to experience lower intrinsic engagement 
with work and a stronger predisposition to realising an early exit. Limited assets may push them to 
EWL, but higher rates of debilitating ill-health and higher likelihood of redundancy also make them 
prone to an early exit. In intervention terms, this group is likely to be the most difficult to influence. 
Their disposition/ability to engage is not just based on less intrinsic attachment to work and lack of 
understanding of relevant parameters (although this is likely to be present) but rooted in structural 
factors that lie beyond personal volition.
A key conclusion of our evidence review was that scope for public policy intervention is greater 
for the middle strata. Reasons for believing this are that members of this group are more likely to 
be in stable employment and employment of a type where the flexible working arrangements, 
that many older workers find attractive, are more likely to be available. They are also more likely 
to possess occupational and/or private pensions that might be enhanced though deferral or 
additional contribution. At the most fundamental level there is some evidence that members of 
this group benefit from more intrinsically engaging work. They also are less likely to suffer from 
ill-health and to possess marketable skills/qualifications, the latter being particularly important in 
times of employment austerity. For these reasons policy interventions aimed at this more receptive 
group can be predicted to yield higher gains than targeting other groups. However, the key reason 
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for concluding this is not attributable to cultural characteristics, such as the degree of intrinsic 
engagement with work, but to structural/contextual differences that give them an advantage 
compared with the low/unskilled, in particular the scope for influence via the employer route (see 
Section B.7). 
Re-entry to the labour market poses challenges to workers of all ages, but is widely held to be 
particularly challenging for older workers (McNair and Flynn, 2005; Bytheway, 2005). Therefore,  
a key priority should be to develop interventions aimed at keeping those who are currently in 
employment working longer. For most, the preference is to continue working for their current 
employer (Hedges et	al., 2009).
Figure 2.1 Segmentation by social status24 
2.2.2 Where are they? 
Recourse to socio-demographic data on income distribution permits an identification of clusters 
of the social groups characterised in Figure 2.1 at regional and local levels, offering the potential 
for targeted intervention, e.g. directly at individuals/households in a given locale via a mailshot, or 
perhaps via local intermediaries, such as community-based groups or local employers. 
It is also possible to use employment demographic data to map the three primary social grades 
characterised in Figure 2.1 by employment sector, e.g. the majority of public sector employees are 
to be found within this middle strata; similarly, lower socio-economic groups are over-represented 
within the manufacturing sector. A mapping, derived from the integration of Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) and Socio-economic Classification (SEC) data, offers the potential for a strategic 
24 Lozenges: distribution of range of retirement in years by social group. Arrows: size and 
proximity indicates the primacy of their relevance to proximal social groups. 
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focus for interventions that aim to influence individuals via their employers, i.e. it highlights sectors 
with the highest concentrations of individuals by social grade, which might be used to develop 
tailored interventions to capitalise on different needs and emphasis.
Use of Labour Force Survey ((LFS), 2010) data, to map SEC onto SIC, and collapsing the standard SEC 
schema to three social groups (Figure 2.2) gives a breakdown of 9% professional/senior managerial; 
37% semi- and unskilled and 49% in the intermediate strata. Figure 2.3 gives a breakdown of the 
proportion of the three strata by employment sector. The sector classifications are quite broad, 
however, the level of insight could be increased by using SIC data to provide a breakdown of the 
distribution of job types within each sector. As would be predicted public sector employees are 
concentrated in health/social care, education and public administration.
Figure 2.2 Derivation of three strata from eight SEC schema
It is also necessary to consider the size of each sector, and the distribution of social groups within 
each. Table 2.2 shows the employment sector where members of the middle social strata are 
most concentrated. Of the six sectors, three reflect concentrations of private sector enterprises: 
manufacturing, construction and wholesale, the remaining three reflect a concentration of public 
sector enterprises. 
Identifying and defining target groups
(1) Higher managerial and professional   (1) Higher management/professional
(2) Lower managerial and professional
(3) Intermediate occupations    (2) Receptive middle 
(4) Small employers and own account workers
(5) Lower supervisory and technical
(6) Semi-routine occupations     
(7) Routine occupations     (3) Low skilled
(8) Never worked and unemployed
Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS).
14
Figure 2.3 Social class (SEC) distribution by employment sector (SIC)
Table 2.2 Derived social grade by employment sector
Wholesale 
retail and Health and 
vehicle Public admin Social work
Manufacturing Construction repair and defence Education
Prof/Senior 955 352  346  696 510 975 
management (19%) (9.4%) (5.1%) (20.9%) (9.3%) (14.4%)
Receptive 1,528 2,195 2,332 2,245 3,263 3,586 
middle (30.4%) (58.7%) (34.4%) (67.4%) (59.2%) (52.8%)
Lowest skilled 2,527 1,190 4,101 390 1,735 2,229 
(50.3%) (31.8%) (60.5%) (11.7%) (31.5%) (32.8%)
Total 3,520 3,737 6,779 3,331 5,508 6,790
Derived from ONS Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) and SIC (2009). 
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3 Communication interventions
Our review revealed notable gaps and misunderstandings in public knowledge regarding extending 
working life (EWL), State, employer and private pension issues. Underpinning this is the finding 
that most people exhibit low motivation to engage in decision-making in this area, i.e. active 
engagement with planning is a minority activity, rather than the norm, most individuals reacting to 
the pension and EWL options and situations they are presented with rather than actively seeking 
them out. The principal implication of this underpinning finding is that the impact of information-
based interventions is likely to be modest. 
3.1 The boundaries of communication
Most social scientists view information-based communication interventions as a relatively weak 
intervention strategy for changing behaviour, with higher rates of influence tending to result from 
addressing more fundamental elements. 
Public policy communication objectives routinely embody the ambition to both inform and motivate 
behaviour change. The former constitutes the more easily realised ambition, but may be insufficient 
to motivate the latter, particularly if audiences are not receptive to the content, or if the necessary 
change in behaviour is unattractive or subverted by established norms, e.g. a ‘live for today’ 
orientation, or precluded, e.g. insufficient income to invest in a personal pension. 
Educational material is likely to have greatest impact on the behaviour of the sub-set of individuals 
who are actively seeking information or at least passively receptive to its content. The review 
evidence suggests that, for EWL, retirement planning and personal pension information, this 
equates to a relatively small proportion of individuals. Moreover, if the content of communication 
material fails to even meet the needs of the receptive middle there is a risk of this ‘on-message’ 
group becoming alienated and disengaged from the change agenda. 
There is significant scope for enhancing public awareness and understanding, however, the 
evidence review highlighted the need to devise interventions that go beyond education-deficit 
communication elements, i.e. a key finding was that while knowledge gaps exist, a range of 
pervasive structural, cultural and dispositional influences impact on people’s behaviour in this 
area. Additionally, the public is critical and sceptical of the EWL agenda, with a number of key 
stakeholders, including the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) being viewed as having 
a vested interest. EWL and pensions (State, occupational and personal) issues are contentious 
and can arouse strong feelings amongst many, most notably where outcomes do not meet with 
what people have been given to expect. A key implication here is that even the best crafted policy 
communication is likely to be significantly blunted, and may even be counterproductive, if the target 
audience does not view the source as credible or trustworthy (see Section 3.2.1). 
Care should also be taken to avoid becoming beguiled into focusing on honing the content of 
communication material within the parameters of ‘what we want to tell the public’. A more salient 
focus is to use empirical insight to inform understandings of ‘what the public need/want to know’ 
(Section 3.3.1) and identifying effective delivery mechanisms, e.g. ‘who would they trust to provide 
it’ (Section 3.2.1), i.e. there is a need to configure messages based on empirical evidence that 
characterises established public understandings (and misunderstandings) and to deliver these 
messaged via sources that they use and trust (see Section 3.3.1). 
Communication interventions
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3.2 Trust – a primary communication filter
Our review highlighted issues of trust in stakeholders as a core influence on the public(s) orientations 
to EWL/pensions (State, employer and personal) and, most pertinently from the perspective of 
government communication activity, it is apparent that there is low trust in the DWP as a source 
for information on extending working life (Clery et	al., 2006; Thomas and Alen, 2008; Vickerstaff 
et	al., 2008; Hedges et	al., 2009). In the context of communicating with the public, issues of trust 
are perhaps best construed as operating as a primary orientating influence, or cognitive filter25. Put 
succinctly, where a negative trust profile is firmly embedded, at best, information emanating from 
that source tends to be viewed with scepticism and suspicion, and this is likely to attenuate the 
disposition to engage with the content. At worst it may lead to complete disregard and produce a 
ripple effect of amplified resistance to the agenda. This would suggest that the DWP should continue 
with its strategy of communication via intermediaries on EWL issues, but needs to consider the 
relative trust profile of these.
3.2.1 Trust in sources of information and advice
A low trust profile potentially negates the impact of even the most rigorously configured and crafted 
message.
It seems clear that the DWP is widely viewed as partisan (aligned with Ministerial agendas) on 
the issue of EWL. However, a less negative profile is apparent for elements such as the calculation 
of pension values; possibly extending to aspects of pension advice (see Thomas and Allen, 2008; 
Hedges et	al., 2009). 
At first sight public orientations might appear to embody a logical inconsistency, over low trust in 
Government and its EWL ambitions, while at the same time holding the view that the Government 
should take action (regulate) over contentious issues, such as employer and personal pension 
investment failures. We would conclude that these views are compatible, and reflect the, at times, 
complex interplay of institutional trust profiles with the issue under consideration. 
The evidence on trust in g/Government (and other) bodies is that building this, and attempts to 
enhance profiles, are unlikely to be fruitful, at least in the short- to medium-term. 
There are a number of reasons for concluding this: 
• most peoples’ insight into the activity of government bodies is vague and impressionistic, and this 
is unlikely to change;
• there are grounds for believing that a positive profile owes much to the absence of bad news, 
rather than a positive track-record, and that a positive track record is quickly lost in the presence 
of bad/unpopular news;
• there are significant logistical barriers to building a positive corporate trust profile when it is highly 
unlikely that people will attend to your efforts due to your relative invisibility; 
• bad news tends to assume higher social/media amplitude than good news and this makes 
government bodies vulnerable to unfolding events, routinely defined by variables beyond their 
control; 
• the public’s preparedness to trust an organisation tends to interact with the issue under 
consideration, such that a positive profile in one domain may well have a limited spill-over to 
other domains/issues. 
25 The impact of underpinning orientations on how new information is perceived and reacted to.
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For these reasons we would recommend that rather than expending resources on attempting to 
enhance/build trust on the EWL issue, the DWP should seek to find ways of working with and around 
its current profile. There are precedents in this area and options, possibly in combination, surround 
the scope for:
• corporate rebranding;
• the use of surrogates with a more positive profile to propagate messages;
• a change of intervention focus to influence bodies/organisations that impact on public behaviour, 
e.g. employers or community groups, rather than aiming to influence the public directly.
3.2.2 The scope for rebranding
The evidence on rebrandinging is limited. However, the establishment of the Food Standards Agency 
(FSA) in the aftermath of the BSE crisis appears to have resulted in a significantly more positive 
public trust profile than when a broadly equivalent function was delivered under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF). We are not aware of any systematic examination 
of the FSA’s trust profile, but the available evidence points to positive inferences drawn on the basis 
of its title, rather than any detailed insight into its practice (Pidgeon et	al., 2003; Weyman and 
Williamson, 2006). 
However, rebrandinging involves high levels of investment, with no guarantee of success. Neither 
does it overcome the potential to lose trust when contentious issues emerge.
3.2.3 The use of intermediaries
The use of intermediaries is discussed in some detail in Section B.3. Contrasting with widespread 
suspicions of DWP’s partisan (biased) interests as a source of advice on EWL, the review evidence 
tells us that the trust profile of employers is more positive than government sources on this issue; 
and that the idea (at a conceptual level) of independent (likely to be interpreted by the public as 
unbiased) financial advisers is also widely liked (Thomas and Allen, 2008). 
We are informed that the DWP has attempted to address aspects relating to commutation barriers 
associated with its trust profile by working with intermediaries in its Extending Working Life Sector 
initiative (2010/11) where there has been work with sector skills councils, trade and professional 
bodies to act as intermediaries for communication with employers and individuals.
The concept of automatic-enrolment26 pension schemes appears to be widely acceptable and 
possibly likely to be preferred by a fairly high proportion of the public. On this issue, it seems that 
many are prepared to implicitly trust others (g/Government and employers) to make the decision for 
them, and would prefer to be relieved of the burden of choice.
As detailed in Sections B.3 and B.6, we believe that employers represent a key intermediary in 
propagating EWL and pension-related messages, not just in terms of a repository for educationally 
orientated communication material aimed at individuals, but in terms of creating a choice 
architecture27 with defaults that permission and norm EWL. The implication here is that a primary 
focus for policy intervention should, more profitably in terms of behavioural impacts, be on 
26 Automatic enrolment is used here to refer to both the UK State’s auto-enrolment scheme, due 
for phased introduction from 2008, as well as separate employer-based organisational pension 
schemes.
27 Options and choices that people are presented with, e.g. automatic-enrolment versus 
individuals opting to join a company pension scheme.
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employers rather than individuals per se, at least for policy intervention activity aimed at those 
currently in employment.
While third sector bodies generally enjoy a positive trust profile, few of them are seen by the public 
as relevant in this domain. 
However, their engagement as delivery stakeholders might offer potential, e.g. they could be 
enrolled to actively propagate key messages, rather than serving as a passive repository. This might 
be achieved as part of targeted (based on the envisaged segmentation analysis) locally based 
initiatives.
While a focus on individuals as the target for behaviour change intervention remains important, 
it is strongly recommended that this should not constitute the primary focus, as there are sound 
grounds for believing that impact effect sizes would be modest and the product of intervention 
activity on behaviour difficult to evidence (see Appendix A). 
3.3 Dealing with knowledge gaps and misunderstandings
It can be useful to think of communication elements as requiring consideration at three levels. At 
the most basic (micro) level communication is about presentational format and simplifying complex 
information to enhance comprehension. Beyond this lie elements relating to ensuring that messages 
are a good fit with the informational needs of target audiences and identifying effective transmission 
routes, e.g. media consumption habits. In the case of high profile issues that are politically charged 
and arouse high public concern, possibly extending to outrage, as is the case with rises in State Pension 
age (SPA) and private pension under-performance, there is a need to consider macro level elements, 
relating to the social legitimacy of the issue, trust in stakeholders, etc. (see Figure 3.1).
3.3.1 The mental models approach to communication
The benefits of an audience-centred perspective based upon tailoring communication content to 
mesh with the extant prior understandings and knowledge gaps (mental models) exhibited by the 
target population(s) are widely recognised (see, for example, Royal Society, 1992; Weyman and Kelly, 
1999; Morgan et	al., 2002). There is also recognition of this within the EWL evidence base ‘...	it	seems	
extremely	important	to	acknowledge	the	way	that	people	feel	already.’ (Hedges et	al., DWP 557, p.92). 
The concept of a ‘mental model’ is used to characterise the way people think about and make sense 
of their world Mental models routinely embody complete and incomplete, accurate and inaccurate, 
understandings of phenomena and how phenomena interrelate, but serve as the foundation for 
decision-making. They can embody recourse to heuristics (rules of thumb) and affective (emotional) 
reactions (see Sections B.3, B.7 and B.9.4). 
Where people’s mental models contain ‘bugs’	(misunderstandings), or omit potentially salient 
variables, this can lead to erroneous conclusions, with unfortunate/unhelpful impacts on 
understandings and, ultimately, behaviour (see Bostrom et	al., 1994; Morgan et	al., 2002). In the 
current context, examples might include: simple inferences, such as: there is little advantage in post 
SPA working as any income would be ‘...	all	whacked	in	tax’. Similarly, ‘...	there	was	an	instinctive	
conclusion	that	they	would	lose	out	–	because	they	would	lose	[pension]	payments	they	were	not	
claiming	...’ (Hedges et	al., 2009; DWP 557).
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Figure 3.1 Concentric model of communication
Described by the Royal Society as ‘A	novel	and	highly	promising	approach.’	(Pidgeon et	al., 1992) 
the technique represents a notable departure from traditional approaches, in that the process 
of developing message content begins with commissioning qualitative research to explore and 
document extant public understandings: in the current instance, EWL and pension/retirement 
planning arrangements. The purpose of this is to probe and characterise public understandings 
and sense-making, through a combination of think aloud, freely-associative interview techniques 
combined with more structured approaches. 
The core elements of the approach can be summarised as follows (also see Figure 3.2):
• Step 1 – Use established qualitative methods of enquiry ‘...	to	elicit	people’s	beliefs	[in a way]	…	that	
neither	puts	new	concepts	in	their	minds	nor	leaves	existing	ones	unstated.’ (Bostrom, et	al., 1992). 
• Step 2 – Perform a thematic analysis of the transcript evidence. 
• Step 3 – Generate a lay model of the issue, using influence diagrams and decision-trees that 
graphically map the salient variables (knowledge and beliefs) and relationships between them. 
• Step 4 – Generate an expert model of the issue – derived from a review of published material, 
supplemented by interviews with experts – and create an influence diagram that graphically maps 
the salient variables and relationships between them.
• Step 5 – Compare and contrast expert and lay models to determine points of congruence and 
deviation.
• Step 6 – Use insight from Step 5 to inform decisions over the content and emphasis of 
communication material. The content should reinforce correct understandings, fill knowledge 
gaps and address misunderstandings/areas of ambiguity.
There is also scope to finesse these basic elements through gathering quantitative data, via social 
survey evidence, between Steps 3 and 4, to test the strength of identified associations within a 
representative sample. The product (communication material), should be trialled/piloted to test its 
effectiveness in meeting audience needs. 
Communication interventions
Source: Weyman and Williamson (2007).
Corporate body
language
Trust
Credibility
Track 
record
Channel
Conduit
Message
content
Mental
models
Comprehension
Design and layout
Macro
Micro
Process
Media profile and
infotainment potential Outrage
Employer
practices
Financial
crisis
Employment
rate
20
A typical finding from applications of the technique is that ‘Many	of	the	concepts	in	the	expert	
model28	[are]	...	simply	absent	from	the	lay	model	...	Bridging	the	gap	between	lay	mental	models	and	
expert	models	requires,	strengthening	correct	beliefs	and	de-emphasising	peripheral	ones’ (Fischhoff 
et	al., 1997). 
Figure 3.2 Summary of the mental models approach 
The technique has been quite widely applied in policy-making and delivery contexts, including public 
health; occupational health and food safety, most extensively in the USA.
In essence, it follows the established education deficit29 communication tradition. But, it offers more 
than this, in generating a more detailed and systematic insight into public understandings, as well 
as the facility to summarise and test policy-maker assumptions about the content and distribution 
of communication material, i.e. it serves as a litmus test of communicators’ mental models of public 
mental models and drivers of behaviour. 
Our evidence review suggests that the mental models of different sub-populations will vary in terms 
of their completeness and sophistication in respect of EWL and pensions issues. Therefore, careful 
thought needs to be given to the sample frame when deriving the lay model(s). Our review evidence 
highlights the salience of: social status; size of employing organisation; employment sector; age and 
gender (see Figures 2.1, 2.2, 3.1 and 3.2). 
28 Experts within the EWL and pensions investment context would foreseeably include senior 
policy-makers, economists and finance professionals.
29 Education deficit model of communication – assumes that exhibited behaviour is the product 
of incomplete knowledge and that behaviour change rests with education and awareness-
raising. Critics point to the potentially partial and bounded nature of this perspective, in so far 
as people are prone to exhibit ‘undesirable’ behaviour in the presence of complete knowledge 
where the change is countered by significant counter-motivations, e.g. structural or cultural 
barriers to change.
Derived from Morgan et al. (2002).
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When exploring public mental models it will be necessary to address elements that go beyond technical 
aspects, such as understandings of pension deferral options, or the availability of part-time work, to 
include aspects that relate to the broader context, e.g. trust in stakeholders: g/Government, pension 
providers, employers and financial advisers, etc.; outrage (sense of loss and being ‘short-changed’); 
blame and accountability (see Section B.8 and Weyman and Williamson, 2007).
Early accounts of the technique (e.g. Bostrom et	al., 1992) can give the impression that it is 
necessarily involved and complex. In part, this is likely to reflect the academic emphasis of the 
foundation studies. We believe that much can be gained from a more pragmatic, streamlined 
approach, e.g. through the use of focus groups rather than individual interviews to develop public 
models (see Weyman and Kelly, 1999; Weyman and Williamson, 2007). 
The main strengths of the mental models approach are that it offers:
• a method for linking communication content to the prior understandings of target groups. The 
advantages of linking new knowledge to old are an established principle in the education and 
training sphere;
• a litmus test of policy-makers’ beliefs and assumptions regarding the information needs of target 
groups;
• alignment with the principle of a segmented approach to intervention;
• an economical way to characterise the public’s knowledge of technical elements of EWL/pension 
issues and broader orientations (cognitive filters), e.g. outrage, trust;
• influence diagrams, decision trees and other simple graphical representations of findings in a 
format that is accessible to policy-makers and other non-technical audiences;
• the potential to quantitatively benchmark salient variables; monitor change over time (important 
from the perspectives of tracking public orientations and monitoring progress towards meeting 
policy delivery targets);
• strong potential for application to communication practice beyond the EWL/pensions domain, 
extending to other DWP/government department/agency communication agendas.
3.3.2 Mental models of retirement, pensions and EWL – what do we know?
The mental models approach, as detailed by authors such as Morgan et	al. (2002) advocates 
characterising public understandings by conducting qualitative interviews with the public. The 
findings reported on here are not derived from dedicated empirical work aimed at achieving this, 
rather they are based on secondary summary accounts, i.e. details provided in reports on DWP 
commissioned research that had a broader remit in terms of characterising public attitudes and 
understandings of EWL and pensions issues. While we believe that dedicated mental models 
research of the type advanced by Morgan et	al.	is needed, we have been able to derive an array of 
relevant insights from our evidence review (see Figures 3.3 to 3.7).
The characterisation of public mental models is considered in terms of: cognitive orientation, 
emotional orientation, behavioural orientation (intentions), beliefs regarding stakeholder interests 
and structural factors. These represent a range of intrinsic and extrinsic influences that inhibit or 
facilitate decisions over EWL and pensions investment.
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Cognitive orientation – embodies knowledge, awareness and beliefs. Beyond simple knowledge 
deficits, a key consideration is the high level of unknowable aspects associated with pertinent 
variables, e.g. the uncertainty that surrounds pension investment returns, post-SPA employment 
options, future health status/longevity and other personal constraints on capacity for employment 
in later life, such as care of dependants.
Affective orientation – feelings towards retirement, pensions and work. Dominant aspects of 
emotional orientation surround issues of trust (more saliently lack of trust) in certain stakeholders 
associated with the EWL agenda, combined with the sense of loss and injustice associated with rises 
in SPA as well as employer and personal pension shortfalls.
Figure 3.3 Key influences on decisions in relation to retirement,  
 pensions and EWL
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Behavioural orientation (intention) – in some degree, influenced by both cognitive and affective 
orientations. Inertia appears to be the predominant feature of behavioural orientation, 
characterisable as a reluctance to actively seek information, make decisions or take action. 
This retreat from engagement appears to be exacerbated by the high levels of complexity and 
uncertainty surrounding options. Despite almost universal recognition of the need for/benefits of 
saving for retirement, and arising positive intentions, if unsupported, it is apparent that many do not 
behave in line with their intentions. 
Orientations towards stakeholders – public awareness, knowledge, experience and, in particular, 
trust in the motives and competence of G/government; employers; and financial services are 
salient in so far as associated beliefs impact on motivation to interact with each or act on their 
advice. Understanding these social profiles is important in terms of their utility in playing a role 
in influencing behaviour, e.g. as sources of information and advice, or in configuring the decision 
architecture.
Structural factors – choices over EWL and pensions need to be considered in the context of an array 
of structural and contextual moderating/mediating influences, e.g. employment opportunities, 
training opportunities; saving/investment options and crucially, the understandings and beliefs 
(accurate or otherwise) that surround these. 
Figure 3.3 provides a global representation of the key influences on decisions in relation to 
retirement, pensions and work. The relationship between the different variables is characterised as 
stakeholders and structural factors impacting (positively or negatively) on cognitive, affective and 
behavioural orientations.
Figure 3.4 aims to typify cognitive, affective and behavioural elements, extending to orientations 
towards stakeholders. Where possible any apparent occupational/social status differences are 
highlighted. However, these should be regarded as a broad brush characterisation given that, 
as elsewhere, they are bounded by the limitations of the underpinning evidence base. The 
following section attempts to distil this into three separate mental models characterising public 
representations and orientation towards the three key issues: retirement, State and personal 
pensions and EWL.
Mental	models	of	retirement	
Figure 8 gives a characterisation of universal/shared understandings as well as differences by 
our three tier social grade characterisation, i.e. professionals/senior managers, middle ranking 
occupations and the low-skilled (see Section 2.0). 
Given that retirement (at SPA) is a much more familiar and culturally normed phenomena than 
working post-SPA, thought needs to be given to how these norms might be changed. Key influences 
appear to be societal, employment sector, peers, family and employers. 
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Figure 3.4 Mental models of variables relevant to EWL30 
In particular, it is necessary to keep in mind that options should be considered in the context that 
any success in shifting individual orientations is likely to be significantly blunted if employer practices 
do not provide a fertile environment for EWL. 
The concept of phased retirement is unfamiliar to most people; hence, the idea of choice in this 
context is essentially foreign, particularly amongst the low-skilled. Choice over date of retirement 
is not evenly distributed across the social groups and becomes increasingly subject to external 
influences (rather than individual disposition/volition) as we move down the social hierarchy. 
Despite the fact that there seems to be widespread recognition amongst the public of the logic of 
need to extend working life due to increased longevity, this does little to erode individuals viewing 
the need to work longer as unjust, and representing a loss of entitlement (Vickerstaff, 2008; Hedges 
et	al.,	2009; Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), 2007), This orientation is unlikely to 
become significantly eroded in the near future, but may change if EWL becomes normed in the 
coming decades. The attractiveness of increased leisure time and choice over how one spends one’s 
time dominates conceptions of post-SPA living. However, opportunities to supplement/support these 
lifestyle choices through, typically, part-time work seem to be attractive to significant numbers and 
this may offer a useful focus. Evidence of widespread ambitions to retire pre-SPA and the high value 
placed on this would also seem to suggest that there may be gains from increasing the availability 
of part-time and other flexible working options for the over 50s. However, the attractiveness of this 
foreseeably depends not just on the amount of part-time employment available but also its quality 
30 Group 1 – Senior managers/professionals; Group 2 – Middle ranking occupations and 
Group 3 – Low-skilled.
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and financial returns. The supply of work by type is not a variable over which individuals have much 
influence.
The positive framing of early retirement is underpinned by worries and concerns over financing this. 
There may be benefit from casting (part-time) EWL as a means of supporting a positive retirement 
lifestyle, with a greater emphasis on lifestyle and work-life balance than work and income per se.
Mental	models	of	pensions
Figure 3.6 offers a model of public understanding of pensions and saving for retirement. As 
elsewhere, it aims to characterise both universal/shared understanding and segmentation 
differences by our three tier social grade characterisation. 
There is an almost universal perspective that the State Pension affords a subsistence income and 
acceptance of the need for personal financial provision to supplement this if hardship is to be 
avoided. There is also a widely held view that there should be State involvement in encouraging 
saving for retirement as well as State regulation of the employer and personal pensions sector. 
However, there is less agreement over the legitimacy of g/Government involvement in providing 
investment advice. 
As noted elsewhere, people see value in the idea of investing in a pension, but there is notable 
scepticism over current options and practices (State, employer and personal). In short, people feel 
vulnerable and ill-equipped to make good choices and worry about being ‘short-changed’. Trust in 
the State and pension providers is seriously eroded.
People value certainty highly, i.e. knowing how much income (particularly money) they will 
receive, when and from whom. What some have characterised as ‘myopia’ does not relate to 
misunderstanding of the need for income above and beyond the State Pension, but reflects the fact 
that large numbers of people tend to be focused on financing their current, rather than their future, 
existence, partly for cultural reasons, partly out of necessity. It is also the case that many people do 
not consider their retirement income during the early decades of their working life, such that this 
delay means that the investments they do make are likely to yield modest returns. 
Of the range of pension providers, people tend to have most (possibly more accurately, least eroded) 
confidence in employer pension schemes. In this respect the review evidence indicates that public 
sector employees tend to have higher confidence than their private sector counterparts. However, 
it is possible that this difference may have become eroded in view of contemporary debates over 
public sector pension reforms.
Most people, irrespective of education level, have a poor understanding of pension options; neither 
do they possess the ability to make accurate calculations of pension values and their retirement 
income. Moreover, important elements are unknowable, i.e. pension performance/future values and 
future income needs. The complexity of the area is such that it is unlikely that plugging knowledge 
gaps through intervention to enhance financial literacy will be effective. Recently announced 
changes to SPA seem likely to have contributed to the sense of uncertainty over retirement income 
and may feed latent inertia and disengagement.
Understanding of tax and benefit systems are almost universally modest and underpinned by 
the fluidity of arrangements. The latter raises questions regarding the impact of manipulations of 
the tax armaments as a significant motivator for pension investment behaviour. If applied, such 
incentives need to be intuitive and simple so that people easily understand what is being offered 
with obvious gains from selecting one option over another. The (heuristic) inference that income 
gains arising from EWL will be seriously eroded by taxation/loss of benefits, in particular pension 
(State and non-State) income, is widely encountered (see Hedges et	al., 2009). A linked perception 
is that any pension income lost through EWL can never be recouped. A similar conception underpins 
(typically sketchy) understandings of pension deferral, i.e. angst over failing to receive what you 
have earned/is rightly yours.
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Figure 3.5 Mental models of retirement31 
Mental	models	of	extending	working	life
Figure 3.7 characterises public understandings of EWL. As noted elsewhere, a very modest 
proportion of individuals are likely to actively seek out information on EWL, partly due to 
fundamental disaffection but also simply because culturally the concept of post-SPA working 
remains an exception rather than a feature of the natural life course.
Widespread resentment of rises in SPA and associated mistrust in g/Government policy towards 
older workers tends to fuel cynicism, which is likely to add to public resistance to policy intervention, 
particularly where it is transparent that the source of information is Government, its departments 
or agencies. Importantly, it is possible that information from these sources may alienate those who 
would otherwise be positively disposed to EWL (Vickerstaff, 2008; Hedges et	al., 2009).
Motivation to EWL embodies both ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors and the relative impact of these vary by 
social group. For example:
• individuals with more skill tend to have greater choice but generally less financial need;
• intrinsic satisfaction and social benefits from work appear to be relatively stronger drivers than 
financial incentives. Thus, stressing the financial benefits appears likely to have a modest impact 
on the orientations of individuals who experience little intrinsic and/or social gain;
• features of the design of work can render it unattractive to many, e.g. shiftwork/anti-social 
hours; high job-demands/stress; long hours culture; inflexibility and poor work-life balance. The 
unpopularity of such features is likely present amongst workers of all ages, but seemingly come 
into sharp focus in the context of incentivising EWL. Resolution, via fundamental changes in the 
design of work, largely lies beyond the public policy domain. 
31 Group 1 – Senior managers/professionals; Group 2 – Middle ranking occupations and 
Group 3 – Low-skilled.
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Gathering national survey evidence of ‘unattractive’ features of jobs and their prevalence by 
employment sector has the potential to inform policy thinking over which groups of employees are 
likely to be disposed to EWL within their current occupation/more disposed to seeking alternative 
employment. Additionally, an examination of the employee age cohort distribution across 
employment sectors would provide an indication of any natural age-related migration. 
Figure 3.6 Mental models of pensions32
32 Group 1 – Senior managers/professionals; Group 2 – Middle ranking occupations and
Group 3 – Low-skilled.
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Figure 3.7 Mental models of extending working life (EWL)33
A core belief is that there are few opportunities for intrinsically attractive work or work that is 
configured in attractive forms (e.g. flexible or part-time) with one’s current employer (the preferred 
EWL option for most) or an alternative employer. Significant interest in flexible post-SPA work is 
tempered by the widespread belief that opportunities are few and limited to a narrow band of 
employees, occupations and sectors. It is also apparent that once people over SPA have ceased 
working they believe their prospects for re-entering the labour market to be low. This they, primarily, 
attribute34 to employer resistance.
In short, people have limited knowledge of potential options for EWL and little direct experience 
of EWL behaviour amongst those they work with. Additionally, employers do not appear to be 
proactive in tabling EWL options to their employees. Both features tend to limit employees’ 
considerations of EWL and reinforce the perspective that options for attractive work are few. 
With regard to training and skills acquisition, the evidence is mixed, ranging from resistance 
amongst some to widespread reports of a lack of opportunities. What does seem apparent is the 
widespread belief that employers are reluctant to invest in older employees. The extent to which 
this belief is an accurate reflection of employer practice is unclear, but, the belief itself (and its 
behavioural implications) is of relevance from the perspective of policy intervention. However, we 
would caution against the use of upbeat examples of opportunities if there are grounds for believing 
that such messages represent a significant dislocation with real world opportunities. 
There is strong evidence of widespread underemployment and over-skilling amongst older workers, 
i.e. working in jobs which are not fully using their skills. This may undermine the perceived value 
of training/skills acquisition amongst older employees (Atkinson, 2003) and, more fundamentally, 
would suggest that high levels of policy investment in enhancing training opportunities is likely to 
produce modest returns.
33 Group 1 – Senior managers/professionals; Group 2 – Middle ranking occupations and
Group 3 – Low-skilled.
34 See Appendix B for a discussion of the scope for bias in causal attribution.
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3.3.3 Mental models approach – conclusions
Our attempt at characterising the public’s mental models of EWL and pensions reveals a range of 
knowledge gaps and misunderstandings, as well as beliefs about opportunities and the motivations 
of stakeholders (for a more detailed account see Section B.7). 
There is scope for using these insights to inform the content of communication material and for 
gathering further empirical evidence on mental models. However, it is important to keep in mind the 
more fundamental finding that most people do not actively and purposefully seek out information in 
relation to retirement, (employer and personal) pensions or EWL. 
The relative strengths of the mental models approach, over and above traditional communication 
practice, can be summarised as:
• enhanced quality and salience of key messages through tailoring them to what individuals 
already know/believe;
• testing communicator assumptions about what the public need (and want) to know;
• charactering orientations to sensitive topics or features of issues and policies likely to cause 
outrage and disaffection;
• providing insight into who/which sources the public(s) seek information from and in particular who 
they trust to provide them with information. 
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4 Framing effects
The identification of an array of context-related biases, termed ‘decision	framing	effects’	(Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1981) constitutes one of the most significant and enduring contributions from the 
foundation work on heuristics and biases (see Section B.5). 
From the earliest work on decision-making35, it was apparent that:
• people are prone to make non-rational choices (choices that do not maximise their gain); 
• people fail to make rational choices in predictable ways; and 
• the way in which choices are presented can impact upon options selected. 
4.1 Message framing in communication
Work on cognitive framing built on these insights, by focusing on how people reacted to systematic 
variations in the way that choices between alternative outcomes are presented. Specifically, it was 
found that when people were presented with choices that gave outcomes of equal value, framing 
the outcome as a ‘gain’ or a ‘loss’ had an impact on the option people preferred. Cognitive framing 
refers to the process of characterising an issue or entity (generally in communication material) in a 
manner which makes it more likely that they will select one option over another.
Of the array of framing effects identified36 the most widely evidenced relate to ‘domain effects’, i.e. 
framing an option as a ‘gain’ or a ‘loss’. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) make much of framing effects, 
construing them as an example of ways to nudge people to select one option over another (see to 
Section 5.2). For many, but not for all issues, people tend to select options that minimise losses.
In their classic experiment, Tversky and Kahneman, offered their participants two choices (of 
equivalent objective value) over finding a cure for a life threatening disease. The only difference 
between the options related to the manner in which risk was portrayed in each. Their findings 
revealed that respondents tended to choose the option that emphasised the ‘number of lives 
saved’ (positive frame), compared with the alternative, ‘number of lives lost’ (negative frame).
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981)
While it is probably true to say that, under a wide array of circumstances, people are loss averse, 
effects are more subtle and complex than this. For example, people tend to prefer a modest sure 
thing/sure win if it is available, as opposed to a long-odds probability of a larger win, i.e. they seek 
certainty – such as a modest guaranteed pension. However, people are equally disposed to risky, 
long-odds options (a chance of success) when faced with a certain loss, e.g. placing your last £5 on 
a 100:1 outsider in the Grand National. 
The attractiveness of domain effects to risk communicators relates to the finding that playing on 
such decision-making bias offers scope to nudge people to make better choices (see Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008). 
35 Framing effects can be a engineered feature of decision contexts beyond the written word, i.e. 
structural and cultural influences can operate as decision frames.
36 See, for example, Kahneman and Miller, 1986; Linville et	al., 1987; Fagley and Miller, 1990; 
Lindberg and Frost, 1992.
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4.2 Contextual framing effects
While the effects of information framing have been widely demonstrated under experimental 
conditions, rather less is known about the variables that might engender (or prevent) framing 
effect’s other than use of the written word to frame an issue. 
Real life decision-making embodies elements of natural and man-made framing effects. An 
example of a natural effect is the individual’s position in the life course, i.e. as people grow older 
they become more sensitised to how many healthy years of life they have remaining, and may 
become increasingly reluctant to spend them at work. Man-made effects include gains and losses 
associated with tax and benefits systems.
4.3 Framing effects conclusions
Domain framing effects are widely applied within the public health communication material. They 
are, for example, encountered in contemporary smoking cessation campaigns, where the emphasis 
has shifted beyond focusing on negative health effects, to stressing intuitive gains, such as ‘having	
more	healthy	years	to	spend	with	your	grandchildren’. Similarly, but perhaps less positively, in 
commercial advertising and labelling of foodstuffs we can observe the tendency for producers to 
frame products as ‘X%	fat	free’; rather than containing ‘Y%	fat’, etc. 
However, a caveat to the use of message framing is that if it is too transparent there is a risk that 
it may ‘...	lead	to	suspicions	of	manipulation.’ (Fischhoff, 1995). Care also needs to be taken over 
the framing of negative consequences, e.g. framing certain social groups as vulnerable could 
have the undesirable effect of increasing their social marginalisation, while at the same time 
reducing the degree to which members of the wider population identify with them and/or feel 
vulnerable themselves. This may inhibit (desirable) preventative/precautionary action on their part, 
e.g. investment in pensions. It could also sponsor resentment and pose a challenge to the social 
contract that underpins features such as redistributive tax and benefit arrangements.
There are a number of limitations to the framing concept, particularly where its application is 
restricted to use in communication material:
• It implicitly assumes that outcome alternatives are known, or knowable. This is often not the case 
in real world decision-making, many options will be likely to embody some degree of uncertainty. 
This is largely true of pension choices.
• Some decisions do not lend themselves to a positive frame, as choices may be between two 
unattractive options, e.g. working beyond State Pension age (SPA) versus living on a subsistence 
income. In such instances, gains are perhaps, at best, construed as a minimisation of losses (see 
Whyte, 1989).
A significant proportion of the evidence on message framing effects is now widely regarded as 
overstating the impact on behaviour, due to the fact that findings were based on behaviour 
intention, rather than actual behaviour and the evidence suggests that intention is a rather weak 
indicator of behaviour change (see Sections B.1.11 and B.5.2.3) .
The most defensible conclusion is that message framing can be a positive feature of communication 
material, but is unlikely to yield high returns. At a fundamental level it is only relevant to those 
population segments that are sufficiently engaged with extending working life (EWL) and pensions 
issues to consume communication material. 
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Table 4.1 Examples of EWL and pensions loss and gain frames
Issue Frame
Engagement with financial advisers over  
post-SPA planning
Loss – re: focus on minimising tax liabilities.
Pension deferral Loss
Early post SPA death Loss – re: loss of pension; loss of leisure1
Age-related debilitating ill-health Loss – re: loss of quality of life/leisure1
Belief in loss of pension income due to tax Loss
Early retirement Gain – re: greater autonomy/leisure
Rise in SPA Loss – re: just reward for work; erosion of social equity
Employer lump-sum payments (offsetting 
reduced pension values)
Gain
Early retirement/voluntary redundancy Gain
Flexible working pre-SPA Gain
Voluntary pensions contributions Loss
1 For most – not offset by financial gain from earned income/tax benefits.
Although under articulated by authors such as Thaler and Sunstein, nudging behaviour in public 
policy contexts is not just about configuring new choice architectures (set of available options and 
their actual/perceived consequences), it requires consideration of established nudges and their 
consequences on behaviour. The world of work and investment might reasonably be construed as 
being full of nudges. Some relate to the configuration of structures and features, such as elements of 
the tax system or employer retirement policies, others to people’s beliefs surrounding this (which may 
well be incomplete or contain inaccuracies – but which, nonetheless, impact on behaviour) extending 
to social norms (e.g. referenced to the place of work, locale, social group and operating at a societal 
level). This area is under-researched (see Fagley and Miller, 1990) and would benefit from further 
empirical exploration, generally as well as within the context of EWL and pension-related behaviour. 
However, a range of relevant insights can be derived from our review (see Table 4.1). 
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5 Motivating public 
engagement
Beyond communication interventions aimed at ‘plugging knowledge gaps’ there are a number of 
insights and techniques that lay claim to having a positive impact in motivational terms. As outlined 
in the recent Cabinet Office and Government social research guidance publications Mindspace (Dolan 
et	al.,	2010) and Behaviour Change Models (Darnton, 2008); theoretically informed approaches to 
intervention tend to draw upon an array of socio-cognitive psychology models of behaviour change 
and economics insights on rational decision-making following the publication of the influential 
text ‘nudge’ (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). This section will summarise and offer comment on the 
applicability of these perspectives within the extending working life (EWL), retirement planning and 
pensions domains.
5.1 (Health) psychology models of behaviour change
The discipline of psychology offers an array of theoretically informed models of behaviour change. 
These have been widely applied in public policy contexts, in particular within the context of lifestyle-
health agendas, e.g. with the purpose of motivating safe sex, healthy diets and smoking cessation 
behaviour (see Section B.1.11).
In varying degrees, these cognitive and socio-cognitive (‘Value expectancy’) models (notably the 
Theory	of	reasoned	action, Fishbein and Aijzen, 1976; the Theory	of	planned	behaviour, Ajzen, 1985; 
and the Health	belief	model, Becker, 1974) reflect elaborations of economics rational choice models, 
in so far as they assume that behaviour is a product of individuals weighing up the relative costs 
and benefits (in at least quasi-rational terms) of the consequences of alternative courses of action, 
behaviour change hinging upon individuals coming to the conclusion that benefits exceed the cost 
of change. 
A complementary perspective is to view the process of behaviour change as a continuum. This 
is routinely characterised as a series of cognitive stages that individuals pass through from initial 
contemplation of an issue, e.g. considering investing in a pension, via attitude reorientation, to 
sustained behaviour change. The Transtheoretical	model	(Prochaska and Di Clemente, 1986) and 
the Health	action	process	approach (Schwarzer, 2008) are the most widely encountered stages of 
change models. 
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In essence, all of these models share a theory of change rooted in the premise that increasing 
people’s awareness of risk and making them feel vulnerable to the negative consequences 
of undesirable outcomes, while increasing their focus on the gains from change will lead to a 
reorientation that motivates attitude change, this, by inference, translating into a positive change 
in behaviour. Established social and cultural norms (observation and imitation of the behaviour of 
others) are typically characterised as a barrier to change; but can also ‘permission’ change. The 
change in public orientations to smoking offers a good example here, the last two decades having 
witnessed a marked reduction in levels of social approval of smoking, to the extent that the norm in 
many (but not all) social contexts is not to smoke. EWL is currently not culturally normed in this way, 
remaining an exception, but may become more so over coming decades.
Communication interventions that draw upon these models typically aim to emphasise aspects 
relating to personal vulnerability, linked with attempts to boost self-efficacy (people’s belief in their 
ability to change their behaviour). Stages of change approaches tend towards ‘counselling’ type 
support aimed at individuals, rather than the media-based communication approaches that more 
typically draw upon value expectancy models.
Primary criticisms of the health behaviour change models are based on claims that they:
• overplay rationality and autonomy (choice);
• overplay the degree to which attitude change translates to behaviour change;
• are too focused on individual orientations, underplaying structural barriers to change; and 
similarly
• underplay social and cultural (particularly normative) counter-influences. 
The impact of interventions based on these models appears to be greater where the approach 
extends beyond passive communication activity (advertising literature, web pages, etc.) to active 
interventions, e.g. community-based initiatives, group therapy, and counselling type activity (Jepson 
et	al., 2006). However, evidence of impact is stronger for enhancing public knowledge/awareness 
than it is for sustained behaviour change. As the authors of a recent National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) funded review succinctly conclude, ‘There	[is]	a	lack	of	evidence	to	support	
conclusions	regarding	the	efficacy	of	[health psychology]	models	or	theories	related	to	changing	
knowledge,	attitudes	or	behaviour.’	(Jepson et	al., 2006). The overarching finding is that behaviour 
impact rates tend to be modest or low, tending to be further eroded with the passage of time.
NICE has produced guidelines for policy-makers on how interventions based on psychology 
behaviour change models should be developed, implemented and evaluated, but eschews the 
adoption of a particular theoretical model or standpoint in favour of a pragmatic approach drawing 
on key concepts from different perspectives. 
The use of cognitive and socio-cognitive psychology behaviour change models within the EWL and 
pension domains must be considered within the context that: 
• almost all people recognise the need/advantages to save for retirement/having a higher income 
in old age. Levels of angst over retirement income are already high. Thus, a health model theory 
of change, predicated on the basis of amplifying perceptions of personal vulnerability and the 
(financial) gains from EWL and pension investment may be of limited value. Both are already 
widely recognised, but commonly do not appear to translate into self-protective behaviour;
• positive individual orientations to EWL and/or pensions may be held in check by broader beliefs, 
e.g. low trust in Government, the finance sector and the actions of employers;
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• most people abstain/retreat from active decision-making over pension investment, and appear 
to be more disposed to reacting to opportunities to EWL, rather than actively seeking them out. 
People tend to exhibit low self-efficacy in these areas;
• if people are to progress through a series of stages that culminate in sustained behaviour 
change they are more likely to travel this route if they are actively supported or nudged by 
being presented with options, rather than being passively equipped with the tools (generally 
information) to make their own choices; 
• to achieve maximal impact from cognitive behaviour change models it is important to provide a 
fertile context, through related measures that address cultural and structural barriers to behaviour 
change, e.g. tax and benefits implications; employer policies and practices. 
Stages of change models are principally advanced as a pathway for the individual, but it is also 
possible to use the concept to characterise proportions (segments) of the working age population. 
Our three-tier social grade characterisation could be interpreted in this way. There might also be 
scope for characterising other segments in this way, e.g. profiling differences between different 
employment sectors. 
Similarly, employers might usefully be encouraged to ‘triage’ their employees’ disposition to EWL, 
characterising individuals as ‘high resistance’, ‘pre-intenders’, ‘intenders’, or similar, which perhaps if 
undertaken a couple of years37 before State Pension age (SPA), might form the basis for configuring 
bespoke support/change packages fitted to each individual’s classification. By extension, such 
activity could be configured to take advantage of evidence that people are more disposed to adopt 
positive pension investment behaviour at key life-transitions, e.g. point of recruitment, marriage, 
birth of a child, etc. 
In conclusion, the scope for applying psychology (health) behaviour change models within the EWL 
and pension domains, is perhaps best construed as constituting a component of the array of tools 
and techniques that might enhance a broad-based intervention strategy, i.e. it would be a high 
risk strategy to restrict intervention to activity based on these models alone, given their chequered 
reputation and the high probability of modest rates of change (see Jepson et	al.,2006).
5.2 Nudges – decision architecture 
Individuals can be inconsistent, and are prone to making decisions they regret in later life, e.g. in 
behavioural experiments and in everyday life it has been possible to demonstrate that individuals 
are sensitive to loss. Behavioural economists highlight the importance of contextual effects and that 
‘behavioural anomalies’	(heuristics and biases) are systematic (see Section B.1.12). With this in mind, 
it has been suggested there is scope for designing public and employer policy that will go at least 
some way towards correcting the ‘mistakes’ (non-rational choices) that people make. 
5.2.1 Nudging better choices
Building upon earlier insights (see, in particular, Kahneman and Tversky, 1974; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981), Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2008) advocate ‘libertarian	paternalism’. Their 
rationale for policy delivery claims to be paternalistic (to stop individuals making poor decisions that 
negatively impact on their future well-being), but also lays claim to being libertarian, in so far as 
choice is retained, i.e. individuals are not forced to comply, they are nudged	(helped) to make the 
better choices. The core premise is that policy-makers know what is good for people and should act 
as choice architects, in order to overcome undesirable effects attributable to behavioural anomalies. 
37 Establishing the optimal timing of this would benefit from empirical investigation.
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Critically, the nudge perspective represents a divergence from the education deficit and psychology 
(health) behaviour change perspectives, in so far as the focus is not on the individual per se, but 
on finding ways to engineer the context in which individuals operate. It is not a rejection of, or 
necessarily incompatible with, these more established perspectives, rather it is supplemental, but 
one that lays claim to addressing more fundamental influences on decision-making. Thaler and 
Sunstein argue that, as framing38 is inevitable, it is better to frame individuals’ choices to enhance 
their welfare. And, by extension, that there is a policy need to redress established nudges that 
engender perverse motivations. 
Based upon the amassed evidence, the following conclusions can be drawn with respect to the 
scope for policy nudges in the EWL and pension domains:
• Interventions should make the most of the benefits of automatic enrolment pension 
arrangements (beyond the forthcoming 2012 State automatic-enrolment scheme). Configuring 
pension investment (State and employer) options as default enrolled-in counteracts weak 
motivations39 to invest in the future. There are also potential benefits from framing saving for 
retirement as a ‘rite of passage’. The sense of loss (of income) is also likely to be reduced where 
this is deducted at source.
• Policy should treat individuals as ‘young’ for as long as possible. For example, State and employer 
sponsored education and training provision is widely perceived to be skewed towards the young. 
This reflects the nature of the work-life-course, but is also a source of social exclusion and is likely 
to contribute to older employees’ perceptions of winding-down. Interventions with education 
providers and employers should focus on reducing this disparity. 
• Policy should be designed to change individuals’ perception that choice is ‘indivisible’ and 
‘irreversible’, in particular that retirement represents a cliff edge. The more irreversible a decision 
is framed, the greater the likelihood that individuals will fear they will incur a loss if they do not 
take the opportunity to retire. Interventions that seek to embed amongst employers’ policies 
that permission (norm) post-SPA working with choices over working hours and date of retirement 
should help to erode the loss frame. 
• There may be benefits from finding ways to induce employers to seek commitment from their 
employees to EWL when they are in their middle age, rather than close to the point of eligibility 
for State Pension, where any sense of loss of leisure time/entitlement might assume a stronger 
focus40. 
• Financial incentives are likely to be more effective if portrayed as loss, i.e. people will incur a 
financial penalty if they retire, rather than as an income gain, from continuing to work. Similarly, 
the additional pension payments to an individual who works longer, e.g. from age 65 to age 68, 
can be framed as the loss they would incur if they were to retire earlier. Individuals tend to be 
more responsive if they feel they are avoiding a financial loss. 
• Financial inducements tend to be more effective if offered as a lump sum payment. Evidence from 
the USA indicates that individuals are more willing to postpone retirement if the inducement to 
work includes a lump sum payment, particularly if realisable in the relatively near future, e. g. for 
working until SPA+2 years.
38 Framing here encompasses: message framing and decision environment.
39 Most individuals do not ‘rationally’ optimise with reference to a life cycle model. Younger 
people, in particular, tend to focus on loss in the here and now, rather than the distant future, 
which results in underinvestment.
40  Establishing the optimal timing of this would benefit from empirical investigation.
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• People are more likely to be induced to retire early where a lump sum is offered by their employer 
as an incentive to withdraw, despite the fact that the long-run value of lost wages and pension 
contributions will almost certainly outweigh this. People also tend to be induced to select pensions 
options offered by employers that trade a larger lump sum in the near future for reduced income 
(pension value) in the more distant future. Nudges of this type potentially engender perverse 
motivations and negative consequences for individuals and the State.
• State and employer policy can also be designed to make use of inertia. This almost certainly lies at 
the heart of the success of default enrolled-in pensions. Similarly, individuals tend to procrastinate 
because they are afraid of making losses. Policy can be designed to offset inertia by stipulating 
‘transaction deadlines’. If financial incentives are offered to encourage individuals to work longer, 
‘transaction dates’ can be set to encourage individuals to make decisions, e.g. to qualify for 
financial inducements to EWL individuals must agree to the scheme by a specified date (or by a 
specified age).
• Policy that focuses on inertia can also offset inconsistency (and lack of self-control), e.g. 
employment contracts can be written to induce individuals to agree contractually to increase 
pension investment proportionately as their wages increase. While, desirably, retaining an opt-out 
option, due to inertia, it is likely that for the majority savings will increase. 
• Money is not fungible41. Many people manage their spending and savings by using different 
mental accounts, that is, they imagine different ‘pots of money’ (mental accounting), e.g. money 
set aside for utility bills, money set aside for leisure. Policy can be designed to take advantage of 
this. The evidence suggests that willingness to save differs when individuals focus on different 
mental accounts, e.g. if taxation policy were to create incentives to change the way individuals are 
paid this would be likely to impact on willingness to save. There is also evidence that individuals 
save more from lump sum payments, e.g. bonuses, than from an equivalent increase in their 
regular wage payments. There may be benefits from exploring how mental accounting traits 
might be used to increase saving for retirement, and perhaps most saliently different aspects of 
retirement. This issue would benefit from further exploration, there being no known published 
findings dedicated to retirement saving/income provision. 
• Individuals are influenced by the way they see others behave. Public policy and most saliently 
employers’ policy over EWL and pensions can be configured to transmit signals about the way 
others behave. The recently announced rises in SPA may have an impact in terms of gradually 
eroding established retirement (likely aligned with incremental rises in SPA). However, employer 
practices are foreseeably a more immediate and salient social reference.
• Individuals are disposed to fall back on heuristics (basic impressions and rules of thumb) partly as 
a retreat from complexity and partly due to low motivation to engage with detail. The evidence 
suggests that policy is likely to be more effective if initiatives focus on simplifying decisions, rather 
than on attempting to train individuals to deal with complex decisions. Thaler and Sunstein 
(2008:112) report on the limited impact of training (they conclude ‘…	teaching	is	hard!’). By 
comparison, simplifying choices can be more effective. The UK Government’s recent proposal 
(March 2011) for a move to a flat-rate State Pension and the removal of top-up payments for 
lower earners through the means-tested Pensions Credit could be seen positively in this respect. 
It is also possible to simplify decisions by ‘channelling choice’. ‘Too much’ choice can be counter-
productive. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) argue that individuals are more receptive if they are asked 
to choose between small numbers of pension options than a wider array. Channelling choice is 
also relevant when individuals choose to work longer. They are more likely to respond if they are 
able to choose from a small number of opportunities to stay with the same company than if they 
are asked to choose from all of the opportunities available in their local labour market. 
41 Interchangeable or moveable in the sense of substitution.
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For a detailed discussion of behavioural anomalies and their implications for EWL and pensions 
policy, see Appendix B. This section also deals with the difficulties that must be addressed if policy is 
to be designed to effectively ‘nudge’ people to change their behaviour. The above is premised on the 
proposition that it is possible to use evidence of behavioural anomalies to design policy to correct 
‘mistakes’, i.e. errors of judgement that people will foreseeably come to regret in later life.
5.2.2 Extensions of the nudge concept
While public policy-making constitutes their primary focus, Thaler and Sunstein also highlight the 
scope for others to play a role in constructing the choice architecture; notably employers. One of 
these authors’ favourite examples is the way that their university (their employer) cafeteria director 
nudges consumption choice through the way in which food is displayed to customers. However, 
these authors only offer a light touch regarding their consideration of the role of employers.
In the context of EWL and occupational pensions the scope for employers to craft the choice 
architecture can be seen as significantly greater than policy-makers can achieve in the wider public 
context. The reason for believing this is that employers have significant control over a broader 
set of salient parameters, including the potential to impact upon structural elements such as 
human resource systems, aspects of job design. In particular, they play the key role in defining the 
background climate which impacts on social and cultural norms in relation to EWL. 
The relatively greater strength (impact) of behaviour change interventions focused on aspects relating 
to organisational climate (in essence choice architecture) compared with a direct individual (employee) 
focus is a long established insight within the broader research evidence based on the employee well-
being and cultural change (see, for example, Hale and Glendon, 1987; Cox and Flin, 1998). 
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6 Designing interventions 
6.1 Direct and indirect approaches to behaviour change
As noted in Section 1.1, a key distinction that can be made is between interventions aimed directly 
at individuals and interventions that are aimed at impacting upon the context in which individuals 
operate: in essence, direct and indirect approaches (Figure 6.1). 
Direct approaches to intervention focus on individuals and represent an attempt to change their 
knowledge, attitudes and behaviour in relation to what is essentially a constant world. Examples 
include smoking cessation, greening behaviour and, historically, drink driving. This reflects the 
primary focus for the (health) psychology behaviour change models outlined in Section 5.1 (also see 
Section B.1.11). 
By contrast, indirect approaches seek to change behaviour through influencing structural 
background climate and cultural elements, i.e. a focus on the contextual drivers of behaviour, e.g. 
features of tax and benefit systems, or changes in employer practice. The ‘nudge’ perspective 
reflects this. In the case of employer practices their role in defining (and norming) the extending 
working life (EWL) climate in the workplace will tend to have an impact on employee culture, e.g. 
more opportunities for, and increased rates of take-up of, EWL in an organisation will foreseeably 
erode established ‘cliff edge’ retirement norms. 
Figure 6.1 Direct and indirect approaches to behaviour change 
Decisions over the relative emphasis on individual or situational variables are dependent upon the 
behaviour(s) to be influenced, and the scope for policy-makers to influence relevant variables. In 
the context of EWL and pension choices, including whether to enrol in an employers scheme or not, 
the review evidence indicated that most individuals are not options seeking and are not actively 
engaged in considering options, i.e. they are more disposed to react to options that are put before 
them. Employers potentially play a key role in offering these options. Therefore, interventions which 
aim to change employer practice, to nudge positive decisions on the part of employees should be 
seriously considered. 
Designing interventions
Direct Climate
Employer 
practices
Employment 
opportunities
Employment 
law
Tax and 
benefits
Individual
Knowledge
Attitudes
Habits
Beliefs
Culture
Workplace norms
Shared experience
Social norms
Natural order
Indirect
40
Indirect approaches to intervention, via the employer route, are considered to embody the potential 
for generating higher rates of impact on employee behaviour than approaches aimed directly at 
individuals. However, intervention via the employer is bounded, in so far as it is better suited to 
certain demographic groups, notably those in stable employment with a single employer. Certain 
sectors, e.g. construction, offshore oil and gas and to some degree, agriculture/horticulture, are 
characterised by notable fluidity and flux in terms of employment arrangements. In these and 
other sectors with comparable characteristics, a direct individual focus on workers to impact on 
knowledge and attitudes might represent the more viable option. 
Additionally, policy intervention options over selecting direct and indirect approaches is not a simple 
either/or choice, rather both can be applied in complementary manner. Furthermore, it should also 
be kept in mind that employers can also be used as a conduit for delivering direct interventions, e.g. 
transmitting (distributing) communication material aimed at motivating individuals to work longer 
and make better financial provision for retirement. 
6.2 Theory of change
The relative influence of the situation versus the individual as a determinant of behaviour has long 
been a topic of debate among social scientists. Viewing each as opposite ends of a continuum, 
situationalists construe behaviour as a function of context, whereas individualists hold that human 
behaviour is the product of personal volition. Most contemporary social scientists would conclude 
that neither position is tenable. ‘Asking	whether	behavioural	variance	is	due	to	either	situation	
or	persons.	..	is	analogous	to	asking	whether	blood	or	air	is	more	essential	to	life.’	(Endler, 1973). 
Arguably, a more sensible question is how do individuals and situations interact and impact on 
behaviour, referenced to the issue/phenomena under consideration? 
This distinction is important from the perspective of intervention to motivate EWL and pension 
enrolment/investment, in so far as it suggests that a focus on one to the exclusion of the other is 
likely to seriously undermine the impact of the behaviour change agenda. However, a caveat to this 
is that different target groups offer varying scope for intervention. 
For example, for those who are currently in employment, the employer can play a key role in 
configuring the choice architecture (situational influences). There are also grounds for viewing this as 
the preferred option given the strong evidence of normative and conformity influences transcending 
individual differences as drivers of cultural change (see Hale and Glendon, 1986; Cox and Flin, 1988). 
In less controlled contexts, e.g. where the focus is on influencing those who are not currently in 
work, a core emphasis on the individual via education-based publicity initiatives would probably 
be the default choice, given the modest scope for impacting on situational influences (beyond 
fundamental push-orientated adjustments to benefit entitlements).
The distinction between a focus on individuals or situations is of acute relevance when considering 
intervention options because the tools and techniques that can be applied are quite different, in 
important and fundamental ways. 
As noted in Section B.3, the scope for developing interventions that focus on individual and 
situational influences varies with respect to the characteristics of the target audience. 
Key distinctions that can be made are between individuals/groups who are:
• in regular employment with the same employer;
• in regular employment with plural or varying employers;
• in regular employment but seeking employment with a new employer;
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• out of work pre-State Pension age (SPA);
• out of work post-SPA.
Direct (individual focused) interventions are possible with all five groups. In broad terms these 
should follow a pathway aligned with the schematic model detailed in Figure 6.2.
Beyond universal nudge stratagems, e.g. pension automatic-enrolment defaults, or changes in tax 
arrangements, the scope for indirect, situation focused intervention is variable between the groups 
and greatest for those currently in stable employment with a single employer.
6.3 Direct interventions – individuals as the focus for change
Direct behaviour change interventions are aimed at individuals and are most commonly 
encountered in the public health domain. The traditional treatment model has been supplemented 
in recent years with an unprecedented focus on prevention, e.g. attempts to engender changes in 
health and lifestyle behaviour and take-up of health screening (see, for example, Black, 2008). Here 
there are transparent synergies with embedding positive EWL/pension investment behaviour, in 
so far as they share the objective of attempting to engender changes in behaviour that impact on 
future well-being. Public health derived, behaviour change models/techniques are discussed in detail 
in the review of evidence (see Appendix B). 
For most practical purposes the scope for individual focused interventions is limited to education 
(plugging knowledge gaps) and awareness-raising. Fundamentally, this embodies the assumption 
that current behaviour reflects (some degree of) ignorance, and that making people aware of the 
issue (and related behaviours) will be sufficient to motivate behaviour change. However, the balance 
of evidence is that low awareness and poor knowledge do not seem to be the primary influences on 
EWL and pensions investment behaviour.
Figure 6.2 Communication intervention pathway 
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Assuming that the configuration of message content is optimised through good practice in its 
development, e.g. taking account of insights from the mental models perspective (see Section 
3.3), message framing (see Section B.5) and broader insights on effective communication (see, for 
example Covello et	al., 2004), the pathway from message transmission to behavioural impact is 
perhaps usefully construed as passing through an array of filters.
• Penetration – Even when well targeted, the communication is unlikely to reach all relevant 
individuals. Careful planning, taking account of segmentation evidence and a broad, informed, 
perspective on transmission pathways should help minimise wastage in this respect.
• Dispositional effects – Differential levels of receptiveness and motivation to engage with the 
issue between sub-sets of the target audience. Certain social groups can be predicted to be more 
amenable to engaging with EWL and pensions (see Appendix B).
• Locus of control – Certain social groups are better placed to act on the information offered than 
others, in so far as they enjoy or perceive relatively greater scope for control over their future. 
There are linkages with level of skill and employment sector norms.
• Profile of source – The trust and credibility/competence profile of the source has potential to either 
amplify or attenuate rates of engagement.
• Relevance – The message content must be relevant and well focused on meeting the information 
needs of the target populations(s) (see Section B.4).
Figure 6.3 Communication impacts on behaviour – rate of attrition –  
 an heuristic model
The science surrounding foreseeable metrics of impact is far from exacting. However, almost all 
evidence points to education initiatives producing modest effect sizes. For illustrative purposes only, 
Figure 6.3 offers an heuristic of the pathway to change from receipt of message to ballpark metrics 
of behavioural impact. 
Although metrics of change may be modest, relatively large numbers of individuals can be influenced, 
but only if the campaign/intervention is of sufficient magnitude. However, achieving this assumes that 
all working age individuals receive the (well configured) message (and can act upon it). This is rarely a 
realisable objective. 
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It is, therefore, important to establish informed and realistic estimates of the number of individuals 
that the message/campaign will reach and to use the influence-attrition heuristic depicted in Figure 
6.3 (or an alternative source based on real data referenced to the issue being considered if it is 
available) to estimate the likely metric of behavioural impact. This can be a useful heuristic to apply at 
the options appraisal stage when considering alternative interventions.
The principal limitation of education-based interventions is that information is but one of an array of 
likely more pervasive influences on behaviour, e.g. habit, social/cultural influences, costs and benefits 
associated with the ‘desirable behaviour’ and structural barriers. In the public domain there is modest 
scope for control over these variables. There is significantly greater scope to influence aspects of these 
key behaviour-shaping variables in more controlled contexts, such as the workplace (see Section 6.4).
6.4 Indirect interventions – behaviour change via intermediaries
Indirect interventions seek to influence the behaviour of target groups via a surrogate or 
intermediary. This requires mapping potential intermediaries, referenced to the target population(s), 
taking account of any segmentation differences, e.g. independent financial advisers are a potentially 
relevant intermediary, but predominantly only for managerial and professional groups. The most 
effective intermediaries are likely to be those professions/organisations that people already interact 
with and, importantly, trust. 
Although their sphere of influence is limited to those segments currently in work and the 
recruitment of new employees, employers potentially play a key role here: 
• They constitute a key normative influence in terms of the duration and configuration of work and 
the duration of working life. 
• They have control over key salient influences, e.g. default opted-in schemes for employer pensions 
and incentives for EWL. 
• They enjoy a more positive (relative) trust profile than other sources. 
• They embody the potential for delivering a consistent message to individuals of all ages in a 
measured and programmed manner, which cannot be achieved through broad-based publicity 
campaigns. 
• They embody the potential to expose (propagate) younger employees to normative influences in 
terms of the working and pension arrangements of older employees.
• Most importantly, they offer the potential to take the scope for intervention beyond relatively 
weak communication elements, extending to aspects that relate to the choice architecture, i.e. 
variables that nudge desired behaviour on the part of employees and the creation of positive 
climate that fosters cultural change. 
• Metrics of influence are potentially greater than individual focused interventions, i.e. a single 
successful interaction with an organisation or an employer’s group representative resulting in 
changes to employer practice can result in a significant ripple effect in terms of the number of 
individuals (employees) that might be influenced.
The use of surrogates to propagate the EWL agenda is likely to represent a prerequisite, in view 
of evidence of the Department for Work and Pensions’ (DWP’s) eroded public trust on this issue. 
However, a primary benefit relates to the metrics of impact and the scope for enlisted surrogates to 
act as amplification stations42. 
42 High salience (to the public) risk communicators/communication sources, including the mass 
media. See Kasperson, R.E. and Kasperson, J., The	Social	Amplification	and	Attenuation	of	Risk. 
http://paul-hadrien.info/backup/LSE/IS%20490/The%20social%20amplifciation%20and%20
attenuation%20of%20risk.pdf 
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A key component here, however, clearly, relates to the potential for these intermediaries to be 
persuaded/motivated to engage with the EWL agenda and its propagation. It is likely that further 
empirical work is needed to establish the scope for this and what would motivate engagement most 
acutely amongst employers.
6.4.1 The scope for intervention via employers
Beyond legislative change and amendments to employment law, the scope for intervention with 
employers potentially equates to:
• gaining support for (sign-up) and adoption of good practice principles (to be defined) in employer 
promotion of EWL (employee retention and recruitment);
• using employers as amplification stations – a conduit to transmit key messages to employees on 
EWL and pensions.
Building on established partnership/stakeholder activity with employers, e.g. aspects of the Age 
Positive initiative (2006) and Extending Working Life Sector initiative (2010-2011), potential 
approaches to engaging with employers include:
• national – high level engagement with large employers; employer interest groups and professional 
associations – possibly under the auspices of Corporate Social Responsibility;
• sectors – working with key employment sector interest groups (including professional associations 
and workers’ representatives). There is scope for a strategic, targeted approach here, informed by 
insights from work on segmentation (see Section B.3); 
• local – regionally based direct engagement with employers (principally small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs)), making use of established communication networks and channels, 
such as local business enterprise groups and associations; and the Chamber of Commerce. 
Complementary strategies might include road-show type events.
As with interventions aimed at individuals, those aimed at employers require careful planning of 
content and delivery pathways.
Intervention	content
• A prerequisite is a clear and empirically evidenced understanding of variables that impact on 
employer preparedness/barriers to engage with EWL – including demographic differences, e.g. by 
sector, size of employing organisation.
• The development of a clear and agreed (with employers and other stakeholders) criteria regarding 
the vision of good practice in promoting and managing EWL.
• The generation of empirically informed practical guidance material aimed at employers detailing 
how to operationalise good EWL practice – principles, systems and structures.
• Tools for employers – e.g. appropriately configured information and advice material that permit 
employees to make informed choices and monitor their performance, etc.
Intervention	delivery
• Mapping the scope for employer engagement opportunities, particularly through established 
structures, groupings and associations – at national, regional, local and sector levels, taking 
account of differences by size of organisation. 
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• Using segmentation evidence to highlight key sectors for intense focus, i.e. identifying sectors that 
are more amenable to adopt good EWL practice and where the employee demographic profiles 
reflect concentrations of the receptive middle (see Section B.3). 
• Examining the scope for forming/enhancing linkages between employers and other EWL relevant 
stakeholders e.g. pensions advisers, trades unions.
6.5 The need for a multifaceted approach
Much has been made here of the opportunities for influencing behaviour via employers. However, 
it is clear that the employer route only offers a partial solution, in so far as the scope for impact is 
limited to those in stable employment and, likely to a more modest degree, with regard to employer 
recruitment policy for older people.
For those individuals currently not in paid work or who do not enjoy regular stable employment, 
the scope for intervention is restricted to more traditional broad-based information and awareness 
campaigns, possibly supplemented by more targeted interventions that focus on regional/local high-
priority/high-risk populations (see Section B.3).
We would suggest that an embracing approach to EWL requires a combination of interventions, 
aimed at both influencing individuals directly and via the configuration of the decision architecture, 
in particular interventions that impact on employers’ decision architecture. The scope for each varies 
between different social groups, a primary determinant here resting with the relationship to stable 
employment (see Figure 6.4). 
Figure 6.4 A multi-faceted multi-layered approach to intervention
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7 The scope for evaluation 
In this chapter we consider the scope and options for evaluation, referenced to our 
recommendations on intervention, detailed in earlier sections of the report. 
7.1 Communication interventions
7.1.1 Message content
In terms of defining the content of communication material, we recommend that the mental 
models approach offers a useful perspective. The premise here is that there is scope for enhancing 
the impact of communication material where its content builds on the prior understandings and 
orientations of target audiences – referenced to expert perspectives. 
Communication message content would be primarily referenced to this empirical platform and 
orientated around filling knowledge gaps and addressing misunderstandings. Arising communication 
material could be configured to take advantage of contemporary insights, notably those arising from 
‘health’ behaviour change models, message framing and the wealth of established guidelines on good 
practice in risk communication (see, for example, Covello et	al.,	2004).
A simple before and after evaluation design with a modest sample of representatives of target 
group(s) would permit the testing of the extent to which respondent understanding is enhanced 
following exposure to generated communication material. Control trials could also be configured, 
but we would suggest that the cost would be disproportionate to the net gain. Of greater intrinsic 
value here is the potential to learn from arising evidence, through iterative trialling of alternative 
content/format and between samples representing different target audiences to assess different 
knowledge needs and the relative impact on understanding. 
Beyond contributions to knowledge and understanding are elements that relate to the motivational 
impact of alternative configurations of messages. The underpinning science here is quite well 
established. Hence, we would recommend that the issue is more one of configuring communication 
material content to take advantage of these insights (see above), rather than seeking to formally 
test effects. For example, it has been possible to identify an array of salient gain and loss frames 
from the established review evidence (see Table 4.1 and Section B.1.12). 
While it would be possible to quantitatively evaluate the impact of alternative message 
configurations, this would require recourse to large samples. In view of the likelihood of small 
effect sizes, combined with the fact that the arising data would be limited to behaviour intention 
(essentially attitude), we believe that the investment costs would outweigh the net benefit. 
7.1.2 Transmitting messages
As discussed in Section 3.2 (and in detail in Section B.8) a core finding with regard to the 
transmission of messages on extending working life (EWL) is that the Department for Work and 
Pensions’ (DWP’s) trust profile is low. We believe that the scope for enhancing this is equally low, 
due to the public’s entrenched negative perception that the EWL policy issue is closely aligned with 
political agendas, which also tend to be mistrusted. This effectively necessitates the continued 
use of intermediaries or surrogates as the primary transmission routes. This might, for example, be 
achieved through the DWP building upon its established employer engagement links and activity.
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Delivery via intermediaries adds an additional layer of complexity to both the intervention and 
evaluation process, i.e. the evaluation package relates not just to the impact on target individuals/
groups but the pathway to facilitating this via intermediaries. Having mapped potential surrogates, 
and discovered more about what it would take to gain their engagement with the DWP’s EWL 
agenda, there is a need to configure interventions that will propagate the ‘sign-up’ of relevant 
organisations (particularly employers), groups and professions to play this role. 
The implications for impact evaluation relate to rates of ‘sign-up’ of intermediaries and tracking the 
percolation of impact on individuals/target groups. It should be possible to generate substantially 
accurate estimates of the number of relevant organisations/professional bodies and practitioners 
and forecast rates of contact/estimates of successful sign-up over time. This would permit a 
quantitative evaluation of penetration. There will also be a need to gather (principally qualitative) 
feedback/intervention progress monitoring evidence. 
There is also scope for a case-control approach to evaluation here, comparing the impact of policy 
activity aimed at different surrogates and the impact of different surrogates on reaching members 
of target groups, plausibly extending to a demonstration of the counterfactual.
7.2 Decision architecture interventions – nudges
While it is possible to construe manipulations of the decision architecture as communication 
interventions, they are perhaps more appropriately cast as relating to the decision-making climate 
(decision architecture – Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
In part, the intent of prevailing tax and benefit arrangements and employer practices can be to 
communicate and motivate people to behave in preferred ways. But they can also have unintended 
consequences, either because they are configured in ways that engender perverse motivations or 
simply because the public are unaware of them, or draw inappropriate inferences. There is a need 
to evaluate not only the impact of new and established nudges designed to engender desired 
behaviour within target groups, but also to gather evidence of the consequences of ‘unhelpful’ 
nudges, with a view to finding ways to redress these. 
In the context of EWL and pensions there are two primary influences on the decision architecture: 
the State (tax/benefit systems and employment law) and employers (terms, conditions, recruitment 
and retention practices and normative references). Each is potentially malleable and impracticable 
in terms of policy intervention and change.
7.2.1 Fiscal and fiduciary arrangements
Baseline evidence on the recently announced State-controlled 2012 automatic enrolment pension 
scheme appears to be established, in so far as work has been undertaken to test public reactions 
(DWP, 2009; Pensions Policy Institute (PPI), 2009) and the evaluation of opt-out rates is, intuitively, 
relatively straightforward to operationalise. 
With regard to other, longer established elements of the decision architecture, notably within the tax 
and benefit system (including substantively inaccurate public beliefs and inferences), on the basis of 
the review evidence, it is possible to identify an array of positive and negative effects. However, there 
is very little quantitative evidence of identified effects, so it is difficult to ascertain how widespread 
their influence might be. There is scope to evaluate and establish this through a modest amount of 
supplementary qualitative work as well as quantification based on a representative sample. 
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We would recommend that the approach to discovering this should be aligned with the mental 
models perspective detailed in Section 3.3.1, as the point of interest rests with not just the rational/
objective influence of the established decision architecture but, more pertinently, with the nudges 
that owe more to people’s beliefs and inferences.
Having established a comprehensive picture of salient influences, it would be possible to evaluate 
current and alternative-future configurations of the decision architecture. Effects could be 
demonstrated under experimentally controlled trial conditions, or through large-scale social surveys, 
and decision-preferences reported. As elsewhere, a limitation is that choices in the domain of 
alternative-futures would be limited to measures of behavioural intention. While this would serve as 
a limit to forecasts of arising metrics of behaviour change, reliable data could be derived regarding 
the relative merits of alternative configurations.
7.2.2 Employers
The key role played by employing organisations on employee culture, in terms of norms values, 
attitudes belief and practices, is well established. Potentially influenceable nudges in this arena 
relate to formal systems and procedures, e.g. retirement policies, pension arrangements, etc., 
as well as more subtle cultural elements, e.g. corporate priorities, leadership style, managerial 
commitment, trust and critically, from the perspective of behavioural change, employee 
interpretations of these (again, accurate and inaccurate). 
The review evidence, although modest on this issue, suggests that contemporary employer 
generated configurations of the EWL and pension decision architecture embodies an array of 
‘helpful’ and ‘unhelpful’	nudges. This area appears to be under-researched/evidenced. 
Commissioned research is needed to characterise employers’ established arrangements and map 
any segment differences by employment sector, size of organisation, etc. This could usefully build 
on established employer survey evidence (Metcalf and Meadows, 2006 and 2010). Necessarily, this 
should aim to capture employer policies and practices, through engagement with employers and 
employees. Engagement with employees is necessary in order to capture key elements relating to 
employee beliefs and inferences. As elsewhere, we would recommend a mental models approach to 
achieve this.
There is scope to examine the potential impact of alternative configurations of the decision 
architecture on employee orientations and behaviour intentions. Effects could be demonstrated 
under experimentally controlled trial conditions, or through large-scale surveys and decision-
preferences reported. 
Evidence here could take the form of qualitative and/or quantitative investigation. However, if 
forecasts of the impact of current, or alternative, future arrangements is sought, this evidence will 
need to be based upon representative samples, via a stratified survey.
The above relates to gathering evidence on the impact of contemporary and alternative employer 
practice. In evidence terms, it informs public policy understanding over the agenda for change, 
i.e. what needs to change in terms of employer practices (decision architecture) to have a positive 
impact on employee EWL/pension investment culture and behaviour.
Having established a model(s) of good practice (see Section 6.4.1) the focus for intervention rests 
with propagating the adoption of this voluntary code among employers. As elsewhere, it is unlikely 
that a one-size-fits-all approach will represent a solution on this issue. Rather, it is foreseeable that 
a range of complementary approaches will be needed, not least to take account of differences 
between employment sectors and different sizes of organisation. 
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Complementary options might plausibly be aligned with the established corporate social 
responsibility agenda, linkages to industry quality standards in the ISO 9000 framework, roadshow 
events43 to engage SMEs in the production of guidance information (web-based or hardcopy, 
e.g. via mailshots), line-management training, and more. 
Interventions of this type require evaluation in terms of their:
1 effectiveness in meeting employer information needs;
2 take-up/penetration rates on targeted employers;
3 impact on employer orientations and practices;
4 impact on employee EWL/pensions behaviour.
In view of its likely iterative nature, the first is probably most appropriately assessed through 
qualitative evaluation. 
The second would depend upon the nature of the intervention, but potential options include 
numbers of promotion events/activities and employer attendance rates, numbers of businesses 
signing up to a good practice charter (or similar); website ‘hits’, etc.
The third has potential to be directly linked to promotional activity, through follow-up assessments 
of businesses that had attended events; signed up to the promulgated good practice charter or 
visits relevant websites, etc. There is also scope for gathering pre- and post-intervention (and on-
going monitoring) data. Data could also be gathered from a random sample of employers. However, 
there would need to be high confidence that the level of resource allocated to the intervention was 
sufficient to generate sufficient change for this to be detectable from a large random sample of 
employers. A more circumspect objective would be to gather evaluation evidence that demonstrates 
that change can be engendered, through pilot studies, so that the policy objective then becomes 
focused on delivery rather than demonstrating its impact per se. 
A salient issue in evaluating the impact on employer practices relates to the reliability of the 
evidence gathered. While it is possible to gather evidence from employers, ultimately the policy 
interest rests with the extent to which any change is apparent to employees. There are sound 
arguments for seeking evidence of impact on employer practices from employees, rather than, or 
in addition to, that elicited from their employers. It would also be possible to gather this type of 
reflective evidence from employees through questions embedded in established UK social surveys.
The fourth essentially relates to the last step in the intervention logic chain. Specifically, there is 
a need to establish the impact of changes in employer practices on employee EWL and pension 
investment behaviour. A notable challenge to establishing causality here is the delay between 
the commencement of the intervention and manifest behavioural consequences, which are 
likely to exhibit notable lag effects, particularly in the case of EWL. An option here might be to 
gather evidence though further follow-up studies of organisations that represent known contacts, 
established through the types of activity detailed at points 2 and 3 above. However, there are 
limitations here:
• difficulties are likely to be encountered in gathering baseline data; 
• a simple before and after design, even if achievable, would make it difficult to take account of any 
intervening variables; 
43 See, for example, Successful	interventions	with	hard	to	reach	groups http://www.hse.gov.uk/
research/misc/hardtoreach.pdf
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• policy intervention of this nature essentially relates to supporting employers in configuring 
and promoting their own interventions. It is difficult to control for the quality of employer 
interventions, i.e. interventions can fail due to being poorly conceived and due to shortcomings in 
their delivery (see review of evidence in Appendix B);
• the self-selectivity of the sample would raise questions over its representativeness. However, 
arising evidence could plausibly be used to exemplify good practice.
Policy activity focused on defining good practice and/or working with a small sample of employers 
to develop workable solutionsmay be beneficial. Once demonstrated this could usefully form the 
basis of more detailed guidance on good practice in configuring a positive EWL/pensions decision 
architecture. The configuration of pilot studies involving a relatively small sample of employers 
aligned with the process depicted in Figure 6.2 offers the opportunity to gather a comprehensive 
array of qualitative and quantitative evaluation evidence focused on the impact on employee 
intention and behaviour.
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8 Conclusions
There are significant challenges to finding ways to encourage people to extend their working lives 
and make effective financial provision for retirement. The main barriers surround the sense of loss 
and social injustice associated with unpopular rises in State Pension age (SPA) and reduced (actual 
and perceived) pension entitlements. 
However, beyond this there is evidence that a significant proportion of individuals would be 
positively disposed to extend their working lives, typically by a year or two, if work was configured 
in an attractive fashion, principally part-time and/or flexible. There is also scope for policy initiatives 
that impact upon cultural norms in the workplace, so that working later in life becomes part of the 
natural order of things.
8.1 Different publics
An array of social differences has been detected regarding people’s orientation to extending working 
life (EWL) and disposition/ability to invest in pensions. Some of these differences relate to personal 
characteristics, however more saliently from the perspective of public policy intervention, there 
appear to be differences by social status. In broad terms, cultural disposition to EWL diminishes 
as we move down the social hierarchy. This has been attributed to a range of social and structural 
criteria, but is most likely to be underpinned by aspects relating to levels of intrinsic satisfaction 
derived from work and employment opportunities, not least opportunities for part-time and flexible 
working arrangements.
Primary implications of the above surround the need for different intervention strategies for different 
social groups, in particular between those in stable employment, irregular employment and the 
unemployed, and the need to find ways to maximise the opportunities for EWL amongst those more 
disposed to consider and act upon the proposition. 
It would seem reasonable to regard professionals and senior managerial grades as essentially fixed, 
in so far as members of these groups tend to be the most culturally engaged with work, benefit from 
more employment opportunities and have modest financial need to EWL. At the other end of the 
social spectrum are the semi- and unskilled. Much has been made in the literature of this group’s 
modest cultural engagement with work in later life. However, there are a number of important 
structural and institutional influences that disproportionately limit the scope for EWL amongst 
members of this group. Notable barriers relate to: restricted skill set, access to stable employment, 
availability of flexible employment and opportunities for intrinsically rewarding ‘good jobs’. Between 
these extremes lie the social strata that we have characterised as ‘the receptive middle’. Although a 
broad church, members of this group are likely to: possess marketable skills, enjoy (relatively) stable 
employment, be in the types of occupations where there are more opportunities for flexible working 
and have modest financial provision for retirement, but view additions to this as a gain. For these 
reasons it is suggested that realisable intervention impact rates are likely to be higher for this group. 
By extension, there may be a case for apportioning resources to take advantage of the potentially 
higher metrics of impact. In no sense should this be interpreted as an avocation for abandoning 
attempts to influence less receptive groups. Rather, it is advanced in the interest of strategic 
consideration of relative resource allocation and realisable net social gain. Establishing change 
within the receptive middle also embodies potential to impact on retirement norms in other social 
groups over the longer term.
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8.2 Communication interventions
It is clear that there is widespread confusion among large swathes of the public over even basic 
elements such as SPA. More saliently, relatively few individuals are motivated or feel able to engage 
with the complexities of either choosing a pension, or calculating their retirement income. The scope 
for education initiatives aimed at enhancing financial literacy to redress this is modest, given the low 
levels of confidence/motivation to engage with the detail.
For most people decision-making in this domain is based on vague and impressionistic 
understandings, oriented around some very basic beliefs and heuristics, e.g. ‘you	need	to	save	for	
retirement’, ‘pensions	are	a	good	idea’, ‘it’s	not	worth	working	[post SPA]	as	I	will	lose	it	all	in	tax’, etc. 
Communication interventions need to focus on addressing these headline beliefs, reinforcing those 
that are substantively accurate and addressing gaps and misconceptions. We have suggested that 
the mental models approach to communication offers a tried and tested framework for gathering 
intelligence on message content and configuring effective material focused on meeting the 
informational needs of target groups.
A significant challenge to effective communication surrounds the low public trust profile of the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) in respect of the EWL agenda. As noted elsewhere, it 
is unlikely that attempts to enhance this would be successful, due to the notable public disquiet 
over recently announced changes to SPA and a strong sense of vested interest on the part of g/
Government. More fundamentally, it is apparent most individuals do not actively seek information 
on EWL. In view of this, the use of surrogates, e.g. employers, professional bodies, community 
groups, finance professionals, to actively propagate key messages would appear to be a prerequisite. 
The DWP’s Extending Working Life Sector Initiative (2010/11), involving work with specific sector 
leads, is an example of this.
To date, the EWL and pension behaviour change policy agendas appear to have been dominated 
by a public health model of intervention, i.e. a focus on the individual as the unit of change. This is 
appropriate but, we would suggest, partial in so far as it embodies the following assumptions:
• individuals are actively engaged with making rational decisions over these issues (most are not); 
• change is vested within the gift of individuals (there are both push and pull influences);
• the primary point of resistance to EWL rests with individuals (potentially underplays structural 
and institutional effects);
• cultural change arises from the sum of individual actions (underplays structural and institutional 
norming influences). 
The evidence is that individuals tend not to be information seeking or actively engaged in planning 
in this area, rather they are more disposed to react to events and opportunities as they unfold. 
This suggests that they are susceptible to an array of nudges, some of which may motivate early 
withdrawal from the labour force, while others may encourage EWL. 
8.3 Decision architecture interventions
The nudge concept, as advanced by Thaler and Sunstein (2008), is quite distinct from (but not 
incompatible with) the (health) behaviour change approach, in so far as while drawing heavily on 
cognitive psychology insights, it extends beyond this to structural arrangements, emphasising the 
role of the decision architecture, i.e. it advocates a focus on policy interventions that make changes 
to the context in which individuals make decisions, – so that they make better decisions – rather 
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than attempting to change how individuals feel about/react to contexts, e.g. automatic enrolment 
in pensions, rather than stressing the pitfalls of failing to invest in a pension. Other examples include 
the removal of the default retirement age and raising the age at which individuals are entitled to 
receive their State Pension.
A comprehensive intervention strategy should necessarily embody elements of both an individual 
and a decision architecture focus. The latter perspective appears to be under-exploited in the current 
policy perspective on EWL, in particular with respect to the role played by employers and the scope 
for influencing this to foster and reinforce a positive, decision architecture for employees. 
Broadening the perspective on behaviour change to one of cultural change and using the 
workplace as a dynamo to feed this would represent something of a paradigm shift in the EWL 
policy perspective, from the individual to the context, but one that can be predicted to yield higher 
returns than a focus on individuals alone. Such a shift in emphasis would require an extension of the 
boundaries of intervention options beyond (relatively weak in terms of behavioural impact) media-
based communication output to one of stakeholder engagement and relationship building. 
The scope for partnership-working interventions with employers is twofold: 
• for employers to act as a conduit/amplification station for transmitting EWL messages to 
employees;
• to propagate the adoption of good EWL practice in human resource management.
Such a strategy would require foundation work with stakeholders to define and agree a voluntary 
code of good employer practice. The scope for aligning/embedding this with established activity 
within the Corporate Social Responsibility and Investors in People agendas should be explored. This 
would need to be underpinned by research into current human resource practice and what would/
would not motivate employers to adopt the to-be-defined good practice.
The promotion of good practice might be propagated though partnership working with employer 
associations, professional bodies, employee representatives and third sector organisations. It is 
foreseeable that support to employers will need to be tailored to meet the respective needs of large, 
medium and small enterprises. There would be a need for stakeholder engagement/research to 
establish this.
Little (beyond the headline data provided by Metcalf and Matthews, 2006) appears to be known 
about contemporary employer practices; in particular the array and prevalence of established 
nudges that influence employee retirement behaviour and the extent which these encourage or 
discourage EWL. There is a need for research to establish this.
Turning to elements of the decision architecture that lie beyond the employer, intuitively there is 
scope to configure tax, benefit and other fiscal arrangements in ways that motivate behaviour 
change. However, again we would recommend that any proposed change in incentives or 
disincentives should be tested on the public(s) to see how they impact on their mental models and 
arising decisions. As Thaler and Sunstein highlight, it would be unwise to make assumptions over the 
extent to which such nudges might inspire rational choices. On the basis of the available evidence, 
we would suggest that nudges of this type would need to be highly intuitive and simply configured 
headlines such as ‘a	tax	holiday	for	working	for	two	more	years’, or ‘a	lump	sum	after	three	extra	
years’, or ‘emphasising	the	loss	of	income	from	early	retirement’ rather than being buried in the detail 
of fiscal arrangements.
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8.4 Summary
We believe that the adoption of a mental models approach offers a useful technique to generate 
intelligence to inform the content of communication material. The configuration of the content of 
any materials produced should also be aligned with established good-practice guidance, including 
insights from the various psychology (health) behaviour change approaches, message framing 
effects and similar. It is foreseeable that there will be added value from tailoring the material 
produced to fit with the mental models and informational needs of different target audiences. 
There are potential advantages from identifying and enlisting the co-operation of more-trusted 
surrogates to transmit any communication material produced. This would require the engagement 
of stakeholders, notably employers, employer’s associations, professional bodies, community groups 
etc. Employers should be considered a primary route due to their stronger relative trust profile, 
compared with other sources. There is a need to find ways to motivate surrogates to operate as 
active (promoting) rather than a passive repositories of EWL/pensions information.
The focus on individuals as the primary target for intervention activity should be broadened/
complemented by a focus on employers and their EWL practices. Organisational climate has a 
significant normative influence on the behaviour of employees. Employers are well placed to table 
options that nudge people to make decisions about EWL and pensions, i.e. work organisations 
play an important role in configuring the decision architecture. A key precursor to configuring 
interventions with employers would be establishing a model of EWL good practice and discovering 
the nudges that would motivate its adoption by employers.
The receptive middle should be considered a priority group for intervention, for the reasons outlined 
earlier in this report. Options for engagement with members of this group include targeted mail-
shots by locale, reference to media consumption profiles and similar, but most saliently via their 
employer. In terms of metrics of influence, there are potential advantages from focusing on sectors 
in which the receptive middle over-represents e.g. health and social care, education; finance and real 
estate activity.
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 Appendix A 
 Evidence gathering, performance 
and impact evaluation
The following is not offered as a comprehensive commentary on the scope for policy development 
and delivery evaluation, as detailed guidance on this is provided within HM Treasury guidance 
(2009a; 2009b), and elsewhere. Rather, this section aims to consider the options and scope for 
evaluation of foreseeable interventions within the extending working life (EWL)/pensions domain. 
A.1 The role of evaluation evidence
The purpose of policy evaluation has been variously described, but is perhaps most succinctly 
captured as ‘...	to	systematically	investigate	the	effectiveness	of	social	interventions	...’ (Rossi et	al.,	
2004). Evaluation is the cornerstone of an evidence-based approach. Moreover, the contemporary 
perspective is that evaluation needs to be an integral part of the policy process, from initial 
identification of priorities, through options appraisal to the assessment of delivery and impact (see 
Figure 16). Evaluation is very much not a post-hoc process.
When considering evaluation, it is tempting to focus on outcomes (impact). This is important; 
however the need for a scientifically informed and robust approach to the selection of intervention 
options and careful planning of the delivery process with feedback on performance cannot be over 
stressed. If these elements are not based on sound evidence a positive outcome in terms of impact 
would, indeed, be a fortunate result. 
The role of evaluation relates not just to impact, but is more appropriately construed as an iterative, 
interactive process based on learning from evidence, rather than a linear process focused on 
outcomes alone (refer to Figure A.2). 
Key questions for evaluation that must be considered at the intervention planning stage surround:
• How complete are our understandings of the influence model(s)?
• Are our assumptions about the world valid?
• Can we benchmark?
• Can we monitor our progress?
• Can we measure the impact?
• Can we attribute the impact to what we have done?
• Can we demonstrate the counterfactual?
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A.2 The scope for benchmarking
The review (detailed in Appendix B) revealed a rich body of evidence on attitudes and behaviour in 
relation to EWL and pensions. The principal limitations of this are:
• The amassed evidence reveals more on ‘what people believe’ than ‘why they believe what 
they believe’, the latter is more important and enlightening from the perspective of configuring 
behaviour and cultural change interventions.
• A public health individual focused perspective predominates, the net result of which is that there 
is very little evidence regarding the scope for indirect influence through intermediaries, e.g. 
employers, or aspects that address the decision architecture. This represents a substantial gap in 
the evidence base.
• National survey evidence, e.g. the Attitudes to Pensions Survey and elements of Labour Force 
Survey, above and beyond statistics on age of employees at the point of retirement, is largely 
restricted to behaviour-intention, e.g. numbers of individuals who claim they intend to extend 
working life, estimates of preferred/likely retirement age, and so on. There is scope to monitor 
changes in such orientations and intentions over time, and infer some degree of behavioural 
impact. However, any conclusions will necessarily be limited to relative change and based on 
inference rather than any absolute measure of the impact on behaviour. 
• National survey data sets are also potentially problematic as measures of intervention success, in 
so far as they offer no capacity for controlling for intervening variables or demonstrating causality. 
At best they offer the potential for complementary evidence of change pre- and post-intervention.
• There is a risk that national survey data sets will be insufficiently sensitive to detect change 
attributable to the intervention or, to put it another way, there needs to be high confidence that 
the configured intervention(s) will produce sufficient change in target groups to be detected 
though reference to these relatively blunt instruments. An undesirable outcome would be a type 
1 error, i.e. the intervention was intrinsically sound, a positive effect was present, but could not be 
demonstrated simply because insufficient numbers were influenced. 
In most cases, it will be desirable to configure bespoke benchmark measures that are aligned with 
and well focused on the configured intervention(s). A significant challenge, however, relates to the 
lag between initiation and any impact on behaviour. This is of particular salience in the current 
instance, where it may take 20, 30 or 40 years to be certain of the impact on length of working life. 
A.3 Impact assessment (summative evaluation)
Given the long-run perspective of the EWL and pension issues, the scope for measuring policy 
impact on outcomes, in particular EWL, is very limited in the short-term. However, assuming that a 
set of credible change pathways can be configured, it would be possible to assess impact in terms of 
progress to achieving the constituent steps (progress) within each.
Options for impact assessment need to be considered with reference to the hierarchy of evidence 
(HM Treasury, 2009a; Figure A.1) and, critically, in terms of what is to be claimed on the basis of the 
information gathered. Randomised control trials are generally regarded as representing the only 
truly experimental model for assessment, all others being considered quasi-experimental. 
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Figure A.1 Evidence hierarchy
However, it is necessary to achieve a balance between the scientific aspiration, the logistics of the 
policy delivery process and associated costs and benefits. In most (all?) instances solutions require a 
pragmatic approach.
Testing the impact of different configurations of communication material, alternative configurations 
of the decision architecture (nudges), and similar, lend themselves to randomised control trial 
or matched sample evaluation, extending to formal testing of the counterfactual. Logistically, 
opportunities for this are greatest when evaluating pilot interventions, or localised/regional 
initiatives, in the context of establishing ‘what works’, i.e. prior to any planned wider roll-out. Once 
at the stage of roll-out, the idea of a comparison control group makes less sense in terms of the 
realisation of policy objectives, not least because it raises significant logistical difficulties and ethical 
implications.
Further issues that need to be considered relate to the focus for impact. The bottom line in respect 
of the current intent relates to the impact on individuals and their retirement/pensions behaviour. 
However, this is quite a blunt measure, with notable logistical barriers to establishing robust causal 
linkages with policy activity. Moreover, there is a high risk that the intervention impact may be 
‘flooded’ by other factors, e.g. cyclical changes in the demand for labour. Careful mapping of the 
intervention logic and necessary metrics of change to achieve objectives offers significant scope for 
the identification of intermediate impacts, e.g. proportions of individuals in target groups who have 
received communication material; proportion of individuals who exhibit good/enhanced knowledge 
of key decision criteria; numbers/proportions of employers that have adopted good EWL practice.
A.4 Performance monitoring (formative evaluation)
It is essential to keep in mind that evaluation is not the end point of the process; it is an essential 
ingredient of an evidence-based approach. It embodies configuring a package of evidence gathering 
that is tailored to meet the needs of the intervention. Typically, a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative evidence is required to test our assumptions, and inform decisions over any need to 
refocus where these are found to be partial, erroneous or otherwise flawed. The core elements of 
this process are characterised in Figure A.2. 
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Figure A.2 The evaluation cycle
A widely encountered weakness of policy interventions is that they are under-evidenced: data-poor, 
rather than data-rich, under-informed, rather than informed, i.e. they have insufficient feedback-
loops to provide an early indication of problematic elements. 
It is also critical to keep in mind that potential problems do not just relate to assumptions that 
we may have made about the target audience(s) and the behaviour change model that we have 
selected, but also to making it happen, i.e. the implementation process. 
It is almost certainly the case that many intrinsically sound interventions, in terms of the scientific 
properties of their theory of change, have floundered due to failures in the delivery process, e.g. due 
to insufficient training of relevant policy delivery staff; poor relationships between interdependent 
functions/groups within the delivery chain. For example, it is not uncommon to come across front-
line policy staff with little insight into the aims and rationale of the intervention they are playing a 
key role in delivering. Gathering relatively low cost qualitative evidence (typically interviews or group 
elicitations with representatives of key functions) to tap embedded knowledge and provide essential 
feedback on the intervention logic and delivery performance can serve as a bulwark to counter this.
For reasons of illustrating the points made we have mirrored the approach of a number of other 
authors in portraying a distinction between impact and performance evaluation. However, within 
the context of application, we would view this as an artificial and undesirable distinction. Rather, 
each should necessarily represent complementary facets of a unified process (see Chen, 1990;  
Owen and Rodgers, 1999; Judge and Bauld, 2001). 
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Appendix B 
Improving communications 
about extending working life 
amongst individuals: learning 
from models of behavioural and 
attitudinal change
Review of evidence related to key policy issues
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B.1 Summary of main findings
B.1.1 How do the public view extending working life (EWL) beyond perceived 
age of retirement?
• Widespread recognition of the logic of the need to finance increased longevity through extending 
working life does not translate into a belief that ‘I	should	extend	my	working	life’.
• The option for pre-State Retirement age (SPA) retirement is a highly valued and widely 
encountered aspiration.
• Being able to choose how to spend your time, rather than having this determined by work seems 
to be a key incentive to retire.
• There seems to be significant demand for post-SPA employment where this is a voluntary decision 
embodying choice, particularly over hours of work.
• Most who would consider working post-SPA want to remain with their current employer.
• Most who would consider working post-SPA want part-time employment, but believe that there 
are insufficient opportunities for this without downshifting.
• The demand for downshifting (less responsibility/lower skilled work) is low.
• Different social groups have different attitudes and intentions regarding extending working life (EWL). 
B.1.2 To what extent does decision-making over retirement and pensions 
reflect the presence of cognitive biases, heuristic reasoning or affective 
reactions?
• Widespread concern over post-SPA income does not seem to motivate engagement with planning 
or increase the attractiveness of EWL.
• EWL is framed as a loss, in terms of leisure time and active life years, which is not outweighed by 
financial gains from enhanced income.
• Large numbers claim to be amenable to the idea of EWL so long as this is not a forced option and 
they have flexibility over hours worked.
• Choice, flexibility and control over the need to work, type and hours of work are highly valued, but 
unevenly distributed and unevenly realisable between social groups.
• EWL is not salient to most people. There are few precedents in the workplace and many do not 
see it as an option open to them.
• The concept of phased retirement is unfamiliar to most. However, there seems to be significant 
attraction to the idea.
• Employers constitute a more important normative influence over how and when to retire than 
other social references, e.g. family, community.
• The rise in SPA adds to perceptions of uncertainty over provision for retirement – and may feed 
disposition to retreat from planning.
• The rise in SPA challenges public conceptions of fairness and social equity – and serves as a barrier 
to engagement with the EWL agenda.
• Widespread recognition of increased longevity does little to diminish individual dread perceptions 
regarding ill-health/an early death.
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• Detailed understanding of tax and pensions is very limited, and, at best, considered vague and 
impressionistic. Education initiatives are unlikely to have a major impact on this.
• People are positive towards the concept of pensions – but confidence in realisable pension values 
is seriously eroded.
• Evidence of predominantly vague and impressionistic understandings of pensions and the tax 
system raises questions over the utility of using incentives, e.g. tax relief, to stimulate pension 
investment. 
B.1.3 How much do people actively engage in decision-making over EWL  
and pensions?
• Active engagement in decision-making over pensions tends to be a minority activity. 
• A significant proportion would prefer to select default options, e.g. joining their employer’s pension 
scheme, rather than selecting an alternative.
• The complexity of pension options and uncertainty over realised values tends to foster inertia.
• Despite almost universal recognition and acceptance of the need to make financial provision for 
retirement around one-fifth of individuals choose to or have very limited scope to act on this. 
• The attitude-behaviour dislocation over pension investment mirrors health and life-style 
orientations, e.g. while few are unaware of the long-term benefits of smoking cessation, reduced 
alcohol consumption, dietary change and exercise and often believe these to be desirable, many 
continue to indulge. 
• Financial considerations play a role in decisions over the date of retirement but for many people 
this is not the only or even the primary criterion. 
• Around one-third of individuals prioritise maintaining their current standard of living over their 
future (retirement) standard of living.
• Around half of individuals feel that they cannot afford to save for retirement.
B.1.4 Which variables impact on decision-making over how and when 
to retire?
• Key push and pull influences on retirement behaviour, include: Individual (health and psycho-
social), financial, family commitments, peer retirement norms, job characteristics (satisfaction, 
working hours; employer attitudes/norms) and structural influences (availability of work; State 
benefit arrangements.
• Social differences, relating to social grade/class appear to constitute a primary influence on EWL 
and pensions behaviour. It has such a strong relationship to having a pension or not; size of 
pension, employment opportunities, access to flexible work and more.
• Suffering debilitating ill-health is the most salient individual-based determinant of early 
retirement and disproportionately impacts on the semi-/unskilled.
• Robust evidence of social networks and sub-cultures based on locale constituting strong 
normative influences on the date of retirement is lacking.
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B.1.5 What information needs, knowledge gaps and misunderstandings exist 
with respect to retirement and pensions?
• Most people react to options for EWL rather than actively seeking them out.
• For the minority who actively seek EWL it is particularly important that they are able to grasp 
salient facts, and that any misunderstandings are addressed. 
• Many people’s concept of EWL reflects simple heuristic inference, it is important that these 
heuristics are appropriate and substantially correct. 
• Plugging knowledge gaps is relatively straightforward in communication terms – but the net result 
is that people are better informed. There is no guarantee that they will make better choices.
• Enhanced knowledge is one of an array of variables impacting on attitudes and behaviour in 
relation to work. In most instances structural and (workplace) climate influences play a more 
pervasive role.
• The idea of phased retirement is unfamiliar to many and there is limited understanding of the 
options or their implications.
• Cultural precedents for EWL are only present in a limited range of employment sectors.
• Flexible working pre- and post-SPA is attractive to many, but people have limited knowledge of the 
range of potential configurations and how post-SPA income interacts with private/employer/State 
pensions and other benefits. 
• Many people experience difficulty in estimating how much income they will need to support them 
in retirement, but there is recognition that State Pension values represent a subsistence income.
• People are able to make substantially accurate estimates of State Pension values.
• Levels of awareness and understanding of the financial implications associated with options over 
early draw-down/deferral of pensions.
• There is fairly strong evidence of a preference for individually tailored, bespoke, pension forecast 
over generic information.
• The impact of complexity over pensions and EWL: increases the probability of people making poor 
pension choices; blunts their motivation to actively engage in decision-making; contributes to 
public uncertainty and a sense of helplessness over planning for later working life and retirement. 
• Knowledge of pension matters is low; only one in 20 rates their knowledge as ‘good’; and one in 
four claims to possess little or no knowledge. Confidence in how best to save for pensions is also 
low (1 in 54 individuals).
• Most people’s knowledge of EWL and pensions polices is limited to headline-lines like ‘State 
Pension age is going up’, combined with a belief that goal posts are prone to move around in this 
area. 
B.1.6 Orientations to sources of information and advice over EWL, retirement 
and pensions?
• Trust in stakeholders is typically vague and impressionistic, but referenced to broader inferences 
regarding perceptions of vested interest. 
• Trust is best conceptualised as multi-faceted rather than as a simple invariant ‘commodity’ or 
rating that is universally attributed to an organisation, profession or other social group. 
• Stakeholder public trust profiles tend not to be uni-dimensional, but interact with the issue under 
consideration. 
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• Trust in Government (Ministers) over EWL is low. There are differences in the trust profiles of 
government (State) departments and agencies, and in the degree of perceived separation from 
Government, and this is prone to vary with the issue under consideration.
• Stakeholders’ trust profile may vary in systematic ways between different social groups, e.g. by 
social class, gender, ethnicity.
• The recently announced rise in SPA appears to have contributed to the low trust profile of  
g/Government.
• DWP is a trusted source for information on State Pension values, but is seen as partisan and close 
to Government on EWL. 
• Jobcentre Plus has a poor trust profile.
• Trust in financial institutions appears to be eroded due to high profile examples of pension failure 
and their role within the current economic crisis.
• Reports of high trust in independent financial advisers seem likely to reflect the absence of 
bad news and to be based on positive association’s with the word ‘independent’, rather than 
referenced to direct experience of performance.
• An array of organisations have positive trust profiles, principally third sector organisations, but do 
not possess intuitive associations with EWL or pensions issues.
• Trust in the concept of pensions appears to be resilient. However, there is low trust (confidence) 
that pensions will realise hoped for values.
B.1.7 Perspectives on employability, employment options, training and beliefs 
regarding employer practices and older workers
• Around half of people aged 50+ years express an interest in post-SPA paid work. Most of these 
people want to work reduced or flexible hours.
• There are social grade differences in disposition to EWL. Those in lower socio-economic groups are 
least engaged. Job (dis)satisfaction appears to be a causal influence.
• The absence of established precedents in most organisations for post-SPA working inhibits 
employee/employer discourse on this issue.
• The absence of cultural precedents within many workplaces feeds fears amongst employees 
that a request for flexible working or reduced hours will be interpreted as a lack of organisational 
commitment.
• There are fundamental differences between employer and employee objectives regarding flexible 
working arrangements.
• There is widespread scepticism regarding the availability of attractive, good quality part-time jobs.
• There is speculation that the definition of a good job may vary by age, but there is no substantial 
empirical evidence on this.
• Care should be taken to avoid over-interpreting older workers’ desire for more flexible work, as this 
is valued by workers of all ages.
• Rates of demand for volitional downshifting amongst people aged 50+ years is offset by a desire 
for promotion/more responsibility. Most downshifting is involuntary and is more appropriately 
construed as underemployment.
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• Robust evidence of a business case for employing older workers appears to remain elusive. The 
premise that a robust business case will motivate employers to employ older workers also appears 
to reflect a leap of faith rather than being grounded in empirical evidence.
• There is a very widespread belief in employer prejudice against employing older workers. 
• Anti-age-discrimination legislation regarding the age of retirement tends to be seen as a smoke 
screen for State Pension savings.
• Age-related training deficits reflect a combination of employer resistance and diminished 
individual disposition to engage. The evidence on employee (un)willingness to train is inconclusive.
• There is no clear casual linkage between participation in training and EWL.
• Amongst the over 50s seeking work, levels of awareness of and beliefs surrounding the availability 
of training are low. It also seems that the availability of dedicated courses aimed at the over 50s 
is low.
B.1.8 Impact of rise in SPA on attitudes to EWL
• The rise in SPA has fuelled widespread sentiments of resentment and challenged established 
notions of social equity.
• There is said to be a broad-based distrust of changes in Government policy towards older people, 
i.e. public attitudes to EWL may be influenced by broader perspectives on public policy regarding 
older people.
• A rise in SPA is a factor in people’s decision-making over retirement, but it would be unwise to 
assume that it is the dominant factor. 
• The change in SPA has contributed to established uncertainty and concern over financial 
arrangements in later life. But it seems unlikely that this will translate into increased motivation to 
invest in pensions or enhance the willingness to extend working life. It may contribute to rates of 
withdrawal and disengagement.
• The conclusion that the impact of a rise in SPA on EWL will be greatest on low income groups 
may be somewhat optimistic, in view of pervasive cultural norms, the incidence of ill-health and 
employment options.
• A potential barrier to policy delivery on EWL, compared with more opaque policy agendas, is the 
transparent alignment in the public consciousness with the objectives of Government ministers, of 
whom there is widespread distrust.
• There is widespread acceptance of the logic of raising SPA, but only modest support (35%) for an 
enforced rise for all, the majority (52%) disagreeing with this policy.
• The idea of working for a couple of extra years (with choice over how much and for how long) 
seems to be less problematic in terms of public acceptance, than the inference that this heralds 
the beginning of a long-term and corrosive agenda on retirement time.
• It is unclear whether the higher expected age of retirement amongst younger respondents 
reflects a cultural change in retirement orientations or resigned acceptance.
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B.1.9 Secondary data analysis
• The average age of retirement is highest amongst the middle income stratum. This stratum 
exhibits a narrower range of retirement age than the other strata. 
• Push and pull influences on pre-SPA retirement impact differently on different social strata/grades.
• Possession of significant pension/asset values appears to serve as an inducement to higher 
managerial/professional groups to pre-SPA retirement.
• For those on low income, redundancy (implicitly no choice or employer incentivised) plays a more 
significant role in pre-SPA retirement than it does for other social grades.
• Middle income groups appear to be less prone (at least to date) to enforced redundancy and are 
unlikely to possess sufficient pensions and saving assets for these to significantly incentivise pre-
SPA withdrawal from work.
B.1.10 Mental models of retirement, pensions and EWL
• There are significant gaps in people’s knowledge over key aspects such as the impact of EWL on 
pensions and other benefits, and they are apt to fall back on simple rules of thumb rather than 
engaging in a systematic evaluation of options. 
• People’s beliefs, substantially accurate or otherwise, impact on their behaviour. There is a need 
to reinforce accurate understandings and tailor messages to address misunderstandings and 
gaps in knowledge.
• Most people tend to react to EWL options presented to them (or not) rather than actively  
seeking options.
• Primary orientations to EWL relate to broader attitudinal perspectives.
• Effective communication requires going beyond the technical properties of options (over EWL  
and pensions) to consider cognitive filters, e.g. trust in stakeholders and affective elements,  
e.g. challenges to notions of social justice. 
• Engaging with public(s) mental models requires consideration of five linked facets: cognitive 
orientation, emotional orientation, behavioural orientation (intentions), perceptions of 
stakeholders and structural factors.
• People view retirement as a just and deserved entitlement. Any erosion of this, particularly if it 
is interpreted as a forced option, is likely to meet with high levels of resistance and, potentially, 
outrage.
• Retirement is a period of uncertainty, particularly with respect to the spectre of age-related  
ill-health and worries over the sufficiency of income. People desire certainty. Configuring structural 
arrangements and communications that increase perceptions of certainty over income levels are 
likely to be more effective in motivating positive EWL/pensions behaviour than those that seek to 
provoke anxiety.
B.1.11 Cognitive and socio-cognitive behaviour change influence models
• The models have been most widely applied in public health contexts, particularly in the context of 
lifestyle (risk) choices.
• They focus on individuals at the unit of change, rather than the contextual (structural and socio-
cultural) elements. In this respect they contrast with the nudge perspective, but both could be 
used in a complementary manner.
Appendices – Improving communications about extending working life amongst 
individuals: learning from models of behavioural and attitudinal change
66
• They are rooted in the rational choice perspective, i.e. the assumption that human behaviour is 
the product of a rational appraisal of costs and benefits of different actions. 
• There is quite strong evidence that they can play a role in changing people’s orientations to issues, 
e.g. risks to their future well-being. However, their impact tends to be modest in the presence of 
strong structural and cultural counter-influences.
• Claims of their impact on behaviour are to be dominated by findings reporting rates of behaviour 
intention (rather than behaviour).
• Stages of change approaches have been widely adopted; however, there is limited evidence that a 
staged approach is superior to alternatives.
• There is potential utility in the use of the stages of change concept as a way of segmenting the 
population to provide a focus for policy thinking over intervention strategy. 
B.1.12 Designing policy to nudge people to work longer and save for 
retirement
• The choices people make are often sensitive to whether options are framed as gains or losses. In 
many instances people are loss-averse.
• If individuals are to be successfully nudged to extend their working life it is important to change 
the perception that they are entitled to retire at 65.
• The endowment effect implies that individuals will need to be offered significant compensation to 
give up their ‘entitlement’ to retire. Framing options as avoiding financial penalties are likely to be 
more effective than a focus on portraying gains. 
• There is strong evidence of higher pension take-up where the default is an ‘opt-in’.
• Status-quo bias – people tend to shrink from changing investment choices for fear that they may 
make the wrong choice, i.e. the avoidance of regret. They make mistakes because they are afraid 
to make mistakes. 
• When an increase in choice increases complexity, individuals are more likely to procrastinate. One 
way to nudge individuals is to reduce ‘choice overload’, possibly through channelling choice.
• Setting deadlines over EWL and pensions investment options can go some way to ameliorate 
inertia and status quo bias.
• Individuals behave as if they assign money to different ‘mental accounts’. There is scope to take 
advantage of mental accounting when setting incentives.
• Paternalists set out to do ‘what is best’ for individuals, but the experts do not always agree on 
what is best. There is also the presumption that the experts are a disinterested party. Defining the 
best choice that individuals should make can be problematic. 
• Policy-makers may claim that they nudge individuals in a very general way, e.g. to save, diet and 
exercise, but effective policy nudges must be more specific than this.
• There is evidence that policy nudges may advantage different groups in different ways. It is 
important to recognise that nudge may have very little impact on those who have little autonomy 
and choice over their access to work and working arrangements.
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B.2  Introduction
B.2.1 Background and context
Despite headline public health concerns over an array of lifestyle issues, people are also not only 
living longer but in general are healthier, more physically able and active in older age than in 
previous generations. However, increased longevity brings with it new challenges to individuals and 
the State, not least with respect to financial provision for old age. At a societal level the impact on 
the ratio of working to non-working life years has raised concerns, most acutely in the Western 
world, over the sustainability of established State and private pensions arrangements.
Beyond fiscal concerns over the sustainability of established retirement norms (historically, 65 
years and earlier in the UK), recent years have witnessed calls from the ‘grey-lobby’ for enhanced 
access to work on the grounds of social inclusion. Interest has also been expressed by employers’ 
groups, conscious of skills shortages and attracted to the benefits of flexible working arrangements. 
Current UK Government policy is that the minimum age at which State Pension will be claimable 
will be raised, incrementally, from 65 years to 68 years by 2046 (Pensions Bill 2011). However, it is 
equally apparent that around one-third of the working population withdraw from the labour market 
significantly before the age of 65 (National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), 2010). There is also 
evidence of a widespread cultural orientation towards retirement amongst the over 50s, this being, 
in part, attributed to employment policies and practices during the 1980s aimed at alleviating youth 
unemployment.
The socio-economic implications of increased longevity have led the UK Government to prioritise 
finding ways to erode established norms over work and retirement, to encourage individuals to 
remain in paid employment for longer. Beyond the economic imperative, this strategy has been 
justified on the grounds of enhancing social inclusion ‘...	to	end	the	perception	of	older	people	as	
dependent;	ensure	that	longer	life	is	healthy	and	fulfilling;	and	that	older	people	are	full	participants	in	
society’ (Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), 2005) and to offset the potential for broadening 
social disparities in standards of living in older age.
The last decade has witnessed increases in rates of employment amongst the over 50s, however, 
approximately one-third of men aged 55-64 and one-third of women aged 55-59 are currently 
unemployed, inactive or retired. In social policy terms this presents a number of challenges, in 
particular the prospect of a pensions crisis and widespread hardship in old age. Changes in the 
economic base leading to a decline in employer pensions, post-war demographics, the high 
post-war birth rate and increased longevity, combined with the legacy of a culture of early 
retirement rooted in the 1980s have led to the widely held conclusion that the cost to the State 
is unsustainable. Further considerations relate to calls for enhanced flexibility over the age of 
withdrawal from paid employment from employers, in order to address skills shortages in key areas 
and grey interest groups, on the grounds of social inclusion. 
Reflecting alignment with key policy objectives on EWL in other European States, the DWP has a 
long-term objective of finding ways to encourage more people to work up to and beyond SPA. The 
DWP’s EWL policy team has strategic responsibility for all aspects of older worker employment. A 
core element of its remit relates to finding ways to stimulate higher rates of employment amongst 
individuals aged 50–69 years. 
Key public policy objectives in this area include:
• influencing employer orientations, policies and practices pertaining to the employment of older 
workers;
• enhancing opportunities for non-working older individuals to return to paid employment;
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• encouraging employees to remain in paid employment for longer;
• encouraging employees to make enhanced financial provision for retirement.
With the objective of maximising the impact of public policy aimed at motivating extended working 
life (up to and beyond SPA) and pension investment, the DWP has commissioned extensive research 
into the array and relative importance of (cognitive and socio-cultural) variables that influence 
people’s retirement orientation(s) and decision-making. 
This report reviews and synthesises the evidence from DWP commissioned research and the wider 
evidence base on EWL and pensions policy. The review represents the initial phase of an evidence-
based approach to policy development in this domain. 
B.3 Aims
• To review and summarise what is known of public orientations, attitudes and behaviour regarding 
EWL including pensions and provision for retirement. 
• Summarise and interpret key findings, referenced to established social science insights on 
decision-making, motivation and communication – relevant to the formulation interventions 
designed to enhance public knowledge and disposition towards EWL.
B.3.1 Research scope
The EWL and pensions evidence bases benefit from qualitative and quantitative contributions, 
including large-scale national survey data. This is a useful feature in so far as it provides insight 
into not only what people know, believe and how they behave but also aspects relating to the 
underpinning rationale. On some issues there is also scope for a valuable element of triangulation, 
e.g. the extent to which different studies report common (or disparate) findings; the extent to which 
qualitative findings appear to generalise when explored using representative samples. 
The review focuses on evidence relating to public/employee orientations, motivations and behaviour, 
rather than those of employers. This emphasis reflects the focus of commissioned research to date, 
which has tended to limit the consideration of influences to aspects of individual volition and decision-
making. By contrast research into contextual (socio-cultural, workplace climate/culture and structural) 
influences has been modest, and largely limited tapping public/employee beliefs surrounding these. 
This imbalance within the evidence base constitutes the primary limitation of the review.
A further limitation, however, is that hard behavioural data is very limited, attitudinal evidence 
predominating, i.e. post-hoc reflections and rationalisations for past/current behaviour and 
intentions regarding future behaviour.
The relationship between attitudes and behaviour can be complex, and is prone to vary with the 
issue under consideration. However, a general and resilient finding is that attitudes tend to be a 
weak predictor of behaviour, particularly in instances where the attitude has a positive frame and 
where engagement in the related behaviour brings with it a time, effort, social or financial cost. Put 
succinctly, a change in behaviour is a stronger (and more reliable) predictor of attitude than attitude 
is of behaviour (see Wicker, 1969).
More positively, there is a sound basis for inferring the direction of behavioural change from a 
measured change in attitude over time, e.g. comparison using a common assessment tool at time 
1, time 2, etc. But, caution needs to be exercised where absolute values are presented, not least 
because people are disposed to responding to questionnaires, in interviews and in focus groups in 
socially desirable ways, i.e. ways that portray themselves in a positive light and ways that offer a 
plausible rationale for their behaviour. 
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When asked to account for past behaviour and future intentions, people are prone to exhibiting an 
array of biases of causal attribution, the most salient of which in the current context are self-serving 
and self-other biases:
• Self-serving biases – include selecting plausible rationalisation for past-behaviour (hindsight 
bias) that are socially acceptable/desirable (rather than necessarily the true volition); similarly 
portraying oneself as a victim of circumstance (externalisation bias), rather than a free agent. This 
can extend to post-hoc modifications of previously held attitudes to fit (justify) behaviour, in order 
to reduce cognitive dissonance. 
• Self-other biases – relate to volition and causality, e.g. the tendency to view failure in others 
as a product of their personal shortcomings, whilst considering one’s self to be a victim of 
circumstance. 
The principal implication of the above is that the ELW and pension behaviour evidence base requires 
careful interpretation. This review aims to be sensitive to these issues though a critical perspective 
that highlights areas where such effects may cast doubt on the reliability of prima facie evidence.
A key challenge to the interpretation of findings is that no single behavioural science discipline or 
paradigm offers a sufficiently embracing perspective. The application of this knowledge in policy 
domains requires a pragmatic assimilation and harmonisation of the, at times, contradictory, 
contributions from cognitive psychology; behavioural economics, social psychology, socio-cultural 
theory and related perspectives. This is not trivial, as there are a number of fundamental differences 
in terms of theoretical underpinnings, approach to investigation and conceptions of the basis for 
human action.
Members of the research team were selected on the basis of their ability to reflect these 
perspectives, their experience of working closely with policy-makers, understanding their research 
and evidence needs and of translating behavioural science insights into practice.
B.3.2 The evidence base
From the outset, it was agreed that DWP-commissioned research on EWL, pensions and retirement 
would constitute the core evidence base for the review. This was supplemented with material 
derived from web-based key-word searches, published texts, refereed journal articles and grey 
literature publications. International evidence was included in instances where there was sufficient 
alignment with UK employment law and pensions arrangements. 
In addition to published materials, the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS), the English Longitudinal 
Study of Ageing (ELSA) and the DWP’s National Attitudes to Pensions Survey (NAPS) (2006 and 2009) 
data bases were interrogated with a view to identifying and analysing variables, combinations of 
variables and potential relationships that could contribute to answering the key research questions. 
In view of the current (relatively high) cultural profile of pensions issues and EWL, in the UK following 
the recently announced planned rise in SPA, combined with media coverage of equivalent events in 
other EU Member States, and their impact on public orientations to EWL, all searches were restricted 
to a post-2000 time frame.
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B.3.3 Structure of the review
The review is configured as a compendium of evidence on public attitudes/orientations and 
behaviour regarding EWL and pensions referenced to:
• key policy questions; 
• techniques for charactering public orientations; 
• contemporary models of behaviour change.
This is supplemented with sections that relate to the status of evidence, in particular aspects 
relating to the limitations and boundaries of the EWL and pensions evidence base, notably what can 
be concluded on the basis of retrospective, intention and attitudinal data.
Each section is designed to stand alone, so that the reader is not burdened with the need to read 
the document in its entirety. Necessarily, this embodies a degree of repetition where common 
findings are of relevance to multiple key questions. Signposts are provided within each section to 
highlight instances where there is read-across to other sections. While there has been extensive 
effort to harmonise the text, minor differences in drafting style, reflecting the contribution of 
multiple authors and disciplinary perspectives, will be apparent between sections.
The set of key policy questions were generated through discussions between the review team and 
with the DWP’s EWL team. These were identified as:
• How do the public view EWL beyond perceived age of retirement?
• To what extent does decision-making over retirement and pensions reflect the presence of 
cognitive biases, recourse to heuristic reasoning or affective reactions?
• To what extent do the public actively engage in decision-making over EWL and pension provision, 
the point(s) in their lives that people contemplate retirement and pensions and what stimulates 
this? 
• What is the nature of any information needs, knowledge gaps and misunderstandings with 
respect to retirement and pensions?
• Orientations to sources of information and advice over extending working life, retirement and 
pensions?
• Perspectives on employability, employment options, training and beliefs regarding employer 
practices and older workers?
• The impact of the (2012) rise in SPA on attitudes to EWL.
Other sections address:
• Mental models of retirement, pensions and EWL.
• Designing policy to nudge individuals to work longer and save for retirement.
• The applicability of cognitive and socio-cognitive psychology behaviour change models to EWL 
and saving for retirement.
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B.4 Method
It was recognised by the DWP that:
• the Department had amassed a large body of dedicated and relevant research evidence on EWL;
• much of the available evidence needed to be distilled to address the key EWL policy questions 
outlined in Section 2.1;
• the evidence base was dominated by descriptive findings that required interpretation, referenced 
to established insights on human behaviour, in particular decision-making and behavioural 
change evidence;
• there was some contradiction between study findings and the bases for this needed to be 
examined;
• findings from qualitative studies, based on small samples, needed to be examined and, where 
possible, verified with reference to evidence from large-scale (representative) survey evidence;
• a review of the amassed research evidence base would permit the identification of evidence gaps.
By intent, the approach was not a systematic review, but an interpretive assimilation of the 
extensive research commissioned by the DWP, UK National social survey evidence, supplemented 
with evidence from other published material from the UK and international contexts. 
The evidence base was constructed from:
• recent (2000–10) DWP commissioned research reports, identified through discussion with 
members of the EWL team and DWP social researchers, supplemented with a web-based key-
word search;
• web-based key-word searches of non-UK Government-funded research including EU and other 
State-sponsored work and grey-literatures e.g. research commissioned by the pensions industry; 
• Key word searches of analytical abstracts for peer-reviewed journals, books and other 
publications, using the University of Bath’s Electronic Library Information Navigator (ELIN) system;
• Published reports and data bases from the BSAS, the ELSA and the DWP’s NAPS (2006 and 2009).
A bibliography of the key references that comprised the evidence base for the review is provided at 
the end of this report.
B.4.1 Approach to analysis
The approach to analysis comprised an integration of four linked activities focused on answering the 
key research questions outlined in Section B.3.1.
• An interpretive themed analysis of published research material referenced to the defined key 
policy questions.
• An analysis of secondary quantitative data (defined variables and derived variables) sourced from 
the BSAS, ELSA and the NAPS (2006 and 2009) data bases.
• Based upon insights derived from (i) and (ii), the production of schematic variable maps/influence 
models and mental models that characterise public(s) beliefs, understandings and orientations.
• A consideration of the applicability of cognitive and socio-cognitive perspectives on decision-
making/behaviour change to EWL and pensions. 
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B.4.1.1	 Thematic	analysis
The core aim of the review was, not only to distil findings from an array of sources of varying foci 
to achieve alignment with the EWL agenda but to relate and interpret the product in terms of 
established theoretical insights on human decision-making and behaviour. The premise here was 
that a theoretically informed insight into the basis for contemporary public orientations to EWL was 
necessary to inform evidence-based policy thinking over future intervention strategy to achieve 
behavioural and cultural change.
Given the interpretive focus of this review and the predominance, by volume, of qualitative evidence 
the approach to the core analysis centred on identifying key and recurrent themes and their 
constituent facets, that mapped onto the research questions detailed in Section 2.1. In essence, 
what was performed was an interpretive thematic analysis, supplemented by quantitative evidence 
derived from the available social survey data. This approach permitted an articulation of points of 
agreement and departure in qualitative findings, while affording a valuable degree of triangulation, 
where possible, with survey evidence derived from representative samples.
Findings have been interpreted with reference to the extensive evidence on cognitive, socio-cognitive 
and socio-cultural influences on decision-making, in particular decision-making in relation to risk, 
public concerns and stakeholder engagement. Beyond rational-actor perspectives and the role 
of incentives lie elements that relate to heuristics, cognitive biases, habit and an array of social 
and cultural normative influences, as well as inter-relationships with characteristics of the choice 
architecture. 
Again, following contemporary qualitative research practice, evidence in the form of quotations 
from respondents cited in the reviewed studies is used to exemplify and illustrate the interpretation 
placed upon findings. Quantitative social survey evidence is used in an equivalent manner. 
The approach to referencing in this document deviates from established precedents over style in 
referring to research commissioned by the Department of Work and Pensions in abbreviated form. 
The rationale for this is twofold:
• the review is aimed at policy-makers and government social researchers. Referencing sources 
by their index, e.g. DWP 557, allows the reader to readily differentiate between government 
commissioned research and other sources;
• referencing government reports by their index number permits brevity in instances were multiple 
sources are cited, e.g. to provide corroborative evidence.
B.4.1.2	 Secondary	data	analysis
The analysis of secondary data was designed to complement and mesh with the review of  
published evidence.
The theoretical governed approach to interpreting the existing literature and secondary data 
analysis using the ELSA database permitted the development of a model of factors influencing 
decisions about when to retire (Figure B.3, Section B.5.4). The ELSA data was used to explore features 
of the model and to test its key predictions. 
B.4.1.3	 Schematic	model	building
This section extracts insights from the review evidence base to characterise public mental models 
of retirement, pensions and EWL referenced to a range of intrinsic and extrinsic influences that 
may inhibit or facilitate decisions. This characterisation embodies: cognitive orientation, emotional 
orientation, behavioural orientation (intentions), stakeholders and structural factors.
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B.5 Insights referenced to key policy issues
B.5.1 How do the public view extending working life beyond perceived  
age of retirement?
Key	findings
• Widespread recognition of the logic of the need to finance increased longevity through extending 
working life does not translate into a belief that ‘I	should	extend	my	working	life’.
• The option for pre-SPA retirement is a highly valued and widely encountered aspiration.
• Being able to choose how to spend your time, rather than having this determined by work seems 
to be a key incentive to retire.
• There seems to be significant demand for post-SPA employment where this is a voluntary decision 
embodying choice, particularly over hours of work.
• Most who would consider working post-SPA want to remain with their current employer.
• Most who would consider working post-SPA want part-time employment, but believe that there 
are insufficient opportunities for this without downshifting.
• The demand for downshifting (less responsibility/lower skilled work) is low.
• Different social groups have different attitudes and intentions regarding EWL. 
B.5.1.1	 Social	acceptability
In unpacking this issue it is important to recognise that it embodies two distinct but linked strands: 
firstly, how people view EWL as a social issue, i.e. whether they see it as a social good; and secondly, 
the extent to which they see it as a personal issue that relates to them. This distinction is important 
as despite widespread recognition of the need for EWL at a societal level, this does not seem to 
translate into a commitment to extend one’s own working life (DWP 531). 
Care should be taken not to infer individual action on the basis of broad-based attitudinal evidence 
e.g. a majority response to questions of the type	‘Do	you	think	that	working	life	should	be	extended	
beyond	the	current	retirement	age?’ should not be taken as evidence that most people are willing to 
extend their own working life.
B.5.1.2	 Social	value	of	work	
The ‘human costs’ of worklessness experienced by 2.8m people aged between 50 years and SPA 
include disillusionment, depression, ill-health, poverty, insecurity and social exclusion (Performance 
and Innovation Unit, 2000). This might be expected to increase motivation to EWL. However, it 
seems that for many this is outweighed by the attractiveness of ceasing work before SPA, most 
viewing post-SPA working as a penalty (see, for example, DWP 557). 
While work brings financial and social benefits, it seems that many individuals ultimately view it as a 
means to an end and retirement as a right of passage (and reward); a period in which to spend the 
short time remaining as one chooses. Even those who enjoy work appear to look forward to stopping 
and the opportunity to do other things. Being able to choose how to spend time, rather than having 
this determined by work seems to be a key incentive to retire (Hedges and Sykes, 2009). 
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In short, it seems that there is a degree of ambivalence about work. On the one hand, it is socially 
valued as a source of financial and personal benefits, on the other it is perceived as imposing costs 
on the individual by displacing more enjoyable activities. It seems that this trade-off becomes less 
satisfactory in old age and there is an expectation that people should be entitled to enjoy a lengthy 
period of active retirement. The paradox is that while work is socially valued over unemployment, 
it is not valued over retirement, even though both are forms of economic inactivity that potentially 
embody hardship. The differentiation between unemployment and retirement has a formal 
dimension in terms of entitlement to State Pension and employers’ right to retire ‘poorly	performing’ 
older workers, but there is also a degree of volition over when individuals feel that their working life 
should end.
B.5.1.3	 Social	status	and	work
The relationship between social status and paid employment is bi-directional. Social groups 
that are accorded low status and perceived to have diminished capacity or competence may be 
discriminated against in the job market, but active participation in paid employment can also raise 
social status and challenge prejudicial assumptions. It has also been suggested that an increase in 
rates of employment amongst older people may have the effect of reducing ageist orientations in 
the wider society, i.e. the suggestion is that exclusion from economic activity feeds, or is perhaps a 
defining influence on the social marginalisation of older people.
A potential pitfall of anti-discriminatory (or even positive discrimination) employment legislation 
aimed at older workers is the danger that younger people may view the retention of older workers 
as reflecting legal obligations rather than being grounded in merit. In this context, pay scales that 
reward tenure could foreseeably become a source of tension.
B.5.1.4	 Retirement	preferences	and	ambitions
Many of the factors that influence retirement lie beyond the control of the individual and cannot 
easily be forecast, for example, serious illness, redundancy or caring responsibilities may occur 
suddenly in an individual’s life and derail their preferred work/retirement strategy. Even so, there 
remains some value in exploring people’s preferences.
Evidence from a range of sources indicates significant levels of latent demand for post-SPA 
employment. A recent survey of the over 50s found that 80% of respondents claimed to be interested 
in continuing to work beyond SPA (McNair, 2010). Other sources suggest that of those who expect to 
be pushed out of work at SPA (74%) 60% of them have an interest in undertaking further paid work 
after this (DWP434). Although there are detail variations by source, it seems safe to conclude that 
there is significant potential demand for post-SPA employment. However, it is important to keep in 
mind the limitations of attitudinal data and the potential for attitude-behaviour disparities.
Significant social variability is apparent regarding ambitions and expectations over the age of 
retirement (see DWP 434):
• younger workers are more likely to expect to work longer. This may reflect a shift in cultural 
expectations, but may also reflect limited exposure to any need to juggle/engage with factors 
that can lead to early retirement, e.g. ill-health or caring responsibilities;
• the self-employed also expect to retire later, possibly due to pull factors such as greater job 
control, or due to push effects relating to lack of pension provision; 
• higher earners appear to be more culturally disposed to EWL, but also have less economic need to 
do so, i.e. they enjoy significant autonomy over the point of withdrawal;
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• Gender differences appear to be modest. However, Smeaton et	al.	(2009) report that less than 
one-tenth of working women wish to retire before SPA (when set at 60 years), compared with 
one-third of men wishing to retire before 65 years. This seems to be reinforced by reports of 
modest differences in the preferred age of retirement for men (63 years) and women (62 years) 
(DWP 434). 
Turning to the demand for downshifting and flexible working, Maitland (2010) found the majority 
(62%) of workers in their 50s report feeling as fit as they ever had. Perhaps surprisingly, just 4% of 
the over 50s wanted to downshift, this being more than balanced by those who held promotion 
aspirations (11%). The impression is that many older workers, rather than wanting to downshift or 
disengage are actually keen to continue their careers at full capacity, perhaps because many continue 
to have substantial financial commitments. Nearly a quarter of 56–59 year-olds report a need to 
provide financial support to their offspring (Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), 2010). 
Although comparatively few older workers seem eager to downshift, there does appear to be 
widespread support for the concept of flexible retirement. The Euro Barometer Survey 2002 reports 
78% of respondents agreeing with the premise that older workers should be allowed to retire 
gradually. However, flexible retirement behaviour seems to remain relatively rare, due to significant 
structural and cultural barriers to older workers negotiating a transition to flexible working with their 
existing employer. 
Aspirations and expectations regarding retirement may be largely determined by personal 
circumstances and lifestyle choices, but they are not entirely immune to the broader policy dilemma 
of funding retirement. Clery et	al.	(2007) explored attitudes to EWL in the context of preferences 
for the long-term funding of State Pension and found that 85% of respondents claimed that they 
were prepared to work beyond SPA to ensure a higher standard of living, compared with 43% who 
preferred increased taxation; 29% who favoured an increase in the SPA; and 18% who preferred a 
cut in the value of the pension (also see McNair, 2010). 
There appears to be little reliable evidence of how individuals (and families) calibrate the trade off 
between retirement age and standard of living, i.e. how much longer people are prepared to work and 
how big the improvement in living standards would need to be to make it an attractive proposition.
In short, although it sounds tautological, there is evidence that many people want to retire early, but 
a significant proportion are prepared to carry on working, as long as this embodies choice and is not 
a forced option. People in their 50s mostly appear to want to continue working at full capacity, with 
a greater proportion seeking promotion than wishing to downshift. 
Most would prefer to continue working for their current employer. However, it is apparent that the 
opportunities for flexible work are limited and concentrated in certain sectors (Chartered Institute of 
Personnel and Development (CIPD), 2007). 
B.5.2 To what extent does decision-making over retirement and pensions 
reflect the presence of cognitive biases, recourse to heuristic reasoning 
or affective reactions?
Key	findings
• Widespread concern over post-SPA income does not seem to motivate engagement with planning 
or increase the attractiveness of EWL.
• EWL is framed as a loss, in terms of leisure time and active life years, which is not outweighed by 
financial gains from enhanced income.
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• Large numbers claim to be amenable to the idea of EWL as long as this is not a forced option and 
they have flexibility over hours worked.
• Choice, flexibility and control over the need to work, type and hours of work are highly valued, but 
unevenly distributed and unevenly realisable between social groups.
• EWL is not salient to most people. There are few precedents in the workplace and many do not 
see it as an option open to them.
• The concept of phased retirement is unfamiliar to most. However, there seems to be significant 
attraction to the idea.
• Employers constitute a more important normative influence over how and when to retire than 
other social references, e.g. family, community.
• The rise in SPA adds to perceptions of uncertainty over provision for retirement and may feed 
disposition to retreat from planning.
• The rise in SPA challenges public conceptions of fairness and social equity and serves as a barrier 
to engagement with the EWL agenda.
• Widespread recognition of increased longevity does little to diminish individual dread perceptions 
regarding ill-health/an early death.
• Detailed understanding of tax and pensions is very limited, and is, at best, considered vague and 
impressionistic. Education initiatives are unlikely to have a major impact on this.
• People are positive towards the concept of pensions but confidence in realisable pension values is 
seriously eroded.
• Evidence of predominantly vague and impressionistic understanding of pensions and the tax 
system raises questions over the utility of using incentives, e.g. tax relief, to stimulate pension 
investment. 
B.5.2.1	 Overview
Human beings are prone to an array of lapses, biases, and other deviations, from formal logic in 
decision-making in situations of uncertainty. They are also prone to taking mental short-cuts, 
(applying simple heuristic rules of thumb) to reduce cognitive load when dealing with complex 
issues (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman and Tversky, 1981; Kahneman and Miller, 1986; 
Thaler and Sunstein, 2008 and others).
While it is easy to dismiss such tendencies as evidence of human irrationality, the consensus 
is that more is to be gained from understanding variables that contribute to such phenomena 
than attempting corrective solutions (Royal Society, 1992; Fischhoff, 1995). This is very much the 
perspective of the influential policy orientated text nudge (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). It is also 
important to keep in mind that despite the research focus on deviations from rationalism, it would 
be unwise to view this as the dominant characteristic of human decision-making. Most decision-
making is essentially rational, or at least reflects internally consistent processes.
The largest contribution, by volume, in this area comes from cognitive psychology and behavioural 
economics. However, there are complementary insights from social psychology, sociology and social 
anthropology. This section will attempt to integrate these findings with what is known of decision-
making and underpinning public orientations to EWL and pension investment.
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B.5.2.2	 Heuristics	
Heuristics are, in essence, rules of thumb, educated guesses and intuitive judgements. They are 
essential mental shortcuts that all people routinely use to support their everyday existence. People 
tend to apply heuristics to save time and/or to reduce cognitive load, particularly when faced with 
complexity and unknown/unknowable outcomes. In such instances, people are prone to fall back 
upon simpler intuitive reasoning. In effect, a cognitively difficult problem is dealt with by selecting and 
answering a simpler problem, based upon a sub-set of (what are taken to be) the most salient criteria. 
In terms of the criteria that individuals draw upon in formulating their heuristics, these tend to be 
derived from prior experience/knowledge of equivalent or similar situations and inferential sense 
making. By extension, they can embody affective/emotional elements and/or draw upon socially 
derived, shared understandings, values and norms.
There is little to be gained from the perspective that heuristic reasoning is something which 
can or should be discouraged. Rather, the key insight in terms of public engagement relates to 
understanding this characteristic of human decision-making and devising policy solutions that take 
account of it. 
B.5.2.3	 Cognitive	biases
The concept of cognitive bias is linked with evidence of heuristic reasoning. Specifically, as well as 
exhibiting recourse to heuristic reasoning, human beings can (some would suggest are prone to) 
exhibit an array of identifiable and predictable biases in decision-making in situations of uncertainty. 
A significant array of biases and related effects has been identified, the most widely evidenced, and 
most pertinent to the current endeavour, are: 
• availability – the ease with which outcomes can be brought to mind. Effects relate to a disposition 
to select familiar solutions or options, e.g. retirement at age 65; but can also relate to the ease 
with which consequences can be brought to mind, in particular the consequences of failure, e.g. 
the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of pension failure or ill-health. There are linkages with 
dread (see below) – the tendency to focus on the consequences of undesired outcomes, rather 
than their likelihood (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1974);
• anchoring and adjustment – the tendency to consider an option referenced to a known value, in 
essence, a focus on relative rather than an absolute value in options appraisal (see Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974);
• representativeness – a tendency to focus on a single (or small number of) attributes/variables, 
rather than multiple variables and interactions between them (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1974);
• attribution bias – relates to an array of biases, but most saliently to volition and causality with 
respect to the self (self-serving bias) and the self referenced to others (self-other bias). Linked 
concepts include cognitive dissonance – the desire to resolve dislocations between attitudes and 
behaviour and the tendency to modify attitudes to account for behaviour (see Jones and Nisbett, 
1971; Ross, 1977);
• unrealistic optimism – a specific type of error of attribution that can embody elements relating 
to social comparison. In short, the belief that one is less vulnerable than would be judged on an 
objective basis (see, in particular, Weinstein, 1980, 1984);
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• framing effects – a key finding here relates to domain effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). 
Framing options as gains or losses can impact on preferences. A general finding is that people 
tend to be loss-averse, unless offered a long-odds option as an alternative to a certain loss (see 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman and Miller, 1986; Fagley and Miller, 1990); 
• psychological time – insights from a range of perspectives, highlight the importance of 
psychological time. Caution tends to be inhibited where negative outcomes are delayed (see 
Bjorkman, 1984). There is also a general preference for certain gains in the ‘here and now’, over 
future benefits, particularly where the future is uncertain (there are linkages with anchoring and 
adjustment effects see above). Sociological contributions point to differences in value structure 
by social class, concluding that differed gratification is more highly valued by professional and 
managerial groups (see Straus, 1962).
Building on the work on heuristics and biases, insights from the psychometric perspective on public 
concerns are also of relevance (for a summary see Slovic, 1992). This work set out to identify core 
characteristics of hazards and risks that impact on public perceptions. There is consensus over the 
orientational influences listed below. These variables can be broadly construed as operating in a 
manner akin to heuristics and biases, however, they are conceived as characteristics of hazards/risks 
that stimulate public reaction (profiles may also vary between different social groups).
• Dread – the tendency to focus on outcomes, rather than their likelihood, in part due to cognitive 
availability (see above). Where outcomes pose high-cost threats to well-being and where 
individuals feel vulnerable this tends to amplify public concern (not just with the issue, but with 
those perceived as responsible for the issue).
• Unknown – where solutions are unknown (not just to the public but to experts) and/or where 
there is uncertainty over the future this tends to amplify public angst and concern. 
• Control – is multi-faceted. Where individuals perceive that they have control over their exposure/
destiny concern/opposition tends to be attenuated. Conversely, if people feel that choice 
is constrained or that they are subject to forced options this tends to amplify concern and 
dissatisfaction. Control, in terms of voluntarism and personal volition, is also salient to perceptions 
of social justice (see Tausch et	al., 2010). Complementary findings on self-efficacy and locus of 
control highlight the role of agency, i.e. the degree to which individuals feel able to impact on their 
future (see Bandura, 1980; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1980; Ajzen, 1985) . 
Although derived from a wholly separate perspective, social psychologists, sociologists and socio-
cultural researchers have highlighted an array of influences, which might pragmatically be construed 
as operating as cognitive filters (Kasperseon, et	al.,	1988). In terms of the manner in which they are 
thought to operate there are analogies with the heuristic and biases insights, in so far as they are 
said to operate in a dispositional manner, embodying basic beliefs about the world and the way that 
it does and should operate. 
• Fairness and equity – notions of fairness and equity are deeply embedded, but are perhaps best 
expressed as a widely held aspiration, rather than an expectation of the social and institutional 
world; the focus of public concern tending to rest with instances of perceived unfairness and 
inequity, where equity is desired (see Fischhoff, 1995; Tausch et	al.,	2010). Contributions here 
come from an array of paradigms and perspectives, however, a global finding is that where 
injustice and disparity is perceived this can foster public concern, in some instances extending to 
outrage (see below).
Appendices – Improving communications about extending working life amongst 
individuals: learning from models of behavioural and attitudinal change
79
• Trust – specifically trust in stakeholders. As in the case of control, insights on trust are 
multifaceted. Contributory influences include competence, social responsibility and acting in 
the public interest, with linkages to issues of blame and accountability. However, there is strong 
evidence that trust in professions, organisations and the State is more complex than a single 
judgement value, rather the profile tends to be subject to variability referenced to the issue under 
consideration, in particular elements relating to perceived vested (routinely economic) interest 
(see Petts, 1998; Pidgeon et	al.,	2003a; Section B.5.6). 
• Outrage – has linkages with notions of social (in)justice, (un)fairness/(in)equity, (mis)trust, blame 
and accountability. In essence, situations where the public/sections of the public perceive that 
others have benefited from their loss, particularly in instances where it is believed that this has 
gone unchecked, e.g. instances where regulators, (g/Government) or other bodies have failed 
to redress perceived unreasonable exposure to harm by businesses/professionals. Outrage can 
contribute to the social amplification of public concern, typically fuelled by media interest and 
orientation (Pidgeon et	al.	2003b; Breakwell, 2007).
• Cultural biases – aligned with the anthropological work of Mary Douglas and more recent social 
research, there is evidence that shared norms, values, attitudes, beliefs, practices and common 
experiences can operate as cognitive filters. Douglas offers a typology of different social groups in 
terms of their value structures (Douglas, 1982). Other authors offer a more organic perspective, 
pointing to normative influences derived from shared experience, e.g. locale (Wynne, 1989).
As noted above, despite extensive research interest in deviations from rationality, it would be unwise 
to view irrationality as the dominant characteristic. The majority of human decision-making is best 
characterised as a logically consistent, rational inductive/deductive process. The range of biases 
outlined above, and the tendency to resort to heuristics is a characteristic we all exhibit and is not 
solely a product of educational deficit, although knowledge gaps are routinely encountered.
Impact on engagement with EWL, retirement planning and pension investment
The overwhelming picture of public engagement with the EWL agenda is that for most there is little 
thirst for seeking out information on this issue, to the extent ‘...	that	any	information	the	Department	
[DWP]	puts	out	on	this	subject	will	not	find	an	audience	eagerly	waiting	to	collect	and	digest	it.’	(DWP 
557, p.114). Rather, pre-retirement behaviour can more reasonably be characterised as people 
passively reacting to events as they unfold in the context of incomplete knowledge (DWP 531) ‘…	
in	general,	relevant	information	held	by	respondents	seemed	to	have	been	acquired	piecemeal	and	
incidentally	rather	than	[having been]	systematically	sought	out	...’	(DWP 557, p.102; DWP 434). 
EWL is not salient to most people, partly because they do not view it as an option available to them 
(DWP 299; DWP 557; DWP 673), the cessation of work at SPA being deeply culturally normed, and 
partly because of the positive frame of gains in leisure time (DWP 557; Low-skilled, 2010). A recent 
EU-wide survey reports 55% of respondents as resistant to EWL, 29% claiming a reduced income 
was not a disincentive to withdrawal (AON Consulting, 2007). 
‘The	model	that	suggests	people	tackle	problems	in	their	lives	by	collecting	and	analysing	evidence	as	
a	basis	for	developing	informed	strategies	does	not	describe	the	approach	that	most	...	participants	
have	been	taking	to	retirement.’ ‘Decision-making	is	influenced	not	only	by	factual	information	but	
also	by	feelings	and	images	[affect].’	(DWP 557, p.115). Thus, rather than engaging in rational 
systematic evaluation people tend to react to circumstances as they arise and to rely upon simple 
heuristic reasoning, possibly extending to affective reactions (also see DWP 299).
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The issue is not simply one of lack of understanding and the difficulty experienced in manipulating 
salient variables to arrive at a decision (bounded rationality) but the reality that ‘most	people	do	
not	find	pensions	[and other post SPA planning]	interesting.	Even	when	they	are	within	10	years	of	
likely	retirement	age,	many	[43% – DWP 193]	individuals	will	not	have	given	much	thought	to	their	
retirement	circumstances	…’ (Vickerstaff et	al., 2004). 
There are also reports of denial (possibly extending to unrealistic optimism) about the personal 
implications of an under-financed retirement (DWP 557), however, a more dominant finding is 
notable angst (worry/concern) over levels of retirement income; ‘Not	knowing	how	much	income	to	
expect	in	retirement	is	very	unsettling	...	[but this]	...	tends	to	[further]	paralyse	already	weak	impulses	
to	plan	ahead.’	(DWP 557). 
Amongst those who do plan, social groups A and B are overrepresented. A primary motivation seems 
to be not so much one of seeking to maximise income (gain frame), through EWL, but to minimise 
income tax liabilities (loss frame) (DWP 531). The motivation to EWL here appears to owe at least as 
much to intrinsic job satisfaction and social benefits as instrumentalist orientations.
Findings on reactions to the concept of a phased retirement (DWP 557) indicate that, while a sizeable 
proportion appear amenable to the idea, the option is essentially ‘not	on	their	radar’ (bounded 
rationality), there being limited social precedent in the workplace. Thus, few are able to readily bring 
to mind (cognitive availability) models of how phased retirement might work, particularly in context 
of continuing to work for their current employer; ‘…	many	people	seemed	to	be	reviewing	the	ideas	we	
presented	to	them	for	the	first	time.’ (DWP 557, p.52), i.e. the degree of disjuncture with the norm is 
such that mental models of options are not intuitive or substantially complete. 
Levels of awareness of pension deferral options are also modest (particularly amongst younger 
employees) and, where present, tend to lack detail (DWP 434), with consequent scope for 
misunderstanding. Many, it seems, fall back on an heuristic that pensions must pay out at SPA. In 
this context, the question ‘When	should	I	start	drawing	my	pension?’ makes little intuitive sense.
Reactions to the idea of referral also appear to focus on a loss frame, ‘...	there	was	an	instinctive	
conclusion	that	they	would	lose	out	–	because	they	would	lose	payments	they	were	not	claiming,	
rather	than	focusing	on	the	higher	rates	they	would	potentially	receive	at	a	later	date	...’ (DWP 557), 
the latter appearing to be tainted with uncertainty and the potential for loss ‘...	there	were	questions	
over	what	happens	if	you	die	before	you	withdraw	it...’ (DWP 557), but potentially a more positive 
(gain frame) orientation surrounding ‘...	whether	it	would	be	transferable	to	your	family?’ (DWP 557). 
Presenting respondents with financial information relating to the respective implications of varying 
their date of retirement and pension deferral on pension values appears to provide an effective 
anchoring effect, in so far as relative change over time becomes transparent (DWP 557). However, 
this does not seem to significantly increase enthusiasm for EWL. ‘As	with	SPA	equalisation,	while	
some	thought	the	idea	[of	pensions	deferral]	was	a	good	idea,	in	principle,	the	vast	majority	of	
interviewees	were	not	considering	deferral	for	themselves.’ (DWP 531, p.97). 
A significant proportion, concentrated within social groups C2, D and E are highly oriented around 
the perspective that they have earned their right to retire and are, consequently, likely to be the 
most resistant to engagement.
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Choice/flexibility/control
In terms of EWL, issues of control, choice and flexibility are perhaps best construed as orientation 
phenomena. Retirement is not only highly valued by most individuals but considered a right of 
passage and just reward for the years of labour. It is, therefore, understandable that many see 
any externally imposed erosion of this period as a loss, whether due to rises in SPA, or enforced by 
economic need. ‘...	they	[the	public]	were	very	resistant	to	the	idea	of	being	made	to	work	on	and	
thought	that	people	should	be	free	not	to.’ (DWP 557, p.34). 
Where EWL is a matter of personal volition and choice, orientations tend to be more positive,  
‘...	generally	people	like	work	but	want	control	over	what	they	do	and	how	they	do	it’, they also want 
choice over whether they have to work or not, i.e. they are likely to be highly resistant to what they 
perceive as a forced option (DWP 531), irrespective of differences in their basal orientation to EWL. 
Qualitative findings highlight gains from providing reassurance that policy objectives for EWL relate 
to a finite period, of one or two years (DWP 557). However, it seems that a significant proportion of 
the public have suspicions that any change in SPA represents the thin end of a wedge, such that the 
recent changes effectively permission future changes.
For many, freedom and choice, over how to spend one’s time is a central retirement orientation; a 
gain. ‘I	think	for	the	word	“retirement”	means	having	choice.	Whereas	pre-retire	meant	you	having	to	
work.’	(DWP 557, p.22). Similarly, ‘Most	respondents	felt	that	a	defining	characteristic	of	retirement	
lies	(or	should	lie)	in	taking	control	of	their	own	life	and	choosing	for	themselves	how	to	spend	their	
time.’ (DWP 557, p.22), and ‘…	choice	was	also	viewed	as	integral	to	what	retirement	entails	…’, 
wealth and health permitting (DWP 531, p.78).
McNair’s finding that 80% of the economically active claim that they would consider working 
after SPA (also see EHRC, 2010), provided their commitment was flexible or part-time (McNair, 
2007) is widely corroborated: ‘There	was	a	lot	of	interest	in	the	possibility	of	flexible	working	and	
gradual	retirement.’ (DWP 531, p.75; DWP 299; DWP 557). ‘Extending	working	life	will	be	assisted	
by	individuals	having	greater	control	over	options	during	the	transition	...	and	greater	control	over	
the	timing	of	retirement.’ (DWP 299, p.7). From an array of sources, it is apparent that a significant 
proportion, of not just those over SPA but also those in their 50s and early 60s, are attracted to 
employment that offers increased flexibility and/or reduced hours (McNair, 2007; Low-skilled, 2010). 
What is less clear is the extent to which this profile differs from the ideals of younger workers.
However, while there is widespread evidence of latent ‘...	interest	in	the	possibility	of	flexible	working	
and	gradual	retirement.’ (DWP 531, p.75), the possibility of flexible working leading up to and post-
SPA is a relatively unfamiliar orientation and not one that most people commonly encounter in their 
experience of work and working arrangements, i.e. its cognitive availability is weak. 
‘Although	there	is	a	consensus	about	the	desirability	of	choice	as	to	when	to	retire	or	if	to	continue	
working,	the	ability	to	exercise	choice	is	unevenly	distributed	[by social group].’ (DWP 531). 
Professionals and senior managerial grades currently enjoy greatest choice over the timing and 
trajectory of retirement, in particular with respect to hours worked. For these individuals, EWL is 
very much a choice, in so far as the level of pension provision they currently enjoy largely removes 
the push effects associated with the need to supplement low income. They are also more likely to 
continue their established career path rather than seek alternative employment. Ultimately, findings 
indicate that the degree of autonomy over hours of work, pace of work, etc., are related to job skill 
and social status, notable exemptions being the self-employed (DWP 299). 
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McNair, in his attempt at a segmented typology of orientations to EWL, concludes that ‘Those	who	
felt	in	control	of	their	job	changes	[promotion/redeployment, etc.]	were	much	more	likely	to	stay	in	
work...	and	be	willing	to	consider	continuing	in	work	after	formal	retirement.’ (McNair, 2007). In his 
typification of Jugglers (those who retreat from work due to caring responsibilities), Survivors (blue 
collar workers likely to withdraw on health grounds) and Choosers (managerial and professional), 
it is the latter group that enjoy the greatest sense of control over the configuration of their working 
lives, the most positive attitudes to work and motivation to stay on. But, importantly, McNair says 
that they report fewer opportunities for flexibility than they would like and, as a consequence; ‘Since	
in	general	they	can	afford	to	retire	their	general	response	to	these	barriers	is	to	do	so.’ (McNair, 2007). 
The apparent attractiveness of choice and flexible working is not just about reducing hours, but 
over the distribution/configuration of hours. Shift working, for example, is unpopular, the evidence, if 
anything, suggesting that this tends to increase the desire to withdraw from work (DWP 531).
It should also be borne in mind that greater choice and flexibility over work is attractive to workers 
of all ages, i.e. it is not just an older person’s issue. Around half the working population desire greater 
flexibility or a change to their hours of work (EHRC, 2010). The primary limiting factor on take-up 
seems to be its (un)availability (DWP 531), with only around a third of employers currently offering 
flexible options (CIPD, 2005). 
While there are strong claims for enhanced flexibility having a positive impact on orientations 
to EWL, it is possible that the research evidence may overstate the case. Specifically, there is 
scope for self-serving attribution bias, i.e. some (unknown) proportion of respondents may have 
been motivated to cite lack of flexible employment opportunities as a post-hoc justification for 
withdrawal from employment.
Norms and normative references
Traditionally, economists and behavioural decision theorists construe factors influencing orientations 
and aspirations towards retirement as a matter of individual choice, rooted in an, at least quasi, 
cost-benefit analysis of wealth, health and caring commitments. However, there is strong evidence 
of social and cultural normative influences on decision-making. 
Normative influences are generally construed as relating to the influence of shared beliefs, attitudes 
and behaviours, on individual (and group) orientations and actions, i.e. social norms are, in essence, 
socially constructed shared ‘rules’, customs and practices. Whether explicit or implicit, they tend 
to manifest themselves in conformity effects, to the extent that norms equate to the natural way 
of things. In cognitive terms, this might be a case of availability bias, i.e. the high salience of the 
natural order of things. 
As noted earlier, mental models of a phased retirement or EWL tend to be incomplete with low 
cognitive availability. A pervasive social norm is the conceptualisation of SPA as a cliff edge (DWP 
557), after which paid employment ceases. 
It has been suggested that a set retirement age (whether referenced to SPA or employer norms) 
has an anchoring effect on public perceptions which inhibits constructive thought about when 
to retire (DWP 673). While this may be true, the normative influence of SPA at (formerly) 60/65 
years is likely to continue to operate as a robust cultural benchmark for the foreseeable future, 
although potentially subject to gradual erosion. Industry/sector norms also play a pervasive role 
here and interact with established cultural norms. There is evidence that approximately two-fifths of 
employers enforce a compulsory retirement age (DWP 673).
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It is widely reported that many people retain an aspiration to retire in their 50s, particularly those in 
semi- and unskilled employment. This orientation tends to be ascribed to normative influences, said 
to have become the established norm during the recession of the 1980s. It is foreseeable that such 
norms will be stronger/more frequently encountered in the regions which witnessed the decline of 
traditional manufacturing, heavy industry and mineral extraction, where mass redundancies, which 
for many in the absence of alternative employment equated to early retirement, were highest. 
Against this background, the policy emphasis on EWL, that probably gathered momentum in terms 
of its media/social profile following the recent announcement of a rise in SPA, has had the effect of 
stirring sentiments of social (in)equity. Many approaching retirement feel cheated and angry over 
the prospect of a loss of their free time and ‘earned’ (‘deserved’ 41% of respondents; EHRC, 2010] 
income and, as a consequence may be unreceptive to initiatives aimed at EWL (DWP 531; DWP 557).
The normative anchoring effect of the work/retirement behaviour of others within peoples 
social reference groups leaves many resentful (in the sense of unfairness/inequity with previous 
generations) with the blame for being cheated out of leisure years tending to be directed at the 
Government. ‘In	many	cases	we	found	feeling	of	anger	and	betrayal	[outrage].’ (DWP 557). ‘A	strong	
theme	...	[was]	of	retirement	as	a	deserved	[equity and justice]	reward	for	a	long	working	life.’ (p.77). 
Many in the sample had worked for 40+ years having left school at the age of 15 (DWP531). 
Culturally, retirement is framed as a brief and limited interlude between work and death, with 
perspectives on retirement and longevity tending to be normatively referenced to the experience 
of parents, grandparents and significant others (DWP 531; DWP 557): ‘The	experiences	of	family	
members	and	friends	would	seem	to	be	very	influential	in	sustaining	this	cultural	view	that	people	
should	not	leave	it	too	late	to	enjoy	retirement.’	(DWP 531, p.81). Examples of an early demise, or 
succumbing to poor health in retirement tend to be, understandably, feared and highly cognitively 
available, ‘...	many	...	knew	someone,	or	knew	someone	who	knew	someone	who	had	not	had	
a	decent	retirement	[representativeness bias]	...	despite	acknowledgement	that	statistically	we	
are	living	longer,	many	respondents	held	pessimistic	views	about	life	expectancy	based	on	the	
experiences	of	those	around	them.’ (DWP 531, p.80), this tending to engender a loss averse 
orientation with, arguably, vestiges of a form of self-other attribution bias. 
We also know that there are social class differences with respect to longevity, with ill-health and an 
early death being more cognitively available as we move down the social structure. Cumulatively, 
these groups are overrepresented in traditional industry regions (Rowntree, 2007) that will also have 
the most established historical norms of early withdrawal from work. 
There is also evidence of normative influence in terms of life-partner work/retirement behaviour. 
Drawing on Labour Force Survey (LFS) data, Lissenburgh and Smeaton (2003) report a correlation 
between exit from work and spouse’s employment status in couples. In the case of traditional male-
female couplings, there is said to be an alignment in the timing of retirement, and that this tends to 
follow the age of the, generally older, male. Corroborative evidence is apparent in the finding that 
single women tend to work to a later date than married women, although push factors, relating to 
the need for income, also seem likely to play a role here (Lissenburgh and Smeaton, 2003, cited in 
DWP 299; see also DWP 531). 
While there is evidence that familial expectations and parental behaviour can have significant 
normative influence on selected date of retirement and there are claims that ‘...	the	influence	of	
work	mates	or	even	acquaintances	on	individuals	attitudes	[can be also]	very	significant.’ (DWP 531, 
p.80), the balance of evidence suggests that employer practices play a more important role, not 
just in a normative sense regarding date of and trajectory of retirement/EWL arrangements (EHRC, 
2010) and attitudes to pensions, but in terms of actively setting financial incentives (DWP 531), e.g. 
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voluntary redundancy packages. It is known that people are disposed to exhibit bias in favour of 
a certain gain (Tversky and Kanemann, 1981), particularly where this is framed in the near future, 
against less certain gain in the distant future (hyperbolic-discounting), i.e. we know people are 
disposed to take a short-term perspective on retirement and that, relatedly, people tend to exhibit a 
‘lump sum’ bias (Gazzale and Walker, 2008). 
There are also instances of employers, notably the NHS, seeking to reduce pension liabilities by using 
nudge type (see Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; Dolan et	al.,	2010) techniques (by accident or design) in 
offering (encouraging) staff the choice to select lower Defined Benefit (DB) pension values against 
higher lump sum payments, i.e. when discounted across a period of approximately 15 years of 
retirement this equates to a loss to the individual and a gain to the employer.
Worries/concerns
The social construction of retirement has been characterised as period of security and freedom to 
pursue one’s interests, but for many the reality is underscored by the financial realities and worries 
over health (DWP 531), i.e. there is notable disjuncture between the ideal and the reality for many. 
Not surprisingly, worries and concerns surrounding EWL tend to be referenced to a loss rather than 
a gain frame. As the authors of DWP 557 note, it is apparent that much uncertainty surrounds 
retirement, many contemplating it in a negative frame of mind. The range of anxiety inducing 
unknowns relate to income, health status and ultimately, issues of longevity and mortality. More 
positively, for many, retirement orientations embody expectations and aspirations regarding what 
to do once time is their own. However, such aspirations tend to be bounded by the perspective that 
time is short and underscored by varying degrees of trepidation over financing the affair. Many have 
not calculated how much income they will need when they retire, but most have concerns over 
whether they will have sufficient (DWP 557; DWP 531). ‘Even	for	those	whose	financial	situation	and	
health	status	was	not	currently	a	worry,	the	risks	of	these	things	going	wrong	was	a	very	powerful	
element	of	how	people	felt	about	retirement.’ (DWP 531, p.80).
A net result of strong orientations around uncertainty and the easily brought to mind (cognitively 
available) spectre of undesired outcomes, e.g. ill-health, limited life expectancy and pension failure, 
is a strong orientation to the realisation of benefits in the here and now. 
‘A	powerful	objection	to	staying	longer	in	work	is	that	it	seems	to	put	to	risk	the	common	goal	of	a	
healthy,	active	and	fulfilling	retirement.’	(DWP 557, p.5). Similarly, ‘The	most	prevalent	reason	for	
intending	to	retire	before	SPA	was	in	order	to	enjoy	retirement	while	still	in	good	health	...	[37%]	
Individuals	cannot	be	certain	how	long	their	good	health	will	continue	and	therefore	base	decisions,	
such	as	early	retirement,	on	the	possibility	that	their	health	may	deteriorate.’ (EHRC, 2010). Fear 
(dread) that they will die or lose their health and miss out is an important factor. ‘Even	working	up	to	
SPA	is	often	seen	to	eat	into	‘quality’	retirement	time.’ 
(DWP 557, p.5 ). 
Despite widespread recognition of increased longevity, the spectre of ill-health and/or an early 
demise are vivid images in terms of cognitive availability, with almost all individuals having the 
capacity to bring to mind instances where this has befallen parents, other family members, 
colleagues or known others. Making people aware of increases in mean life expectancy has little 
effect on individual beliefs and decision-making, as it offers no personal guarantee. People appear 
to have no difficulty in recognising that other people are living longer, but this tends to do little to 
convince them that they will live longer themselves (DWP 531). 
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It has been suggested that ‘Whether	information	campaigns	on	life	expectancy	could	do	anything	
to	shift	these	[fatalist]	orientations	remains	largely	untested.’ (DWP 557). However, the balance of 
evidence from the pensions domain and the wider literature on risk (see, for example, Weyman and 
Kelly, 1999; Weyman and Williamson, 2005), suggests that communications campaigns that stress 
this point are likely to have a modest impact. As in other risk domains, the public exhibit a strong 
disposition to focus on the consequences of unwanted events (dread), rather than their probability 
(Royal Society, 1992; Fischhoff, 1995). 
It has also been suggested that sabbaticals and unpaid leave may help to reduce the sense of 
potential loss and prolong preparedness to stay in work (EHRC, 2010). While no known empirical 
evidence exists on this issue, this type of discounting is not well aligned with insights on decision 
behaviour.
Confidence in pensions
Issues of confidence are multi-faceted relating to broad-based impressions of the pensions industry, 
employers and State practice. These are derived from a combination of: mediated accounts and 
direct personal experience, as well as socially derived knowledge of the pensions, experiences of 
others, notably colleagues, friends and family members (DWP 562).
There is widely cited evidence of an erosion of confidence in pensions (NAPF, 2010; DWP 434; 
DWP 557; DWP 562). This is ascribed to a combination of a general loss of confidence in financial 
institutions, following the onset of the financial crisis in 2007/08, media coverage of earlier high 
profile failures in pensions, e.g. Equitable Life, and ongoing coverage of the State Pension crisis (DWP 
438; DWP 562; DWP 528), the planned rises in SPA potentially reinforce this. 
There is strong evidence of a widespread belief that pensions are an area of uncertainty (unknown 
risk), extending to cynicism, not surprisingly most acute amongst those who have had bad 
experiences (DWP 434; DWP 531; DWP 562). Unknown in this context should not be interpreted in 
terms of knowledge deficit, but the belief that future cannot be predicted and controlled. Issues of 
confidence and uncertainty surround not just the date of entitlement but realised pension value 
(DWP 557).
In many respects, the pensions issue is a risk issue and it seems likely that its current cultural profile 
reflects some degree of (likely ongoing) social amplification (DWP 438; DWP 562), i.e. its profile 
is one where public perceptions of the degree of crisis/perceived failure is greater than might be 
justified on the basis of objective assessment. The extent to which this erosion of confidence may 
inhibit future take-up/motivate opt-out behaviour remains unclear.
The erosion of confidence in pensions adds further uncertainty, to a period of life naturally framed 
with uncertainty, over health and longevity (NAPF, 2010; DWP 531). Uncertainty in this domain has a 
number of facets including:
• uncertainty over whether pension choices will prove to be sufficient to support retirement 
ambitions; 
• uncertainty over which products to select; and 
• uncertainty over future State Pension provision. 
Less than a quarter of employees express ‘high’ confidence over ‘how best to save for pensions’, with 
almost two-thirds reporting that lack confidence over how best to save for their retirement (DWP 434). 
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In other risk domains, uncertainty has demonstrated the potential to evolve into organised concern, 
and this remains a possibility. However, at an individual level the more salient effect is the tendency 
for uncertainty to contribute to disaffection and disengagement. ‘Not	knowing	how	much	income	to	
expect	in	retirement	is	very	unsettling	and	tends	to	[further]	paralyse	already	weak	impulses	to	plan	
ahead.’	(DWP 557). 
Issues of uncertainty (more saliently the desire for certainty) have strong intuitive linkages to issues 
of trust (see Section B.5.6), and are potentially important when considered in terms of confidence in 
sources of information and advice, particularly over pensions.
An SPA of 60/65 years is so deeply culturally engrained, as a life cycle benchmark (DWP 557) that, 
until the recent changes were announced, constituted part of the unchanging natural order of 
things: ‘one	of	life’s	certainties’. It would be unwise to underestimate the potential ripple effect from 
this change, in terms of its impact on public confidence in pensions (the earlier equalisation of SPA 
for men and women probably benefited from chiming with perceptions of social equity). 
It seems that some have even come to the conclusion that recent changes represent the vanguard 
of a process of phasing-out the State Pension. ‘These	uncertainties	were	multiplied	by	widespread	
doubts	that	the	State	Pension	would	continue	at	all	–	or	at	least	at	a	worthwhile	level.’	(DWP 557, 
p.40). Similarly, ‘Overall	there	was	a	sense	that	the	goal	posts	kept	moving	and	it	was	quite	difficult	for	
the	individual	to	do	the	right	thing.’	(DWP 531, p.84), and; ‘There	was	widespread	cynicism	in	relation	
to	the	Government’s	motives	for	intervention	in	matters	relating	to	pensions	and	retirement.’	(DWP 
531, p.19).
Only around a third of people have high confidence that their pension will give them sufficient 
income in retirement (NAPF, 2010b); public sector respondents being overrepresented here. The 
findings that there are ‘...	substantial	differences	between	public	and	private	sector	employee	
confidence	in	their	own	employer	pensions	would	both	guarantee	and	deliver	a	sufficient	income	[for 
retirement].’ (DWP 434) may be subject to erosion with the onset of proposed changes to public 
sector arrangements (The Pensions Bill 2011). 
However, other evidence highlights widespread positive orientations to pensions, at least at a 
conceptual level. Here, as elsewhere, we can detect some disjuncture between what the public 
believes should happen and what they believe will happen. It seems that widespread reports of an 
erosion of public confidence in pensions should not be interpreted as fostering outright rejection of 
the concept, rather people simply lack confidence in current arrangements. The concern surrounds 
whether the level of income received will be sufficient. In this regard, levels of confidence are almost 
universally low (DWP 434). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, preferences for saving in another way (38% DWP 434) e.g. ISAs and 
investment in property, are most widely reported amongst those with direct experience of poor 
pension experiences. However, the reported correlation (DWP 434) between alternative investment 
and the wider belief that pensions deliver an unguaranteed return should perhaps be treated with a 
degree of caution. While this can be interpreted as reflecting a loss-averse orientation, it could also 
embody some (unknown) degree of attribution bias, in so far as the expressed belief may be used 
as a post-hoc justification for not investing in a pension, i.e. lack of confidence in pensions may be 
used by some as a retrospective justification for non-investment, rather than reflecting a conscious 
(causal) decision criterion. 
Similarly, whist there is evidence that can be interpreted as suggesting that reduced confidence 
(loss aversion) may inhibit investment in pensions, based on the belief that realised values will be 
modest, we believe that care should be taken in interpreting findings in this area (see DWP 294), as 
some of the evidence gathered has sought to elicit rationalisations from respondents for the basis 
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for non-investment. As such, it is not possible to partial-out elements that reflect attribution bias 
and/or, a desire to reduce cognitive dissonance, i.e. rationalising a decision not to invest in pensions 
on the basis of their modest contribution to retirement income over and above State Pension may 
reflect a desire to reduce cognitive dissonance (sense of regret), rather than reflecting the product 
of deliberative decision-making resulting in detachment, per se.
It seems likely that decisions to invest in pensions owe much to the product of what amounts to a 
do-nothing option, in the case of employers’ pension schemes, or a tendency to fall back on some, 
quite likely socially derived, basic heuristic that amounts to ‘pensions	are	either	a	good	(or	a	poor)	
thing	to	invest	in’.
Deferred gratification
The life cycle hypothesis, propagated and taken as a given by many economists, assumes a 
preference for deferred gratification, i.e. that: 
• people are forward looking (many are not);
• people can predict the financial resources they will have over their lifetime (most cannot); 
• people understand the amount they will need to save (most do not); 
• people make informed choices over financial options (most are not motivated to do so and find 
this too complex);
• modest [subsistence orientated] State Pension values motivate people to seek supplementary 
income for retirement (evidence is unclear);
• maximal utility represents the primary decision criterion (other effects are salient, e.g. habit, 
affect and workplace norms).
In varying degrees, behavioural decision insights and empirical evidence on EWL and pensions 
counter these core assumptions.
Deferred gratification relates to an orientation where there is perceived benefit from investment 
(time, effort and/or financial) today, in order to reap the benefits tomorrow. In essence, it relates to 
the motivation to invest for the future and impulse control, including pension investment and gains 
from pensions deferral.
While deferred gratification has been identified as a personality trait, more saliently, from the 
perspective of the current review, it is also said to operate at a cultural level (see Douglas, 1967). 
Specifically, sociologists have suggested that deferred gratification operates at the level of a cultural 
value, that is more commonly encountered in A, B, C1 households. This is said to contrast with 
working class cultural norms, in particular those of younger people, which are characterised as 
placing higher value on ‘instant gratification’, i.e. a preference for reaping benefits in the here and 
now, or near future (also see Goldthorpe et	al.,	1968). 
It seems that between one-quarter and one-third of adults are more strongly orientated around a 
preference for funding their current standard of living than saving for the future, i.e. what the authors 
of DWP 562 refer to as ‘myopia’. Younger people, those with lower incomes and those with lower 
perceived life expectancies are more likely to prioritise their current standards of living over saving for 
retirement (DWP 294; DWP 434). It is also the case that large numbers of low paid workers do not 
have sufficient disposable income to fund a worthwhile personal pension investment. While attitude 
behaviour disparities might reasonably be expected in this area, it seems that the orientation is not 
fundamentally hedonistic, as comparatively few (11%) appear to believe saving for retirement to be 
pointless or that retirement is so far off it is not worth worrying about (15%) (DWP 434).
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The increasingly salient threat of unemployment, combined with high profile accounts of pensions 
failure will increase uncertainty for many. It is foreseeable that this may increase the tendency 
to focus on the near future, uncertainty tending to draw the focus (cognitive availability (dread)) 
towards the potential for loss. ‘The	negativity	about	pensions,	the	role	of	the	financial	institutions	and	
government	did	not	serve	to	encourage	people	to	consider	working	longer,	but	was	rather	more	likely	
to	reinforce	the	‘live	for	the	day/today’	attitude,	as	the	future	was	uncertain.’ (DWP 531, p.119).
The introduction of the default State coordinated personal account pension enrolment 
arrangements, planned for 2012, is designed to reduce myopia (DWP 562): ‘...	the	financial	incentives	
of	tax	relief,	investment	growth	and	a	mandatory	minimum	contribution	from	employers	and	
government	equal	to	that	from	employees	are	expected	to	persuade	most	of	the	auto-enrolled	who	
are	tempted	to	opt-out	to	resist	and	remain	enrolled.’	(DWP 562). The approach reflects ‘nudge’ 
related behavioural decision-making insights (see, in particular, Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; and Goda 
and Flaherty, 2010). 
The personal accounts scheme is also likely to benefit from the inclusion of tripartite contribution 
arrangements (State, employer and employee) on grounds of perceived social equity, compared 
with employee-only contributions (68% take-up versus 13%, respectively, DWP 562) (Gough and 
Hick, 2009; Pettigrew, 2007; Cleary et	al.,	2007). The Save More tomorrow (SMarT) initiative in the 
USA also reflects behavioural decision-making insights, in so far as it makes play of the fact that any 
sense of loss arising from enhanced contributions as a proportion of annual pay rises is mitigated if it 
is deducted at source and requires no conscious decision to invest, compared with the alternative. 
B.5.3 To what extent does the public actively engage in decision-making 
over EWL and pension provision, the point(s) in their lives that people 
contemplate retirement and pensions, and what stimulates this? 
Key	findings
• Active engagement in decision-making over pensions tends to be a minority activity. 
• A significant proportion do not actively engage and would prefer to select default options, e.g. 
joining their employer’s pension scheme, rather than selecting an alternative.
• The complexity of pension options and uncertainty over realised values tends to foster inertia.
• Despite almost universal recognition and acceptance of the need to make financial provision for 
retirement, around one-fifth of individuals choose to or have very limited scope to act on this. 
• The attitude-behaviour dislocation over pension investment mirrors health and life-style 
orientations, e.g. while few are unaware of the long-term benefits of smoking cessation, reduced 
alcohol consumption, dietary change and exercise and often believe these to be desirable many 
continue to indulge. 
• Financial considerations play a role in decisions over the date of retirement but for many people 
this is not the only, or even the primary, criterion. 
• Around a third of individuals prioritise maintaining their current standard of living over their future 
(retirement) standard of living.
• Around half of individuals feel that they cannot afford to save for retirement.
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B.5.3.1	 The	life	course	model
In order to grasp the decision-making process over EWL and pension provision it is important to 
adopt a life course perspective, which recognises that the factors which influence decision-making 
can change over the course of life and interact with the circumstances under which decisions are 
taken. The function of pension savings is to redistribute surplus income from the period of working 
life to the time of scarcity following retirement, a process referred to as ‘income smoothing’. Rational 
choice theory would suggest that young workers would recognise the value of redistributing their 
income in this way. However, there are attitudinal and situational factors that can impact upon or 
defer this decision-making process. As we shall see, the salience of saving for retirement increases 
as workers get closer to SPA, with the result that decisions about saving for retirement tend to be 
engaged with at too late a stage in the life course.
If serious retirement planning is deferred until the late 50s or early 60s, then any increase in pension 
contribution is likely to yield a modest return and is unlikely to redress underinvestment in preceding 
years. For people in this position, the more viable proposition may be to extend their working life. It is 
intuitive that those with inadequate pension provision will be the most likely to continue working up 
to and after SPA.
However, as Philipson, has argued, the period of the life course between 50 and SPA is marked by 
complex social and demographic changes. Where previous generations may have experienced a 
mid-life plateau, this part of the life course is increasingly characterised by multiple transitions, not 
just in work-related roles, but also as carers, family members, consumers, etc. It is suggested that 
these changes in the social world have given rise to greater diversity and uncertainty in people’s 
experiences, with impact on their orientation to work: ‘Work-related	transitions	are	certainly	one	
important	dimension,	but	these	exist	alongside	the	development	of	citizenship,	consumerism	and	
leisure	activities.	In	the	future,	people	will	almost	certainly	be	looking	for	a	balance	between	these	
areas,	and	it	seems	unlikely	that	employment	alone	will	take	precedence	in	the	organisation	of	daily	
life.’ (Philipson and Smith, 2005).
An implication here is that these new demands and opportunities are in tension with the financial 
imperative to continue working full-time up to and beyond SPA. In response to these changes 
Philipson argues that a new social contract is required which ‘balances	individual	and	collective	
responsibilities	in	the	various	transitions	running	through	the	lives	of	people	in	their	50s.’ (Philipson 
and Smith, 2005). Rather than aiming to extend current patterns of working life across the board, 
policy-makers should recognise the diverse needs and preferences of the over 50s and put in place 
policies that facilitate flexibility, choice and security.
The Transitions after 50 research programme offers broadly equivalent conclusions: ‘…	a	debate	
around	whether	people	should	be	retiring	earlier	or	later	is	misplaced.	People	in	their	fifties	vary	hugely	
in	terms	of	their	work	situation,	their	expectations,	their	attitudes	to	work,	their	financial	position,	their	
health	and	their	personal	lives.	Many	difficulties,	which	they	encounter,	stem	not	from	an	inability	to	
face	up	to	the	trade-off	between	income	and	leisure	in	later	life,	but	from	a	lack	of	choice	and	control.’ 
(Philipson and Smith, 2005).
A key message appears to be that older workers are a diverse group, not least in the degree of 
choice and control they have over their employment status. The principal implication here is that 
EWL intervention activity will need to take account of this diversity amongst the over 50s.
A life course perspective on pensions and retirement policy implies the need for tailored 
interventions to meet the needs of different age cohorts. For younger workers policy might focus on 
encouraging greater personal pension savings, for older workers the emphasis might be on putting 
in place policies that will extend choice and control over retirement age, for example by promoting 
flexible working.
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B.5.3.2	 Decision-making	about	pension	provision	and	assets	for	retirement		
(also see Section B.5.2)
Most people appear to recognise the desirability of, and need for, saving for their old age (see, for 
example, NAPF, 2010). The 2006 National Attitudes to Pensions Survey (NAPS, 2006) found that 60% 
of respondents thought that the best time to start pension contributions was as soon as one started 
earning. Over half thought that it was the individual’s responsibility to ensure they had sufficient 
retirement income, rather than the responsibility of Government or their employer (although most 
also felt that the Government should top up the income of low-income pensioners; also see Gough 
and Hick, 2009).
However, despite widespread recognition of the need to make financial provision for retirement 
around a fifth of the working population do not behave as the economic theory on incentives 
suggests they should (Wicks and Horack, 2009).
Of those who choose not to invest in pensions, reasons cited include direct experience of poor 
pension investments the experience of known others and mistrust of financial institutions. A more 
dominant finding is that confidence in the concept of pensions remains robust, with over half of the 
working population believing that putting money into a pension is the most secure way of saving for 
retirement. However, the latter perspective is caveated by low confidence that the amounts realised 
will be sufficient to fund retirement. Two-thirds of home-owners report that they would consider 
using this equity to fund retirement, usually by moving to a smaller home or cheaper area (NAPS, 
2006, 2009).
Although, these elements play a part, there is evidence suggestive of a more fundamental 
reluctance to defer the gratification of spending income in the short-term in order to benefit from 
increased income in later life. While differential abilities to make relevant calculations should not 
be discounted, a potentially more salient factor appears to be a widespread reluctance (29% –
NAPS, 2006) to sacrifice current standard of living for future gain, i.e. the desire to enjoy a good 
quality of life now tends to outweigh anxiety over retirement income. Notably, almost half (49%) of 
respondents in this survey reported that they could not afford to save for retirement.
Most people appear to recognise that they should save for their retirement and that they should 
begin saving early in their working life, but exhibit varying degrees of dislocation between their 
attitudes and behaviour.
The problem for policy-makers is not primarily one of providing stronger incentives, for example, the 
evidence suggests that facilitating early access to pension savings as an incentive to save has little 
effect. Nor is the problem entirely one of knowledge deficit, or attitudinal change, because people 
know and believe that it is in their interests to save for their retirement; the problem is that despite 
the incentives they are often incapable of acting in what they know to be their own best interest. 
In many ways, the attitude-behaviour dislocation over pension investment mirrors orientations 
surrounding the adoption of healthy lifestyles, e.g. while few are unaware of the long-term benefits 
of smoking cessation, reduced alcohol consumption, dietary change and exercise, and often believe 
these to be desirable, many continue to indulge.
B.5.3.3	 Barriers	to	saving
In their review of attitudes towards pensions saving, Wicks and Horack (2009), highlight 
relationships between structural, attitudinal, informational and behavioural obstacles, see Figure B.1.
The model characterises the complexity of structural variables (pension product options, tax and 
benefit arrangements) as feeding already low motivations to invest, within a context of mistrust 
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and cynicism over positive outcomes and a predilection for a myopic focus on today rather than 
tomorrow.
These authors recommend ameliorative policy intervention in the form of individualised guidance 
on pension investment. This is based on the premise that the solution lies in reducing complexity, so 
that it is easier for people to calculate their pension needs and develop strategies for meeting them. 
While there is likely merit in this, the potential impact of such interventions should be considered 
against the background that:
• very modest proportions of the public appear to actively engage (or could forseeably be induced 
to actively engage) with pensions decision-making and retirement planning;
• the scope for reducing complexity is limited;
• outcomes of alternative choices may be inherently unknowable/uncertain;
• too much information may lead to information overload and decision fatigue, possibly to the 
extend of promoting withdrawal.
The introduction of automatic enrolment in workplace pension schemes (planned for introduction in 
2012), may go some way to addressing myopia and inertia effects.
Figure B.1 Links between different barriers to saving 
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B.5.3.4	 Decision-making	in	work/retirement	transition
The previous discussion implicitly assumes that financial considerations are the prime determinant 
of retirement age, i.e. people retire as early as they can afford to. Indeed, a criticism that can 
be levelled at much of the research in this domain is that it assumes that individuals are active 
decision-makers, basing their choices on the principles of parsimony/utility maximisation.
However, ‘…	it	is	unclear	regarding	the	extent	to	which	individuals	in	their	50s	or	60s	make	detailed	
financial	calculations	on	the	relative	merits	of	working	over	retiring.’	(Phillipson and Smith, 2005). 
While financial considerations are likely to play a role, it seems safe to conclude that they are only 
one consideration, and may not represent the primary consideration. There is strong evidence that 
an array of individual and contextual variables plays a role in individual and family-unit decision-
making over the timing of retirement. However, a key distinction can be drawn between those who 
are pushed towards retirement through redundancy, ill-health, or caring responsibilities and those 
who have more choice in the matter.
Further research is required on the decision-making process, especially regarding: the timing of 
decisions about retirement; the optimum time to influence decisions; identification of who are the 
key actors who influence decision-making; and the influence of conscious and unconscious motives. 
As a first step in this process, we have attempted to model some of the variables that impact on 
decision-making over retirement (see Sections B.5.4 and B.6).
B.5.4 Which variables impact on decision-making over how and when to 
retire, including normative influences and social references?
Key	findings
• Key push and pull influences on retirement behaviour include: individual (health and psycho-
social), financial, family commitments, peer retirement norms, job characteristics (satisfaction, 
working hours; employer attitudes/norms) and structural influences (availability of work; State 
benefit arrangements).
• Social differences, relating to social grade/class appear to constitute a primary influence on EWL 
and pensions behaviour. It has such a strong relationship to having a pension or not; size of 
pension, employment opportunities, access to flexible work and more.
• Suffering debilitating ill-health is the most salient individual-based determinant of early 
retirement and disproportionately impacts on the semi-/unskilled.
• Robust evidence of social networks and sub-cultures based on locale constituting strong 
normative influences on the date of retirement is lacking.
B.5.4.1	 Push	and	pull	factors
The transition from work to retirement is ultimately a volitional act. The SPA may be fixed by statute 
and until recently employers may have had the right to retire employees when they reach that age, 
but ultimately, it has always been down to the individual to decide whether they accept the status 
of retirement or continue to seek paid employment. However, although individuals must decide 
when to retire, rarely do they make that decision under conditions that are wholly of their own 
choosing. The literature suggests that there are multiple factors that influence the age at which 
people retire:
Appendices – Improving communications about extending working life amongst 
individuals: learning from models of behavioural and attitudinal change
93
• individual factors – physical and mental health, psychological dispositions, attitudes/beliefs, and 
knowledge of pensions and retirement options; 
• financial factors – pension value, other savings and financial obligations, for example, financial 
support for children; 
• family and social network factors – caring responsibilities, retirement date of partner and 
reference group retirement norms; 
• workplace factors – job quality, opportunities for flexible working, and employers’ attitudes; 
• structural and economic factors – enforced redundancy, decline of traditional industries, changes 
to State benefits.
Social status is considered a key socio-demographic factor because it has such a strong relationship 
to having an occupational or private pension or not; size of pension income, employment 
opportunities, access to flexible work and more.
In Figure B.2 we have attempted to draw together insights to produce a hypothetical model of the 
impact of the factors outlined already on three primary socio-economic groupings: high income 
professionals, middle income groups and low-skilled, low-income workers. The model is discussed 
below, but first we will introduce and articulate the constituent variables
B.5.4.2	 Health	status
Suffering long-term debilitating ill-health represents the most salient individual factor as a 
determinant of early retirement. Lower income groups exhibit proportionally higher rates of 
debilitating ill-health (MacInnes et	al.,	2009), in part due to workplace exposures, but also due to 
broader cultural/lifestyle effects.
There is strong evidence that employers could do more to enable employees with health problems 
to stay in work (Black, 2008). Employee perspectives appear to reflect this. Around two-thirds of 
those, who rate their health fair or poor, claim that their employer is insufficiently sensitive to their 
health needs. Additionally, around a third of those who report ill-health claim to be inhibited from 
making their employer aware of this for fear of discrimination (particularly for mental health issues). 
Both phenomena increase the potential for migration to chronic ill-health status. There is also 
evidence of socio-cultural differences in health status and perceived capacity to work (EHRC, 2010).
B.5.4.3	 Financial	factors
Insufficient pension income, coupled with ongoing financial obligations such as a mortgage or 
dependent children, have the potential to operate as push factors. Possessing sufficient retirement 
income permits greater flexibility in making trade-offs between the intrinsic and extrinsic benefits 
of work and leisure. Those in low-skilled, low-income jobs are more likely to encounter financial 
disincentives to returning to work, e.g. after illness, redundancy or retirement, including low wage 
income and loss of benefits.
B.5.4.4	 Familial	and	social	network	factors
Those who are married or divorced are more likely to stay in work than those who are single or 
widowed, although there is evidence of gender differences, single women appearing to be relatively 
more disposed to EWL. Caring for children or adults is common amongst those aged 50-55 (39%) 
and disproportionately impacts on women. The need to provide care for others can push people out 
of employment, but may also operate as a financial incentive to stay at work (EHRC, 2010).
Appendices – Improving communications about extending working life amongst 
individuals: learning from models of behavioural and attitudinal change
94
Harder to quantify is the influence of social norms about retirement age. These may be mediated 
through the family or broader social networks. However, there is evidence that couples seek to align 
their retirement date referenced to the elder partner (Lissenburgh and Smeaton, 2003). Despite intuitive 
appeal, there appears to be little beyond speculation regarding the extent to which social networks and 
sub-cultures based on locale constitute strong normative influences on the date of retirement.
B.5.4.5	 Workplace	factors
Workplace factors relate to the nature of work, the design of work and the social context of 
work. Where employees find work intrinsically rewarding, disposition to EWL might reasonably 
be predicted to be higher, or perhaps more succinctly, disposition to retire early moderated. By 
extension, where extrinsic variables, such as camaraderie and social support are strong, this may 
make work more attractive. Where work is not intrinsically engaging, with low social support, with 
high physical and psychological demands, or anti-social hours it is, unsurprisingly, less attractive to 
most people.
A number of authors cite an increased intensification of work in recent decades as a causal influence 
in the incidence of work-related stress (see, for example, Philipson and Smith, 2005). Other sources 
paint a more complex picture of the stress epidemic (see Cox, 1993). However, what is apparent is 
that large numbers of the over 50s cite work-intensification-stress as an important criterion in their 
decision to withdraw from employment. A third of those who rate their work as ‘high stress’ report 
planning to retire before SPA compared with a 20% average (Philipson and Smith, 2005).
B.5.4.6	 Structural	and	economic	factors
Citing the experience of the 1980s and early 1990s, Phillipson and Smith (2005) note that there 
has been a tendency amongst employers to treat older workers as a reserve army of labour, with 
employment opportunities tending to reflect fluctuations in the wider demand for labour. Such 
effects are likely to be more pronounced amongst the low-skilled. However, sector-based differences 
are foreseeable, i.e. demand is likely to be higher in areas where there are skills shortages.
B.5.4.7	 Modelling	relationships
Social differences, relating to social grade/class appear to constitute a primary influence on EWL and 
pensions behaviour. While not wishing to underplay the degree of social complexity here, Figure B.2 
and Table B.1 represent an attempt to characterise/typify the profiles of salient variables referenced 
to three broad social banding’s.
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Figure B.2 Characterisation of relative salience of variables by social status
Within the model constituent variables, their relative salience and their socio-demographic 
relevance have been derived from an assimilation of qualitative and quantitative evidence.
Interpretation of Figure B.2
• The header rail donates age of retirement.
• Three socio-economic groups are characterised as: high income professionals (A and B)44, middle 
income managerial/white collar (C1 and C2) and low/unskilled (D and C). Each social group ellipse 
embodies the range of incomes (X axis) and range of retirement ages (Y axis). 
• The arrows represent factors impacting on age of retirement. Their relative size indicates relative 
impact. Where factors are salient to more than one socio-economic group, the arrow is placed 
closest to the most affected groups, e.g. poor health is most salient to lower income groups doing 
routine work.
High income groups are characterisable as the most strongly attitudinally disposed to EWL  
(see DWP 531), with the most opportunities for employment, greatest choice over the configuration 
of work and the point of withdrawal. They are also likely to impose the lightest load on State 
finances in retirement.
The low-skilled arguably have the strongest financial incentive to EWL, but also experience the 
strongest push to retire at, or before, SPA e.g. due to ill-health, redundancy, restricted scope for flexible 
work. Members of this group have the least volition (choice or control) over the point and manner of 
retirement and tend to be the least intrinsically engaged with, and motivated by, the work experience.
44  NRS social grades – www.ipsos-mori.com (July 2009).
The 
receptive 
middle
High income professionals
Low-skilled, low-income
Low income
replacement
Caring for
relatives
Big pension
Downshift
Poor health
Redundancy
Employer
pressure
Low pension
knowledge
Dependent
children
Employer
support
Job satisfaction
Low job quality
Flexible
working
Little pension
Low assets
56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 66 68 69 70676564
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Table B.1 Characterisation of primary social contrasts
Retirement push factors EWL pull factors
High income professionals Generous pension and liquid assets High intrinsic job satisfaction
Strong market demand for skills
Strong flexible working options
Good health
Choice
Middle income 
Managerial/white collar 
and skilled
Redundancy
Job stress
Care of dependants
Modest flexible working options
Modest pension or liquid assets
Financial support for offspring
Low-skilled Poor health 
Redundancy 
Low job quality 
Low intrinsic job satisfaction
Low market demand for skills
Few flexible working options 
Low choice
Low control
Low pay
Care of dependants
Little/no pension or liquid assets
For the middle strata, the factors driving them to retire early are considered to be relatively weaker 
than for the low/unskilled group. Poor health, in particular job stress, can operate as a push factor, 
but diminished physiological capacity is likely to be less important than for those in traditional 
manual employment. A high proportion is also present within the public sector where there are 
currently more opportunities for flexible working (CIPD 2007). The majority are likely to have some, 
modest, established pension provision and be culturally orientated around differed gratification 
(saving for tomorrow). But their pension values are unlikely to be sufficient to support volitional 
retirement much before SPA. The push from caring responsibilities can be predicted to be less than 
for the semi-/unskilled due to greater opportunity for flexible working and/or income levels sufficient 
to buy care services.
We deduce that these factors will conspire to afford this middle group a relatively narrow band of 
retirement ages, clustering around SPA or a couple of years below. Despite this narrow range, we 
also predict that this group will have a degree of control over precisely when and how they retire.
While the model we advance remains hypothetical/theoretical, it is rooted in our synthesis of the 
evidence base and we believe that it offers utility in terms of policy thinking over a segmented 
approach to intervention.
However, caveats surround potential limitations of the evidence base. This is a composite 
of qualitative and quantitative evidence and questions might reasonably be raised over the 
representativeness of some samples. In addition, the quantitative evidence tends to be limited 
to univariate analyses and prevalence rates, e.g. opportunities for flexible working. At a more 
fundamental level, we run into the limitations of attitudinal data, referenced to previous and/or 
future behaviour, e.g. ‘do	you	think	you	would	retire	later	if	you	had	the	opportunity	to	work	flexibly?’.
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In Section B.6 we report findings from our attempts to apply multiple regression modelling to the 
ELSA data set, in order to answer some of these questions. Unfortunately, this type of analysis asks 
a great deal of the data set, so it has not been possible to quantify or test all of the relationships 
posited in our hypothetical model. Where gaps remain these are identified and may provide agenda 
for future research.
B.5.5 What is the nature of any information needs, knowledge gaps and  
misunderstandings with respect to retirement and pensions?
Key	findings
• Most people react to options for EWL rather than actively seeking them out.
• For the minority who actively seek EWL it is particularly important that they are able to grasp 
salient facts, and that misunderstandings are addressed. 
• Many people’s concept of EWL reflects simple heuristic inference, it is important that these 
heuristics are appropriate and substantially correct. 
• Plugging knowledge gaps is relatively straightforward in communication terms but the net result 
is that people are better informed. There is no guarantee that they will make better choices.
• Enhanced knowledge is one of an array of variables impacting on attitudes and behaviour in 
relation to work. In most instances structural and (workplace) climate influences play a more 
pervasive role.
• The idea of phased retirement is unfamiliar to many and there is limited understanding of the 
options or their implications.
• Cultural precedents for EWL are only present in a limited range of employment sectors.
• Flexible working pre- and post-SPA is attractive to many, but people have limited knowledge of the 
range of potential configurations and how post-SPA income interacts with private/employer/State 
pensions and other benefits. 
• Many people experience difficulty in estimating how much income they will need to support them 
in retirement, but there is recognition that State Pension values represent a subsistence income.
• People are able to make substantially accurate estimates of State Pension values.
• Levels of awareness and understanding, the financial implications associated with options over 
early draw-down/deferral of pensions.
• There is fairly strong evidence of a preference for individually tailored, bespoke, pension forecast 
over generic information.
• The impact of complexity over pensions and EWL increases the probability of people making poor 
pension choices, blunts their motivation to actively engage in decision-making, and contributes to 
public uncertainty and a sense of helplessness over planning for later working life and retirement. 
• Knowledge of pension matters is low; only one in 20 rate their knowledge as ‘good’; and one in 
four claim to possess little or no knowledge. Confidence in how best to save for pensions is also 
low (one in 54 individuals).
• Most people’s knowledge of EWL and pensions polices is limited to headlines like ‘state	pension	
age	is	going	up’, combined with a belief that goal posts are prone to move around in this area.
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B.5.5.1	 The	limits	of	an	education	deficit	perspective
Before proceeding with this section it is necessary to define its boundaries and to reflect upon the 
context of public information needs, knowledge gaps and misunderstandings. First and foremost, 
there is an implicit assumption that decision-making over retirement and pensions is the product 
of rational, contemplative activity that broadly equates to some form of, at least quasi, cost-
benefit analysis. The overwhelming evidence is that by far the majority of individuals do not engage 
with EWL and pensions issues in this way. ‘...	few	people	use	information	gathering	routinely	or	
systematically	as	a	starting	point	for	planning	and	decision-making	–	certainly	[not]	in	relation	to	
broad	topics	like	extending	working	life,	which	is	an	amorphous	topic	that	people	typically	have	little	
motivation	to	explore.’ (DWP 557).
Seemingly due to some combination of subject matter complexity, the distal nature of the 
consequences; or simple preference for more attractive and less tedious ways to spend their time 
(Gough and Hick referred to in DWP 562; DWP 299; DWP 557), it is apparent that most people are 
not disposed to actively engage in planning for later working life and retirement. Thus, while it 
is frequently easy to demonstrate gaps in knowledge, this is of limited value, when considered 
against a default orientation of under-engagement. ‘...	the	public	do	not	usually	have	a	clear	focus	
on	issues	like	these	and	haven’t	flagged	them	mentally	as	things	that	they	need	to	find	out	about.’	
(DWP 557, p.100). For most people, levels of engagement equate to ‘going with the flow’, reacting 
to circumstances as they arise (DWP 557) and hoping that ‘things will work out’ – somehow. There is 
ample evidence that for most the level of engagement, at best, is such that they fall back on simple 
heuristics, affective intuitions, habit and social normative effects (see Section B.5.6).
That said, while it seems to be a minority activity, some individuals do actively engage/attempt 
to engage with the details surrounding options over EWL, retirement and pensions. For these 
individuals in particular, it is important that they are able to grasp salient facts, and that their 
misunderstandings are addressed. To a lesser degree, for the wider group that exhibit a propensity 
for recourse to simple heuristics, it is important that these heuristics are appropriate and 
substantially correct. For these reasons there is merit in identifying and understanding gaps in 
the public’s mental models and using this insight to tailor communication material to reinforce 
appropriate knowledge and correct misunderstandings (Morgan et	al.,	2002).
It is also important that we do not assume too much from addressing education deficits. Plugging 
knowledge gaps and demystifying complex material is a relatively straightforward activity in 
communication terms. The net result, assuming people are motivated to attend to the information 
provided, is that they are informed, to the extent that they have the potential to make better 
choices. This tends to have a modest impact on their motivation to make appropriate choices, 
particularly if options and/or the process of selecting them is viewed as unattractive. ‘There	exists	
a	broad	literature	on	both	perceptions	[knowledge and beliefs and attitudes]	and	actual	savings	
[behaviour].	There	is	however	very	little	compelling	evidence	on	the	inter-working	of	the	two	and	
where	there	is	evidence	it	reveals	contradictions.’	(DWP 562; also see DWP 434).
Improving knowledge and understanding can have an impact on employee attitudes and behaviour 
in relation to work. However, in most instances structural and (workplace) social climate influences 
play a more dominant role (see Warr, 1980; Hale and Glendon, 1987).
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B.5.5.2	 Knowledge	gaps	and	misunderstandings
Financial literacy
Evidence of low levels of knowledge and understanding of pension arrangements, investment 
options and the ability to manipulate salient variables has led to calls to increase public literacy in 
this area. ‘...	most	had	only	a	relativity	superficial	grasp	of	how	things	work	–	and	a	small	number	
appear	to	have	scarcely	any	understanding	at	all.’	(DWP 492).
There is transparent frustration amongst policy-makers (DWP 557) that people do not seek out 
information, linked with a desire to ‘make	them	more	rational’. From this perspective, it is perhaps 
tempting to conclude that the solution lies in developing more sophisticated education initiatives 
that not only inform but motivate action (DWP 562). The basic premise here can be characterised 
as ‘…	if	we	make	the	information	easier	for	people	to	comprehend,	equip	them	with	the	necessary	
knowledge	to	make	decisions	they	will	be	more	motivated	to	engage	and	make	better	(more	rational)	
decisions.’ (after Fischhoff, 1995).
Differences in pension literacy have been reported by education level. While those possessing 
only basic literacy skills are likely to experience the most difficulty, it seems that many educated 
to degree level and above also experience problems. As the authors of DWP 562 report, 62% of 
respondents educated to degree level rated pension information as too complicated, compared with 
80% of others.
Findings on the role of education and financial literacy and communication are contradictory, 
but pension options are likely to remain complicated (DWP 563). The impact of educational 
interventions, to date, appears to be modest. This mirrors the degree of impact of public risk-
education initiatives in other public policy domains. Moreover, claims of spill-over effects (DWP 
562) from individuals who engage in education on pensions via their subsequent interaction with 
(education of) others within their social network, do not appear to be well substantiated and are 
judged to be somewhat optimistic.
Where attempts have been made, under experimental conditions, to demystify and simplify 
decision options over planning retirement income, many individuals still find it difficult to consider 
and manipulate the number of relevant variables (DWP 557). Too much information and too 
many variables to manipulate results is overload. What people are seeking is clarity, simplicity and 
certainty (DWP 562).
Initiatives aimed at increasing the clarity and personal relevance of information, its pertinence to 
individuals and the timeliness of its arrival offers promise, but pension options are likely to remain 
complicated (DWP 562).
Flexible working
It is apparent that most people view retirement as a cliff edge (DWP 557). The concept of phased 
retirement is unfamiliar to many, and there is limited understanding of the options or their 
implications (DWP 557).
Part of the reason for the limited insight in this area seems to be attributable to the traditional 
orientations of many employers and few precedents within the workplace, combined with wider 
social references and established work/retirement norms.
The concept of flexible working in the run-up to and post-SPA is attractive to many (see, for 
example, McNair, 2010). However, it seems that people have limited knowledge of the range of 
potential configurations and options or how the income they receive (post SPA) will interact with 
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private/employer/State pensions and other benefits. There are claims that employers provide little 
information in this area, even at the most fundamental level ‘...	people	didn’t	know	whether	gradual	
retirement	was	available	to	them	or	not.’	(DWP 531, p.75). The EHRC reports 38% of men and 46% of 
women being unaware of their right to request flexible working hours (EHRC, 2010).
Tax and benefits system
Paralleling the general picture on EWL and pensions, understandings of tax and benefits implications 
are, for most people, vague and impressionistic, e.g. there is widespread confusion over whether 
personal pensions investment will have a negative impact on means-tested state benefits (DWP 562 
). Similarly, it has been found that, ‘There	was	a	perception	across	all	groups,	but	most	strongly	in	the	
non-savers	group,	that	having	savings	of	investments	reduces	your	entitlement	to	State	Benefits	...’ 
(DWP 562).
The latter appears to be corroborated by evidence that two-fifths of individuals are unable to quote 
any of the tax rules in relation to pensions (NAPS, 2009). However, more positively around two-thirds 
know (or correctly guessed) that personal/employer pension was taxable and around half that 
private pensions qualify for tax relief (NAPS 2009). There is also notable confusion over how State 
and personal provision mesh, in terms of implication for personal pension income (DWP 294).
With respect to EWL there is evidence of a widespread presumption that any income earned post- 
SPA would be ‘...	all	whacked	in	tax…’ (DWP 557); and that benefits would be reduced to the extent 
that people would be worse off financially if they went to work (DWP 531). There appears to be 
limited awareness of tax breaks for those over SPA (DWP 557), or of the potential gains from pension 
deferral (DWP 434; DWP 557). However, there is evidence of socio-demographic differences, with 
those from professional and managerial groups tending to have a more detailed appreciation of 
the tax and income implications. By inference, this may reflect higher rates of engagement with 
professional financial advice (DWP 562).
There is considerable debate over the extent to which tax relief impacts on pension investment 
behaviour (see Blundell et	al.,	2006; DWP 294). Some authors cast the impact as minimal (DWP 434), 
while others claim it to be the strongest influence (DWP 562). However, the balance of evidence 
seems to be that economists tend to overstate the case, i.e. for large swathes of the population tax 
incentives have a modest impact relative to other variables.
There is a degree of contradiction in the perspective, particularly popular amongst economists, 
that people are irrational and the belief that (knowledge of) tax breaks will motivate investment 
behaviour, or by extension, that unhelpful aspects of the tax system operate as a disincentive.
A balanced conclusion might be that tax relief has a positive impact on the behaviours of some and 
not others (DWP 562) and that lack of knowledge and understanding of tax relief and how it works 
represents a potential barrier.
Estimating retirement income
Many people experience difficulty in estimating how much income they will need to support them 
in retirement, but there is recognition that State Pension values represent a subsistence income 
(Nesbitt and Neary, 2001; Gough and Hick referred to in DWP 562) combined with widespread 
misgivings over whether what they will have in total will be sufficient (DWP 557). There are 
suggestions that ‘Not	knowing	how	much	income	to	expect	in	retirement	is	very	unsettling	and	also	
tend	to	[further]	paralyse	already	weak	impulses	to	plan	ahead.’	(DWP 557).
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With respect to knowledge of likely pension values, there is evidence that many people have ‘…	a	
poor	grasp	of	their	likely	entitlement,	misgivings	about	what	they	will	get,	[and]	limited	understanding	
of	how	things	work	...’ (DWP 557, p.2; see, also DWP 492). Similarly, Mayhew (2002) reports that 43% 
of those within ten years of SPA had only a vague or no idea of what their retirement income would 
be (also see Vickerstaff et	al., 2004). There is also evidence that people tend to overestimate the 
amount they will receive from defined contribution (DC) pensions (DWP 515).
More positively, there is a global finding that people are able to make substantially accurate 
estimates of State Pension values (DWP 562; NAPS 2006). However, there are also grounds for 
concluding that this may underplay sectional differences. For example, a recent study of the 
estimates made by ethnic minorities reports that only around half were able to accurately estimate 
State Pension values (+/-£20) (Gough and Hick, 2009).
There appears to be limited awareness and understanding of the financial implications associated 
with options over early and deferred draw-down of pensions, or drawing pension while EWL and 
metrics of variability, depending on the selected age of retirement (DWP 557). It seems that many 
simply assume that pensions will be paid at SPA. So the question ‘When	should	I	start	drawing	my	
pension’ tends not to be salient. However, many draw the intuitive conclusion that they will lose 
income (DWP 557).
Providing people with information in a simple intuitive format that demonstrates the impact of 
alternative dates of retirement on pension income appears to offer a useful anchoring effect (see 
Section B.5.6). However, while this has a positive impact on understanding (DWP 557), it is less clear 
how persuasive this is in making EWL more attractive than retirement.
There is fairly strong evidence of a preference for individually tailored, bespoke, pension forecast 
information, over generic information (DWP 557; DWP 562). However, it also seems that people 
approach the results of personal forecasts with some apprehension, which may go some way 
towards explaining the low levels of take up reported (DWP 557) in pension estimate interventions. 
Mirroring expedience of relativity low take-up rates for well-man clinics, HIV testing, and the like, 
within the public health domain, people tend to be aversive to the possibility of bad news.
Widespread evidence of the complexity of information relating to pensions leading to poor decisions 
and, more commonly, a retreat from engagement, has led some to infer that there is much to be 
gained from finding ways to present salient information in simple more intuitive forms. It is likely 
that there is considerable scope for this, however, the inherent complexity of current arrangements 
represents the most significant barrier and rationalisation in this domain would foreseeably yield 
more significant effects. But the scope for this is generally held to be modest (DWP 562).
The impact of complexity is essentially three-fold:
• it increases the probability of people making poor pension choices;
• it is held to blunt (already weak) motivation to actively engage in decision-making; 
• it contributes to public uncertainty and a sense of helplessness over planning for later working life 
and retirement.
These issues are most salient for those who need/chose to make their own pension provision. 
‘Private	pensions	are	considered	to	be	both	risky	and	confusing	...	.	The	majority	claimed	they	lacked	
confidence	in	their	ability	to	make	decisions	about	pensions.’ (DWP 562, p.18). However, those who 
participate in employer pension schemes are still periodically faced with having to make choices 
where the impact of options can be less than transparent.
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Confidence
The level of self-rated knowledge of pension matters is low. It seems that only around one in 20 
rate their knowledge as ‘good’; and one in four claim to possess little or no knowledge. Confidence in 
how best to save for pensions is also low, again at around one in 54 individuals (NAPS, 2006).
Those who are investing in/are in receipt of a private pension tend to be more confident that they 
have ‘good’ or ‘reasonable’ knowledge, however, the direction of causality is unclear, i.e. ‘It’s	not	
clear	whether	better-informed	people	chose	to	take	out	private	pensions	or	if	joining	a	private	pension	
served	as	a	means	of	gaining	information	about	pensions.’	(NAPS, p.57) and both could be the case.
There is also evidence of socio-demographic differences, with 56% of graduates reporting low 
confidence, compared with 97% of social housing tenants (NAPS, 2006).
Knowledge of policies and resources
For most people knowledge of EWL and pensions polices is vague and impressionistic and limited 
to headline-line conceptions of the type ‘state	pension	age	is	going	up,	similarly,	the	belief	that	goal	
posts	are	prone	to	move	around	in	this	area.’ (DWP 557).
Levels of awareness and, consummately use, of information resources and websites that offer 
information on EWL and retirement are low. The available evidence suggests that this should not 
be interpreted as principally an IT literacy problem, but reflects a dominant orientation of low 
motivation to actively seek out information on these issues. Tellingly, the authors of DWP 557 report 
that none of their respondents had heard of AGE Positive and its website.  
B.5.5.3	 Demographic	differences
In Section B.5.4 we reviewed the principal factors that impact upon retirement decisions. Our 
provisional conclusion was that choice and control over the manner and age of retirement varies by 
socio-economic group, with high income professionals having greatest choice and opportunity and 
low-skilled, low paid workers the least. We also know that the low-skilled tend to be less intrinsically 
motivated by work, placing a high value on early withdrawal.
In short, interventions to remedy the knowledge deficit over pensions and EWL are likely to have 
very limited impact on low-skilled low paid workers unless they are accompanied by more radical 
interventions that would widen individual choice and control over retirement age. Knowledge deficit 
(education) interventions might be predicted to be more effective among high income groups, but 
arguably their need is least. There may be a case for focusing knowledge base interventions on 
the social strata(s) between these extremes, on the grounds that a significant proportion of this 
group are likely to benefit from options for flexible working; will have established (modest) pension 
provision and are likely to be in stable employment.
B.5.6 Orientations to sources of information and advice over extending 
working life, retirement and pensions?
Key	findings
• Trust in stakeholders is typically vague and impressionistic, but referenced to broader inferences 
regarding perceptions of vested interest. 
• Trust is best conceptualised as multi-faceted rather than as a simple invariant ‘commodity’ or 
rating that is universally attributed to an organisation, profession or other social group. 
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• Stakeholder public trust profiles tend not to be uni-dimensional, but interact with the issue under 
consideration. 
• Trust in Government (Ministers) over EWL is low. There are differences in the trust profiles of 
government (State) Departments and Agencies, and in the degree of perceived separation from 
Government, and this is prone to vary with the issue under consideration.
• Stakeholders’ trust profile may vary in systematic ways between different social groups, e.g. by 
social class, gender, ethnicity.
• The recently announced rise in SPA appears to have contributed to the low trust profile of g/
Government.
• DWP is a trusted source for information on State Pension values, but is seen as partisan and close 
to Government on EWL. 
• Jobcentre Plus has a poor trust profile.
• Trust in financial institutions appears to be eroded due to high profile examples of pension’s failure 
and their role within the current economic crisis.
• Reports of high trust in independent financial advisers seem likely to reflect the absence of 
bad news and to be based on positive association’s with the word ‘independent’, rather than 
referenced to direct experience of performance.
• An array of organisations have positive trust profiles, principally third sector organisations, but do 
not possess intuitive associations with extending working life or pensions issues.
• Trust in the concept of pensions appears to be resilient. However, there is low trust (confidence) 
that pensions will realise hoped for values.
4.6.1	 Communication	beyond	knowledge	gaps
As the authors of DWP 557 recognise, underpinning knowledge deficit elements lie broader 
orientation influences, relating to perceptions of message sources45, often impressionistic and 
affective in nature, yet pervasive, with the capacity to neuter the impact of even the most robustly 
designed message content, i.e. controversial issues tend to require attention to macro level 
elements of the communication process (see Figure B.3).
When attempting to influence public behaviour, communication interventions tend to represent the 
default policy option. Explicitly, or implicitly, this tends to be founded on the belief that there are 
gaps in public knowledge that need to be filled, i.e. an education-deficit perspective (see Pidgeon et	
al.,	2003b).
The amassed evidence on EWL and pensions highlights an array of areas in which there are gaps 
and errors in public understanding. However, the reader is cautioned against concluding that 
addressing these is simply a technical matter of de-constructing, simplifying and distilling complex 
concepts into a more accessible and readily digestible format. Although these aspects are important 
and benefit from extensive research insight, by volume (see, for example Covello, 2004, 2007), 
effective communication rests upon more than ‘telling people what you want them to know’, rather 
it embodies tailoring content to complement what they already know/want to know (including 
misunderstandings), their preferences/established behaviour in terms of communication channel 
45 A broad conception of ‘message source’ should be inferred here – that extends beyond media 
based communication to encompass broader aspects relating to implicit messages inferred 
from corporate body language and behaviour.
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and, critically in the case of controversial issues, aspects relating to macro level impressionistic and 
affective orientations, in particular those relating to trust in, and credibility of, the message source 
(see Fischhoff, 1995; Pidgeon et	al., 2003a).
Figure B.3 Concentric model of communication
Issues of professional/institutional trust come into sharp relief where there is significant underlying 
public concern and suspicion over the motives of stakeholders. As noted elsewhere, at one level 
trust can be viewed as operating as a cognitive filter, in essence, an anchoring effect, whereby 
information received is processed and its credibility referenced to a priori beliefs surrounding the 
competence and motives of the source. In extremis, where trust is seriously eroded, the cultural 
profile of the source may be such that people shrink from engagement, to the extent of disregarding 
the information it produces. In short, if a source’s trust profile is seriously eroded, efforts expended 
on honing message content are very unlikely to reap proportionate benefits. In such circumstances, 
resolution may lie in finding suitable conduits and trusted surrogates to deliver messages.
B.5.6.2	 Trust	in	stakeholders
In communication terms, issues of trust, institutional credibility and outrage are generally regarded 
as orientating (or macro level) influences that can impact on how the public perceive and react to 
stakeholders, in the current instance, principally, Government, its departments/agencies; employers; 
and pensions providers (see Pidgeon et	al.,	2003a; Pidgeon, et	al.	2003b; Breakwell, 2007).
Information and advice from, and public preparedness to engage with, these stakeholders can be 
referenced to the individual’s previous experience of engagement, the experiences of trusted-others 
(family, friends or colleagues, etc.) and media accounts. Each of the relevant stakeholders is likely to 
enjoy an established trust profile, however:
• this will typically be based on rather vague and impressionistic intuitive understandings (Petts, 
1998; Pidgeon et	al., 2003a); 
• this tends to be referenced to the social legitimacy of the stakeholders’ role rather than 
knowledge of their activity (particularly for departments and agencies of the State) 
(Pidgeon et	al., 2003a); 
Source: Weyman and Williamson (2007).
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• even key words in the title of the profession or organisation can have an impact, e.g. there tend to 
be positive associations with words like health, independent, standards (see Petts, 1998; Pidgeon 
et	al., 2003a; Weyman and Williamson, 2007);
• the profile is unlikely to be unified and unvarying, in so far as a stakeholder may be trusted for 
information of type ‘A’, but not for information of type ‘B’ (Petts, 1998; Pidgeon et	al., 2003a);
• the profile may be subject to erosion by external events. There is evidence that a positive/neutral 
profile may owe more to the absence of bad news than any public belief in prowess Pidgeon et	al.,	
2003a, 2003b);
• a stakeholder’s trust profile may vary in systematic ways between different social groups, e.g. by 
social class, gender or ethnicity (Pidgeon et	al.,	2003a); by locale (Wynne, 1989; Weyman and 
Williamson, 2007). 
There is strong evidence from a range of risk domains that, for high profile/high consequence 
issues public perceptions can be referenced to variables drawn from beyond the presenting issue 
(Slovic, 1993; King et	al.,	2005) e.g. post-2008 perceptions of pensions may be referenced by wider 
perspectives of a financial sector in crisis (DWP 438; DWP 562; DWP 528). 
There is an emerging consensus that trust is best conceptualised as multi-faceted rather than as 
a simple ‘commodity’ or rating that is universally attributed to an organisation, profession or other 
social group. Institutional trust profiles are potentially dynamic and dependent upon a range of 
contextual/societal influences, with the relative salience ascribed to these also potentially culturally 
variable, i.e. levels of trust vested in institutions and professionals can, in some instances reflect a 
complex interplay between the stakeholder and the issue under consideration. 
Public perceptions of stakeholders are routinely vague, impressionistic, and frequently mediated, 
rather than being based on direct experience or the product of systematic investigation and 
informed deliberation. The public(s) routinely apply a range of heuristics in their assessments 
of trust, e.g. ‘the	profit-motive	undermines	public	well-being’;	‘the	government	should	hold	them	
accountable’. Core variables contributing to public trust include: openness; competence; objectivity/
bias; fairness; consistency; independence and altruism (see Pidgeon et	al.,	2003a). Beyond these 
lie more subtle, but potentially no less important, nuanced understandings of the actions of 
organisations, equating to what has been termed ‘corporate	body	language’ (Horlick-Jones – 
personal communication). It should also be kept in mind that the set of variables identified as 
eroding/undermining trust are not simply the antonyms of those found to engender it (Pidgeon et	
al.,	2003a; DWP 528).
Of particular relevance to this review are findings relating to levels of trust vested in ‘Government’; 
almost universally found to be low in all studies, with some authors claiming a progressive erosion 
over the post-war period (Petts, 1998); although empirical evidence is absent on this issue.
With one or two notable exceptions, e.g. DWP 557, the EWL/pension evidence base lacks 
sophistication in this area, in so far as reference to g/Government routinely fails to differentiate 
between the profiles of elected officials (Government) and the institutions of State (government). 
There is established evidence of scope for viability in these profiles from other domains (Petts, 1998; 
Hunt et	al.,	1999; Pidgeon et	al.,	2003a), i.e. profiles reflecting varying degrees of separation from 
elected officials and differences in profile between governmental bodies.
Other noteworthy contrasts surrounded the public’s distinction between the Government of the day 
pursuing its policy agendas (which tend to be viewed as partisan) and government as a regulator 
(which is generally viewed as acting in the public interest). The public(s) also tend to exhibit, 
frequently strong, beliefs about how elected Government officials should behave, and the role of 
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government, referenced to a critical perspective on how they actually behave and what motivates 
them, the latter tending to be underpinned by a default heuristic of suspicion referenced to intuitive 
linkages to personal and/or economic advantage.
The public’s impressionistic perspective on trust should be considered alongside findings highlighting 
the relative ‘invisibility’ of many Government agencies and departments. Public understanding 
of government bodies, their respective roles and responsibilities tend to be based on ‘visible’ 
elements and, on occasion, little more than inferences drawn on the basis of their title. Where 
public knowledge and direct experience is thin or partial, there is a tendency to fall back on intuitive 
heuristic inferences, based upon generally incomplete mental models of role, remit and practice 
(Petts, 1998; Pidgeon et	al., 2003a; Weyman and Williamson, 2007). 
However, this should not be taken to infer that there is much to be gained from educating the public 
in this respect. Rather, key insights relate to gaining insight into institutional trust profiles referenced 
to a given issue and working with the public’s natural/default orientations.
Although people tend to be wary when they perceive vested interest or an angle on an issue 
(bias), particularly where they pick-up information that reinforces a pre-existing suspicion of this, it 
would be inappropriate to conclude that they adopt a rigorous conscious approach to filtering the 
information they receive against some preconceived model of trust in the source. As in other areas, 
the dominant orientation and approach tends to be impressionistic and reactive. 
Echoing findings from work on public concerns in other domains, there is evidence within the 
EWL/pension’s evidence base of a multifaceted perspective on trust. While there is a general, 
and expected, finding of low trust in g/Government (DWP 528), it is also apparent that there are 
variations in department/agency profile, referenced to the issue under consideration, i.e. different 
sources are trusted/mistrusted to different degrees, depending on the types of information 
transmitted to or sought by the public, e.g. there is evidence that the DWP is a trusted source for 
information on State Pension values, but is seen as partisan and having a vested interest in terms of 
propagating the EWL agenda (DWP 557; DWP 528). There is also evidence that The Pensions Service 
enjoys a positive profile. However, very much the converse is the case for Jobcentre Plus. Sentiments 
extending to overt antipathy are reported towards Jobcentre Plus, most acutely amongst those 
who have direct experience of using its services. ‘[People]	do	not	expect	to	be	treated	well	...	or	given	
access	to	the	kinds	of	jobs	they	are	interested	in.’ Its profile is said to be underpinned by a widespread 
perspective that the organisation is ‘...	unwelcoming	and	uncaring.’ (DWP 531, pp. 6 and 8). It is also 
apparent that there is no intuitive linkage in the public consciousness between Jobcentre Plus and 
EWL or pension advice (DWP 531).
Qualitative and quantitative sources highlight widespread bitterness (mistrust in government) over 
the recently announced rise in SPA (DWP 531; DWP 557). The degree ‘...	of	bitterness	and	mistrust	
over	pensions	issues	and	related	cynicism	about	the	Government’s	motive	for	raising	the	SPA’ 
uncovered by the authors of DWP 531 was reported as being significant, to the point of posing a 
barrier to discussing issues surrounding extending working life with respondents. Importantly, these 
authors conclude that there is widespread mistrust of changes in Government policy towards older 
people, on a broad front, i.e. beyond the EWL life agenda. In this sense, the authors portray public 
perceptions of the rise in SPA as ‘...	part	of	a	wider	set	of	policies	that	had	the	potential	to	worsen	
the	situation	of	the	older	population.’ i.e. ‘increasing	SPA	fuelled	the	more	general	cynicism	about	
government’s	motives	in	the	field	of	extending	working	life.’	(DWP 531, p.96).
Beyond evidence of distrust over the EWL policy agenda, it is apparent that the public sees a 
legitimate role for government as regulator/final arbiter in the domain of overseeing fair play and 
acting as a safety net in the event of market failure. Two-thirds of adults believe that g/Government 
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should intervene in instances where pension funds fail, and that Government should be relied upon 
to provide a basic level of State Pension (DWP 434).
In terms of the trust profile of other stakeholders, there is evidence that employers are trusted more 
than other sources for advice over pensions, including independent and not-for-profit organisations 
(NAPF 2010; DWP 528). This finding is perhaps notable, in so far as it might have been predicted that 
employees would view employers as having a vested economic interest in this domain, i.e. having 
the effect of moderating trust. It also contrasts with qualitative findings, that report ‘...	a	mixture	of	
fatalism	and	anger	in	individuals’	comments	...	[about pensions advice from employers in the past].’ 
(DWP 531, p.74). In either event, it seems that only a small proportion of employees turn to their 
employer for pension advice, there being evidence of concerns over competence in this area (DWP 
557), similarly with regard to ‘...	the	possibility	of	flexible	working	and	gradual	retirement	...	there	was	
a	sense	that	employers	did	not	provide	very	much	information	[on this]	...	hence	people	didn’t	know	
whether	gradual	retirement	was	available	to	them	or	not.’ (DWP 531, p.75).
Contributing to a pension does not seem to make much difference to who people trust, except in 
the case of employers, those who have an employer pension rating trust in employers higher than 
others (DWP 528). However, there is no evidence of any distinction between public and private 
sector profiles, it seeming likely that, despite reports of erosion in recent years (CIPD, 2010), public 
sector employers will be more trusted to deliver on pensions. There is no evidence of differences by 
age, gender, working status’[?]’ or income in terms of the trust profiles attributed to stakeholders 
(DWP 528). However, evidence on institutional trust from other domains suggests lower levels, 
for Government and its agencies, attributed to social marginalisation and disaffection, amongst 
members of social groups D and E (Walker et	al.,	1998; Pidgeon et	al.,	2003a).
The finding that independent financial advisers (IFAs) tend to be perceived as neutral and, by 
inference, constitute a trusted source (almost a third of respondents, DWP 562; see also DWP 434 
and DWP 557), contrasts with other findings ‘Lack	of	trust	in	financial	advisors	was	another	recurring	
theme.’ (DWP 531) and, as such, is worthy of further exploration. In view of evidence of low rates 
of engagement of financial advisers (16% of respondents, DWP 434; also see DWP 562), it seems 
unlikely that the majority of reported positive responses were informed by direct experience, or 
even the experiences of ‘trusted others’. A plausible explanation seems to be that respondents were 
falling-back on inferential heuristics, relating to properties of the title, i.e. the word ‘independent’ has 
positive semantic associations, with neutrality and absence of bias. Comparable effects have been 
encountered in other trust research (Pidgeon et	al.	2003a; Weyman and Williamson, 2007). More 
fundamentally, it seems that the public do not view IFAs as having much to offer regarding decisions 
over EWL, beyond pension investment options (DWP 562).
It has been suggested that trust in pension providers can be conceptualised in terms of 
‘competence’ and ‘care’ (DWP 434). In terms of ratings of ‘competence’, financial institutions 
(banks/building societies are rated higher and appear to be the most trusted (~30%); with little to 
distinguish between the relatively less positive profiles ascribed to employers, 12%, and Government 
(State Pension) 10% (DWP 434).
However, this contrasts with rating of ‘care’ (broadly considered here to be synonymous with 
‘altruism’/‘acting in the public interest’) where not-for-profit organisations are the most trusted, 
followed by g/Government and employers. The interpretation here is that, where the public 
believe they see scope for self-serving commercial interest they tend to fall back on the seemingly 
ubiquitous heuristic that the ‘profit motive corrupts’, i.e. motivating behaviour that is counter to the 
client’s/public’s interest (DWP 557).
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A further observation is that limiting the conceptualisation of trust to some combined rating of 
competence and care (DWP 434) seems to miss the key issue of public confidence in the concept 
of pensions and their personal pension values. This is a potentially important issue on at least two 
counts: 
• levels of trust and confidence could diminish to the point where they encourage withdrawal/opt-
out from pension schemes;
• young people may be discouraged from taking up pensions in the first instance.
However, survey evidence seems to suggest some resilience in this area. NAPF, for example, claim 
that ‘...	although	only	a	minority	believe	their	pension	will	provide	them	with	enough	income	in	
retirement,	it	is	not	because	they	do	not	trust	them’ (NAPF 2010) and that 44 % (the DWP 528 survey 
quotes 50%) of their sample rating pensions as the ‘most	effective	way	to	save	for	retirement’. Other 
sources highlight mistrust and recourse to alternative preferred retirement investment strategies, 
although, this orientation seems to be concentrated amongst those with bad pensions experiences 
(DWP 434).
Evidence of the modest level of trust vested in banks and building societies (DWP 434; Gough and 
Hick, 2009) for pensions advice seems to reflect further recourse to the ‘profit motive corrupts’ 
heuristic, suggesting that there is limited value in using these sources as a conduit for policy 
initiatives on pensions advice (DWP 562). More fundamentally, there is evidence that the public does 
not view these institutions as likely/relevant sources from which to seek pensions’ advice. Despite 
recommendations to the contrary from some sources (DWP 531, p.121), on the balance of evidence, 
it seems that broadly equivalent conclusions can be drawn regarding the profile of an array of third 
sector advice/advocacy organisations, e.g. the Citizens Advice Bureau, Age UK, disability groups 
welfare rights/law centres; trades unions; GPs and other health professionals, i.e. while all enjoy 
high trust ratings, they are not intuitive sources for providing information and advice over EWL, 
retirement planning or pension investment (DWP 562; DWP 557).
A number of studies highlight the influential role played by social networks, in particular friends and 
family and colleagues, in terms of propagating established pension investment/non-investment, 
retirement age norms and related habits (by inference, propagating any heuristics and biases 
that underpin their choices). Some authors go as far as to cast these groups as reliable (trusted) 
sources of pension information and advice (DWP 528); both positive and negative. There are 
claims that direct interaction with people with experience of pensions is more likely to generate 
trust, rather than distrust (DWP 528). However, the grounds on which this conclusion is drawn are 
unclear. Moreover, it does not chime with established insights within the social amplification of risk 
framework, and what is known of cognitive availability and dread effects. It has also been claimed 
that young people (16-24 years) are more likely to say that ‘experience of a friend or relative’ had 
most influenced them (38%), compared with 26% for all groups (DWP 528).
More fundamentally, while in no way negating the potentially important normative role of significant 
others, construing them as sources of information and advice over pensions and later-life working 
arrangements, implicitly assumes that individuals (generally younger people) are actively seeking 
their advice on these issues. However, this depth of processing would be somewhat uncharacteristic 
of the general approach to decision-making over EWL issues. Additionally, in terms of the potential 
corrosive effect of pension failure this perspective does not really capture the subtleties of the way 
that ‘folk stories’ permeate and circulate at a community level (see, for example, Lantz, 1971).
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B.5.6.3	 Social	amplification	of	risk
A number of sources conclude that ‘...	high	levels	of	mistrust,	disappointment	and	uncertainty,	
extending	to	hostility	surround	pensions.’ (DWP 557). Similarly, ‘...	claims	of	miss-selling	of	personal	
pensions	and	of	endowment	policies	have	also	acted	to	reduce	public	trust	in	financial	institutions	and	
their	products.’ (DWP 434; Gough and Hick, 2009). However, it is reported that Government is less 
distrusted in the pension domain than private pension schemes (Gough and Hick, 2009). What is less 
certain is the extent to which the recent/ongoing banking crisis and stock market decline impact on 
public orientations to pensions investment decisions.
While there is strong evidence that public understanding of the linkages between private DC 
pensions and the wider financial markets is, on the whole, limited and sketchy, at a more 
impressionistic (heuristic) level, there is widespread awareness of a pensions crisis. As noted 
elsewhere, changes in State Pension arrangements and the raising of SPA seem to have had the 
effect of introducing uncertainty into an area where certainty was previously taken as a given.
Beyond personal experience, the significant negatively framed media coverage of pensions and 
other investments over the last decade, notably high profile events such as the Equitable Life failure, 
is widely considered to a have challenged public confidence in pensions (Gough and Hick, 2009; 
DWP 562). As others have commented, ‘…	this	is	a	generation	that	has	experienced	some	of	the	
worst	“financial	scandals”.’ (DWP 557, p.119). It has also been suggested that widespread outrage, 
mistrust and negativity over pensions amongst older people has the potential to permeate to 
younger people, i.e. the potential for it to become culturally accepted/normed that pensions are 
unreliable (DWP 531).
Recent media news stories are said to be the biggest influence on trust (DWP 528). Importantly, 
‘bad news’ stories tend to possess greater amplitude, with a stronger ripple effect that leaves a 
more durable memory trace than ‘good news’ stories. ‘Bad news’ stories also tend to be more 
cognitively available where there is an established undercurrent/disposition amongst the public of 
suspicion, i.e. latent mistrust. Additionally, reports of widespread public scepticism and mistrust of 
the media should not be interpreted as negating its role as a primary reference source and probably 
more saliently, the potentially corrosive influence of a persistent background ‘drip, drip’ of bad news 
(Pidgeon et	al., 2003b; Breakwell, 2007).
Although none of the studies reviewed explored the issue directly, we know from other research 
domains that the media can play a pivotal role in contributing to an amplification of public concern, 
sometimes producing significant ripple effects and impacts on public orientations and behaviour, 
e.g. the MMR triple vaccination controversy and BSE/CJD issues. Precursors to the social amplification 
of risk include: uncertainty; lack of personal control; harm (‘unjustifiably’) imposed by others; 
perceptions that key stakeholders are pursuing partisan interests counter to the public interest; 
attempts to change the natural order of things and perceived regulatory/governmental failure 
through inaction (see Pidgeon et al., 2003b).
B.5.7 Perspectives on employability, training and beliefs regarding  
employer practices
Key	findings	
• Around half of people aged 50+ years express an interest in post-SPA paid work. Most of these 
people want to work reduced or flexible hours. 
• Most people who express an interest in working beyond SPA prefer to remain working for their 
current employer. 
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• There are social grade differences in disposition to EWL. Those in lower socio-economic groups are 
least engaged. Job (dis)satisfaction appears to be a causal influence.
• The absence of established precedents in most organisations for post-SPA working inhibits 
employee/employer discourse on this issue.
• The absence of cultural precedents within many workplaces feeds fears amongst employees 
that a request for flexible working or reduced hours will be interpreted as a lack of organisational 
commitment.
• There are fundamental differences between employer and employee objectives regarding flexible 
working arrangements.
• There is widespread scepticism regarding the availability of attractive, good quality, part-time jobs.
• There is speculation that the definition of a good job may vary by age, but there is no substantial 
empirical evidence on this.
• Care should be taken to avoid over-interpreting older workers’ desire for more flexible work, as this 
is valued by workers of all ages.
• Rates of demand for volitional downshifting amongst people aged 50+ years is offset by a desire 
for promotion/more responsibility. Most downshifting is involuntary and is more appropriately 
construed as underemployment.
• Robust evidence of a business case for employing older workers appears to remain elusive. The 
premise that a robust business case will motivate employers to employ older workers also appears 
to reflect a leap of faith rather than being grounded in empirical evidence.
• There is a very widespread belief in employer prejudice against employing older workers. 
• Anti-age-discrimination legislation regarding the age of retirement tends to be seen as a smoke 
screen for State Pension savings.
• Age-related training deficits reflect a combination of employer resistance and diminished 
individual disposition to engage. The evidence on employee (un)willingness to train is inconclusive.
• There is no clear causal linkage between participation in training and EWL.
• Amongst the over 50s seeking work, levels of awareness of and beliefs surrounding the availability 
of training are low. It also seems that the availability of dedicated courses aimed at the over 50s 
is low.
B.5.7.1	 Status	of	evidence
The evidence on training, employment options and employer practices is derived from the accounts 
of employees (including the unemployed/potential employees) and consequently has the potential 
to embody an array of attribution biases.
B.5.7.2	 Employment	options
For those who remain in work aged 60+ years there are reports that attachment to work gets 
stronger, and progressively weakening amongst those who withdraw. This is likely to reflect the 
fact that those who remain economically active are a survivor population and those who drop out 
are increasingly not there in survey results. It also seems likely that those who remain may do so 
where they have arrived at working arrangements that are a good fit with their non-work ambitions/
commitments.
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Of those who report wishing to remain in work post-SPA around three-quarters would prefer to 
remain working for their current employer (EHRC, 2010). The most notable finding is that only 
around 10% appear to want to work on a full-time basis, post-SPA. As noted elsewhere, many feel 
reticent over approaching their employer, for fear this will be interpreted negatively. The absence 
of strong EWL cultural precedents probably feeds this. The above is also true of the 50-60/65 years 
cohort (DWP 557).
The scale of employee inhibition from engaging with employers appears to be significant, with 
reports of comparable effects for those suffering from ill-health. A third of employees aged 50+ 
years who rate themselves as in poor health report feeling unable to approach their employer 
regarding adjusted working arrangements (EHRC, 2010).
Most people who report that they are considering EWL are: (a) happy with their jobs; and (b) would 
prefer to stay with their current employer. Unsurprisingly, those who are unhappy with their current 
job either wish to change to an alternative, or withdraw from the labour market. The main sources 
of dissatisfaction seem to relate to hours of work and (in)flexibility (EHRC, 2010; McNair, 2007).
It is tempting to interpret findings highlighting enhanced choice and flexibility over work as offering 
the key to motivating EWL, and it seems that there is some promise in this. However, it is important 
not to over-interpret findings, given strong evidence of a desire for greater autonomy and choice 
over the configuration of work across all age groups (see, for example, Blauner, 1964; Warr, 1983). 
As McNair notes, ‘...	older	people,	like	younger	ones,	seek	a	degree	of	control	over	their	working	lives,...	
if	employers	make	jobs	more	attractive,	offering	greater	flexibility	and	control	allowing	employees	
to	move	to	part-time	and	flexible	working	to	take	up	new	challenges	or	to	“downshift”	in	terms	of	
responsibilities	without	disproportionate	financial	penalties	workers	are	likely	to	stay.’ (McNair, 2007).
Despite varying emphases from different sources, statistical evidence of the demand for voluntary 
downshifting appears to be modest (4%), being outweighed by reports of underemployment, 
particularly amongst those over 50s (EHRC, 2010).
It is difficult to establish the extent to which phenomena such as part-time working; downshifting/
under-employment; flexible hours, etc. reflect volitional behaviour (choice) on the part of employees, 
discrimination by employers or the absence of effective carers’ guidance. ‘Would	such	people,	given	
the	choice,	which	they	do	not	believe	they	have,	prefer	something	different?’ (McNair, 2007, p.96).
In view of the above, evidence of widespread downshifting amongst the over-50s is perhaps best 
viewed as predominantly involuntary. There is also evidence of a linear relationship with age (12% of 
50–55 year-olds; 21% of 50–59 year-olds, 38% of 60–64 year-olds and 75% within the 65–75year-
old cohort (EHRC, 2010).
Reports of downshifting/seeking alternative employment, in a bid to reduce job stress (high job 
demands, low control and social support) suggest that this is a significant factor, not only in terms of 
stimulating an early health-related exit, but as a disincentive to continuing work. Rates of reporting 
of job stress have increased to unprecedented levels over recent decades (Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE), 2000, 2006). Changes in the economic base, in particular the growth in service 
sector jobs, are likely to be of relevance here. While this shift may have reduced the physiological 
demands of work (Disney and Hawkes, 2003), there is correlational evidence of a linkage between 
jobs which involve direct interaction with the public and (self-reported) mental stress (HSE, 2005). 
‘The	high	incidence	of	stress	…	has	significant	policy	implications	in	terms	of	the	extending	working	
lives	agenda	...’ (EHRC, 2010, p. xi).
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Despite speculation that the reference criteria applied in defining a ‘good job’ may vary with age, 
there seems to be no empirical evidence on this. Care should also be taken over interpreting the 
finding that ‘...	negative	job	attitudes	decrease	with	age.’, as samples represent survivor populations 
i.e. those who remain in work may simply be individuals who hold intrinsically more positive 
attitudes to work, per se.
In terms of job-mobility, the EHRC suggest that the over-50s have two fears about changing 
jobs: fear of rejection by employers and concern over the financial implications in the run-up to 
retirement (EHRC, 2010). Quoting Office for National Statistics (ONS) data, McNair notes, that job 
mobility declines with age, although the effects are less pronounced amongst those educated to 
degree level and above (McNair, 2007). While a proportion of women 50+ years change their jobs/
retire, principally due to caring commitments (McNair, 2007) and, in the case of married/co-habiting 
women to achieve alignment with their partners’ dates of retirement (DWP 434), in most instances it 
seems that their job change patterns mirror those of men. Orientations to employment type/career 
change also seem to vary by experiences of work (there are crude linkages here with Standard 
occupational Classification (SOC)/social class). Specifically, there is evidence that individuals with 
a more varied/chequered employment history are more disposed/resigned to engaging with 
alternative job choices post-SPA. Women are overrepresented in this group (DWP 557).
People in lower skilled jobs tend to be the least disposed to EWL, this appearing to be linked with 
rating of job-satisfaction. Thirty-nine per cent of those over 50 years engaged in low-skilled/
elementary work report a desire to change their job (EHRC, 2010).
Despite the appeal of part-time/flexible working, a number of sources point to widespread beliefs 
amongst employees that there are insufficient part-time and/or flexible working options available 
(EHRC, 2010). This belief seems to be substantively accurate, with flexible options only open to a 
relatively narrow band of employees in a limited range of sectors (DWP 299; CITB, 2007).
B.5.7.3	 Employer	practices
The overwhelming evidence is that older workers and those with ongoing health issues are 
disproportionately excluded from work and are overrepresented in low-skilled, less secure, low paid 
work, (Dearden, 1998; Taylor and Walker, 1998; Bardasi, 2002; Fevre et	al., 2008). The current policy 
perspective regarding employer practices is one of self-regulation and corporate social responsibility, 
with much faith placed in education initiatives (Black, 2008b); some have suggested ‘unrealistic	
faith’ (Taylor and Walker, 1998). Core ‘educational themes’ advanced by g/Government and industry 
associations focus on the business case for EWL; a managed approach to maintaining well-being/
rehabilitation and debunking46 of cultural stereotypes, e.g. older people have higher absence rates 
and lower levels of productivity. However, there is a paucity of rigorous evidence in support of the 
business case (Weyman, 2010) and strong evidence of higher absence rates amongst older workers 
(HSE, 2005).
There is some discrepancy in findings over employee claims of age discrimination on the part of 
employers. Porcellato, et	al.	(2010), for example, report relatively few individuals citing personal 
experience of employer age discrimination. However, other sources suggest that discrimination is 
widespread (Arrowsmith and McGoldrick, 2001; McNair and Flynn, 2005; Bytheway, 2010; TAEN, 
2008; cited in EHRC, 2010, DWP 110).
In either event, and importantly from the perspective of public EWL orientations and behaviour, 
it seems clear is that there is an almost universal belief amongst the public that discriminatory 
46 Empirical evidence does not reinforce this position, see Taylor and Walker (1998); Skirbekk 
(2003); HSE (2005).
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practices are widespread. That said, it would be unwise to view the high reported proportion (79%, 
EHRC, 2010) of retired people saying that a greater policy focus on employers to recruit older 
workers would help them to get jobs as wholly free of attribution bias.
There is evidence of widespread cynicism over justifications for rises in SPA on grounds of anti-
age-discrimination legislation, and limited confidence that the related legislation will protect 
older workers from being discriminated against by employers (DWP 557). Some authors have also 
cautioned that this background orientation of scepticism acts as a cognitive filter, to the extent 
that Government/DWP messages that stress employer enthusiasm for EWL are at risk of clashing 
with entrenched beliefs/experiences of the workplace (DWP 557). Whether substantively accurate 
or otherwise, such beliefs potentially attenuate employee motivation to engage in discourse with 
employers on this issue. However, ultimate ‘Control	lies	with	the	employer	and	either	perceived	
occupational	incompatibility	or	inflexibility	by	employers	are	the	main	obstacles	...’ to take-up (EHRC, 
2010; p.29).
Despite reports of widespread interest and apparent desire for increased flexibility over working 
hours, over two-fifths of employee respondents indicate modest opportunities and an array of 
(perceived or actual) structural barriers to take-up, due to the organisation of work, e.g. shift 
working; team working. Beyond employee preferences, benefits to employers are held to include 
smoothing of peaks and troughs in demand for goods and services and enhanced industrial 
relations, due to increased employee satisfaction (Loretto et	al.,	2005; Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), 2008). However, few of these claims are robustly 
evidenced. It is also important not to be seduced into over-interpreting the degree of alignment 
between employer and employee interests. Despite the use of common terminology, it seems that 
the term flexibility reflects different, and not wholly compatible, objectives on the part of employees 
and employers.
The most commonly cited rationale (15%) for not looking for post-SPA work is the belief that no 
employer would recruit the over 65s. When asked about factors that would assist return to work, 
71% cite ‘employers	being	more	willing	to	recruit	older	workers’, 68% ‘if	employers	were	sensitive	
to	health	needs’ and 68%	‘if	there	were	part-time	or	flexible	jobs’. Forty-five per cent cited ‘more	
affordable	training’ (EHRC, 2010)47. ‘Employers	continue	to	play	a	key	role	in	facilitating	or	preventing	
older	people	from	meeting	their	employment	needs	and	preferences.’ (EHRC 2010, p.136). There is 
also strong evidence that once out of work post-SPA, the likelihood of return is low and that where it 
does occur opportunities tend to be restricted to low status, low paid, less secure work, with a high 
probability of under-employment (Couch, 1997; Walker, 2002; McNair, 2007; EHRC, 2010).
B.5.7.4	 Training
The evidence on training embodies elements relating to attitudes and orientations of employees 
and potential employees to participation, as well as beliefs surrounding employer disposition 
to invest in older workers. A limitation of the evidence base in this area is that there has been 
little engagement with issues surrounding the extent, duration or quality of training received. In 
almost all studies training is treated as a generic entity, i.e. no distinction is made between simple 
instruction, perhaps lasting as little as an hour or so and high quality programmes of training and 
skill acquisition. There is also very little in the way of distinction made between skills based training 
and other job-related training, e.g. health and safety training; product quality control and the like.
47 These proportions do not appear to represent discrete groups. It is unclear how much overlap 
there is in response category membership – but this is likely to be high. Additionally, the 
sample base for these figures was individuals who said they would.
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The available evidence indicates that age-related training deficits reflect a combination of employer 
resistance and diminished individual disposition to engage. What cannot be concluded on the basis 
of the evidence base is the relative strength of these push and pull factors.
Newton et	al.	(2005) attribute rates of older employee participation in training to lack of individual 
engagement/volition rather than lack of opportunities offered by employers (also see DWP 299). 
However, other authors highlight uncertainty on this issue (McNair, 2007). There is also no robust 
evidence of active resistance to training amongst those in employment.
However, there appears to be an array of demographic differences, e.g. opportunities for training are 
reported to be fewer in small and medium sized businesses (McNair, 2007). Additionally,  
‘...	those	who	did	receive	support	were	more	likely	to	be	highly	qualified,	high	earners	in	professional/
managerial	jobs	working	in	larger	firms.’ (McNair, 2007). The EHRC offers evidence of around half 
of 50-55 year-olds reporting that they had received employer-based training at some point in the 
previous three years. However, the authors also report a negative linear effect with advancing years 
(44% for 56-59 year-olds), diminishing to around a third for 60–64 year-olds (EHRC, 2010, p.48)48.
Rates of training amongst individuals aged 55+ years who are unemployed/economically inactive is 
said to be less than 10%, with the likelihood of a 55 year-old undertaking training around 50% less 
than a 35-44 year-old (Newton, 2006). There are also reports of a downturn in employer training 
provision. However, it is not clear whether this is a general impact of recession or a specific older-
worker effect (DWP 673).
Despite intuitive appeal, it seems that there is no clear correlation between participation in training 
and EWL. Although some studies report a positive relationship, McNair (2007) concludes that the 
direction of causality is unclear.
In terms of gaining access to employment, Porcellato et	al. (2010) report claims amongst the 
over 50s that a significant barrier relates to employers’ tendency to focus on formal qualifications, 
in preference to work-based skills and experience (also see DWP 557). This was felt to limit re-
employment options to low-skilled, low status, low pay, poor jobs. There is significant scope for 
(external) attribution bias in such claims, and the sample used by Porcellato et	al.	appears to be 
very small (N = 16). But it is incontrovertible that older people have fewer formal qualifications than 
younger people.
It is also apparent that social precedents/established cultural norms regarding training for older 
workers (particularly those over SPA) are scant. ‘Some	appeared	to	regard	it	[the classroom]	as	
an	alien	world	and	lacked	confidence	to	tackle	it.’ (DWP 557, p.54). Additionally, the limited time 
remaining for older workers to capitalise on formal learning tends to diminish its subjective value 
(DWP 557). Conversely, there is evidence of older people claiming to be just as willing to invest in 
learning new skills as younger cohorts (Taylor and Unwin, 2001).
Amongst the over 50s seeking work, levels of awareness of, and beliefs surrounding, the availability 
of training appear to be low. There are also reports of a reluctance to attend mainstream education 
establishments, such as further education colleges, these tending to be viewed as the domain of 
young people, combined with scepticism regarding the likelihood of training leading to enhanced 
employment opportunities (DWP 557). Notably, the authors of DWP 557 comment that they 
‘...	found	it	hard	to	track	down	relevant	and	convincing	[training course]	material	that	was	suitable	
…	and	attuned	to	the	context	of	extending	working	life.’ (DWP 557, p.52) concluding that what is 
offered needs to be tailored to meet the needs of older people, not just in terms of content but also 
in terms of venue.
48 The sample in this study also appears to have been restricted to those in employment.
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B.5.8 The impact of the rise in SPA on attitudes to EWL
Key	findings
• The rise in SPA has fuelled widespread sentiments of resentment and challenged established 
notions of social equity.
• There is said to be a broad-based distrust of changes in Government policy towards older people, 
i.e. public attitudes to EWL may be influenced by broader perspectives on public policy regarding 
older people.
• A rise in SPA is a factor in people’s decision-making over retirement, but it would be unwise to 
assume that it is the dominant factor. 
• The change in SPA has contributed to established uncertainty and concern over financial 
arrangements in later life. But it seems unlikely that this will translate into increased motivation to 
invest in pensions or enhance the willingness to extend working life. It may contribute to rates of 
withdrawal and disengagement.
• The conclusion that the impact of a rise in SPA on EWL will be greatest on low income groups 
may be somewhat optimistic, in view of pervasive cultural norms, the incidence of ill-health and 
employment options.
• A potential barrier to policy delivery on EWL, compared with more opaque policy agendas, is the 
transparent alignment in the public consciousness with the objectives of Government ministers, of 
whom there is widespread distrust.
• There is widespread acceptance of the logic of raising SPA, but only modest support (35%) for an 
enforced rise for all, the majority (52%) disagreeing with this policy.
• The idea of working for a couple of extra years (with choice over how much and for how long) 
seems to be less problematic in terms of public acceptance, than the inference that this heralds 
the beginning of a long-term and corrosive agenda on retirement time.
• It is unclear whether the higher expected age of retirement amongst younger respondents 
reflects a cultural change in retirement orientations or resigned acceptance.
B.5.8.1	 Sense	of	injustice	and	uncertainty
There is evidence that the announcement of a rise in SPA has fuelled widespread resentment and 
challenges established notions of social equity. People (most likely to be, most acutely, those with 
insufficient financial options to permit choice) feel cheated, disappointed, angry and betrayed by the 
Government. Ceasing work before SPA is widely seen as a ‘good’, or ‘bonus’ and working beyond as a 
‘penalty’ (DWP 557).
There is widespread mistrust of changes in Government policy towards older people on a broad 
front, i.e. raising SPA is seen, at least by some, as	‘…	part	of	a	wider	set	of	policies	that	had	the	
potential	to	worsen	the	situation	of	the	older	population.	...	increasing	SPA	fuelled	the	more	general	
cynicism	about	government’s	motives	in	the	field	of	extending	working	life.’ (DWP 531, p.96).
However, because the rise has yet to take effect, empirical evidence of the impact on EWL/pension 
behaviour is limited to extrapolations from attitudinal data. Moreover, while SPA is a factor in people’s 
decision-making over retirement, it would be unwise to assume that it constitutes the dominant 
factor. If this were the case we would expect to see higher rates of working to 65 years, under current 
arrangements. But this is not the case. ‘...	a	wide	variety	of	personal,	structural	and	cultural	factors	[and 
the interaction between these]	serve	to	influence	decisions	about	when	and	how	to	leave	employment	
…	many	of	these	decisions	are	not	in	this	sense	truly	individual.’ (DWP 531, p.124).
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By extrapolation, we would suggest that the temporal coincidence of high profile mediated 
discourses on changes to pension arrangements, the mass transition to DC from DB pensions 
and pension failures with the rise in SPA, seems likely to contribute to an impression of crisis in 
the public(s) consciousness (DWP 438; DWP 562; DWP 528). Importantly, it seems likely that the 
change in SPA will contribute to established uncertainty and concern over financial arrangements 
in later life. The combination of uncertainty and a strong sense of social injustice can reasonably be 
predicted to have the effect of amplifying public concern, possibly extending to outrage. However, it 
seems likely that, where this occurs, it will be concentrated amongst certain social groups, but not 
restricted to those who are most socially disadvantaged. It also seems unlikely that this concern will 
translate into increased motivation to invest in pensions or enhance the (willing) desire to EWL.
Recent experience of the rise in SPA for women is that this met with modest levels of concern/
opposition. However, while not widely welcomed, opposition to this change was likely mitigated by the 
overtones of gender equity. In terms of the impact on the duration of working life, it seems that ‘gains’ 
are modest, ‘...	there	was	no	evidence	to	suggest	a	strong	link	between	the	policy	initiative	and	women’s	
likely	retirement	timing.’ (DWP 531, p.94). In the case of women in a long-term relationship, there is 
evidence of a disposition and tendency to align with the retirement date of their, typically, older male 
partners (Lissenburgh and Smeaton, 2003, cited in DWP 299). ‘The	overall	feeling	towards	extending	
the	SPA	[for all] was	more	negative	than	the	overarching	reaction	to	equalising	SPA.’ (DWP 531, p.95).
It has been suggested that push effects associated with raising SPA for women (and men latterly) 
are most likely to have an impact on retirement behaviour in low income households (DWP 531). 
‘Many	of	our	low	income	respondents	expected	to	carry	on	working	to	SPA	and	beyond,	or	were	at	
least	resigned	to	it.’ But they are still angry about it and ‘...	did	not	respond	at	all	well	to	the	hard	
messages	we	tried	out	on	them.’ (DWP 557, p.95), e.g. messages of the type that stress ‘for	the	
good	of	the	country’ are not appealing or persuasive, tending to have the effect of making people 
feel uncomfortable, even anxious but with no apparent impact in terms of increasing disposition 
to extend working life (DWP 557). However, despite evidence that basic financial necessity is the 
most important reason for working for around half 50-59 year olds, and a quarter of those over 65 
years (EHRC, 2010), the conclusion that the impact will be greatest on low income groups may be 
somewhat optimistic, given evidence that this strata is the most culturally resistant to EWL, are 
more likely to suffer from debilitating ill-health in later life, are more likely to be made redundant 
and experience the most restricted employment options, particularly during periods of mass 
unemployment (McNair, 2007; DWP 434; EHRC, 2010).
In other risk domains, uncertainty and a strong sense of injustice have translated into organised 
concern. At an individual level a likely effect is disaffection, withdrawal and disengagement (DWP 
294), ‘Not	knowing	how	much	income	to	expect	in	retirement	is	very	unsettling	and	also	tend	to	
[further]	paralyse	already	weak	impulses	to	plan	ahead.’ (DWP 557, p.44); ‘Overall	there	was	a	sense	
that	the	goal	posts	kept	moving	and	it	was	quite	difficult	for	the	individual	to	do	the	right	thing.’ (DWP 
531 p.84; DWP 294). If this interpretation is accepted, it raises important questions regarding the 
utility of a policy perspective predicated on the basis of stressing the financial benefits of planning 
for later working life (pre- and post-SPA) and retirement. The fact there is also evidence of ‘...	
widespread	cynicism	in	relation	to	the	Government’s	motives	for	intervention	in	matters	relating	to	
pensions	and	retirement.’ (DWP 531, p. 119) raises the possibility of significant public alienation to 
the EWL policy agenda.
All policy agendas are at some level political agendas, however, some enjoy more intuitive and 
transparent linkages to the objectives of Government Ministers. It seems that a high degree of 
transparency prevails in the current instance. Thus, the degree of separation between public 
perceptions of Government policy objectives and Government policy delivery on this issue can be 
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predicted to be modest. This will, foreseeably, present difficulties for the policy delivery function 
beyond those experienced in less contentious areas, ‘...	a	legacy	of	bitterness	and	mistrust	over	
pensions	issues	and	related	cynicism	about	the	Government’s	motive	for	raising	the	SPA.’ (DWP 531, 
p.119), have been found to constitute a significant barrier to discussing EWL with the public, i.e. 
the public may exhibit lower rates of engagement with (DWP) education and behavioural change 
initiatives and interventions compared with other policy delivery domains, partly due to perceived 
linkages with ministers and partly because the policy is, simply, unpopular (EHRC, 2010; Vickerstaff, 
2008).
B.5.8.2	 Impact	on	age	of	retirement
The rise in SPA is likely to have a modest impact on those who intend to retire early, at least if 
they are able to realise their ambition. Findings from the NAPS (2006–09) indicate that around a 
quarter of individuals earning £29k+ intend to retire in their 40s or 50s, although it is likely that a 
lower percentage will have sufficient financial provision to translate this aspiration into behaviour. 
However, the finding that ‘Only	very	small	numbers	had	retired	at	or	after	SPA,	meaning	that	analysis	
is	only	possible	for	those	who	retired	before	SPA	…’ (DWP 434, p.162), would seem to suggest that 
many are successful in realising their early retirement ambitions.
Few people have difficulty in comprehending that Britain has an ageing population, with increasing 
longevity placing a burden on the Exchequer, and that this justifies a rise in SPA. The logic of this is 
transparent at a population level. But, at an individual level this does not allay fears of an early demise 
(DWP 557) or reduce the sense of potential loss associated with extending their own working life 
(particularly amongst the semi- and unskilled). While there is evidence of engagement with the need 
to raise SPA, there is only modest support (35%) for an enforced rise in SPA for all, a majority (52%) 
expressing disagreement with this policy (DWP 434). There also appear to be large social class related 
differences regarding the premise that people should work longer to take account of increased life 
expectancy: 49% of graduates agreed, compared with 28% of non-graduates (DWP 434).
The idea of working for a couple of extra years (with choice over how much) is, not surprisingly, much 
less daunting than some indefinite extension. However, it seems that some see any change as the 
thin end of a moveable wedge, in an area where there was previously a high degree of certainty. This 
extends to the view, in a minority of instances, that the State Pension is being phased out (DWP 557).
There is evidence that younger respondents ‘expect to retire’ later than older cohorts. Twenty-
two per cent of 18-24 year-olds are said to expect to retire in their 70s or 80s (DWP 434), which 
could be interpreted as indicative of some age-related change in social norms. What is not clear is 
whether the underpinning orientation is resigned acceptance or constitutes evidence of some more 
fundamental change in retirement orientations. Notably, the Euro Barometer Survey 2003, reports 
a four year average disparity between preferred (mean 58 years) and expected age of retirement 
(mean 62 years) (Esser, 2005).
B.6 Secondary data analysis
Key	findings
• The average age of retirement is highest amongst the middle income strata. This strata exhibits a 
narrower range of retirement age than the other strata. 
• Push and pull influences on pre-SPA retirement impact differently on different social strata/grades.
• Possession of significant pension/asset values appears to serve as an inducement to higher 
managerial/professional groups to pre-SPA retirement.
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• For those on low income, redundancy (implicitly no choice or employer incentivised) plays a more 
significant role in pre-SPA retirement than it does for other social grades.
• Middle income groups appear to be less prone (at least to date) to enforced redundancy and are 
unlikely to possess sufficient pensions and saving assets for these to significantly incentivise pre-
SPA withdrawal from work.
B.6.1 Introduction
In Section B.5.4 a theoretical model was developed around factors that influence retirement decisions. 
Drawing on the literature on retirement decisions, a range of push and pull factors were identified 
as being key to explaining observed variations in age of retirement. It was also concluded that social 
grade acts as a fundamental cleavage over the way that retirement decisions are reached. The 
theorised model (Figure B.2; Section B.5.4) suggests that typical retirement ages and their spread vary 
by social grade due to the differential influence of the push-pull factors. This section aims to test the 
validity of the theoretical model using available quantitative, empirical, evidence.
Previous empirical analysis of the relative importance of push and pull influences on retirement 
decisions highlight the primacy of health status, possession of a private pension and employment 
status of spouse (Crawford and Tetlow, 2009). However, what cannot be established on the 
basis of this evidence is the extent to which identified influences are prone to variability by social 
demography, in particular social grade.
B.6.2 Data set choice and limitations
The analysis in this section attempts to model the relative importance of a range of push-pull 
factors on age of retirement for the three social grades characterised in the model in Section B.5.4.
A key consideration surrounded selection of the most appropriate data set(s). A number of data sets, 
notably the BSAS and the DWP’s NAPS generate retrospective and prospective attitudinal/knowledge 
data, e.g. retirement and pension investment intentions. As noted elsewhere, a limitation of this 
type of evidence is that it embodies an unquantifiable degree of hindsight (attribution) bias, and 
potential dislocation between intention and behaviour. Also, unplanned factors, such as ill-health, 
poor pension performance or redundancy can flood ambitions over when to retire.
The preferred approach, therefore, was to focus on (retrospective) behavioural data rather than 
attitudinal evidence, i.e. not what respondents believe will determine their retirement decision, nor 
post-retirement rationalisations for action, but what factors predict age of retirement behaviour. For 
this analysis the ELSA data set was used. This large data set (N = 11,050) tracks participants aged 
50+ years from 2002–09. It offers data on a range of factors including: health, economic position 
and quality of life.
As with any data set, ELSA has limitations, particularly when explored in ways beyond the intentions 
of its architects:
• Our analysis is, necessarily, limited to the sub-set of respondents who have actually retired, i.e. a 
relatively small sub-sample of the ELSA data set.49 This inevitably limits the scope for analyses.
• The work, healthcare and pension experiences of respondent’s, typically born around the middle 
49 Data limitations placed further restrictions on those who were selected for analysis beyond the 
requirement of being retired. Appendix A outlines, in more detail, how the sample of retired 
were selected.
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years of the 20th century, may be different from younger cohorts. 
• The ELSA data set was not designed specifically to analyse decisions about when to retire. Some 
of the push-pull factors theorised in Section B.5.4 are either not measured at all or are imperfectly 
operationalised versions of those factors. 
• A final caveat is that because so few people of this examined generation extend working life, 
sample sizes for individuals working beyond SPA is small. Therefore, arising predictive models of 
retirement age draw heavily on data from those who retire below or close to SPA (60/65 years).
B.6.2.1	 Sampling	from	the	ELSA	data	base
The analyses described in this section are based on sub-samples of the full ELSA data set  
(N = 11,050) (see Figure B.4). There are two reasons for this:
• since the intention was to examine the age of retirement of those already retired, those not 
retired were excluded (5,853 cases);
• employment-related data were only recorded if the respondent was in employment during one of 
the four waves. In order to obtain employment-related data, those who had not been employed 
during any of the waves were excluded from the analysis (3,780 cases).
Our analysis was conducted on the sub-set of ELSA respondents who were retired by wave 4, but 
had some history of employment during earlier waves (N = 1,417) (see Figure B.4).
It should be borne in mind that this group of newly retired may differ from other retired sample 
members, which will have implications for the ability to generalise from these findings, e.g. 
by definition it will exclude those who have moved from a non-employed status, such as 
unemployment, to retirement. It may also under-represent early retirees as well as those who 
extend working life. Descriptive analyses (Table B.2) show that when compared to those within the 
ELSA sample who were retired through waves 1 to 4, the newly retired are significantly younger. 
They are also more likely to be female, more likely to be married (but less likely to be widowed) and 
come from similar occupational groups.
Table B.2 ELSA composition of the retired wave 4 with retired waves 1 to 3
Variables 
Retired at wave 4, recently 
employed Retired waves 1–3
Age 66 (SD 14) 72 (SD 17)
Female 53% 61%
Married/widowed 68%/18% 58%/28%
Lower Socio-Economic 
Classification (groups 5–7) 37% 38%
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Figure B.4 Summary of ELSA sample
B.6.3 Descriptive statistics
The mean age of retirement for those within the ELSA data set is 61 years for men and 59 years for 
women, with around two thirds of the individuals retiring within five years of these means (see Figure 
B.5). Both conform to well established patterns: Firstly, despite the mean age of retirement being 
before SPA, the single most common retirement age (modal age of retirement) is SPA (60/65 years). 
Secondly, both distributions are negatively skewed (particularly the men), i.e. a large proportion retire 
in the years leading up to SPA, with a relatively small proportion continuing to work post-SPA.
Full ELSA
sample
11,050
No
N = 5,853
Yes
N = 5,197
Retired at wave 4?
Employed during any of 
previous three study waves?
No
N = 3,780
Yes
N = 1,417
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Figure B.5 Distribution of retirement ages
B.6.4 Contrasts by social grade
To explore support for hypothesised social grade effects, respondents were divided into three social 
grades, based on their most recent occupation. This division was derived by collapsing the Office for 
National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (SEC) schema50 to a three tier division.
Defined in this way, higher managerial/professionals amount to a relatively small proportion (14%) 
of the retired. The largest group is the middle income strata, of mid-range managerial and white 
collar workers (49%). The remainder (37%) comprises those employed in low paid, routine semi-/
unskilled work (see Figure B.6).
50 A detailed discussion of the rationale for, and practical way in which, the three classes were 
derived can be found in the Phase 2 report.
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The ELSA question set also asks respondents to indicate their reasons for retirement (refer to Table 
B.3). The most frequently cited reasons for retirement for the low paid and low-skilled were: reaching 
retirement age, ill-health and redundancy. By contrast the middle income groups exhibit a wider 
range of, more evenly distributed, reasons. For the higher managerial/professional strata, volitional 
factors, such as ‘to enjoy life’ and wishing to spend more time with partner/family predominate (also 
see Phillipson and Smith, 2005).
While these data lend support to the premise of demographic differences by social grade in 
decisions over when to retire, any conclusions are subject, not only to caveats relating to the 
potential for hindsight (attribution bias)51, but also restriction of range, i.e. responders selected their 
answer from a set of given alternatives. Notable omissions from the list offered in the ELSA question 
set are some variables that lie beyond personal volition, e.g. restricted employment opportunities. 
Additionally, the data set offers little insight regarding the interplay of multiple factors, their relative 
importance or how this might impact on the age of retirement.
Figure B.6 Standard occupational classification collapsed to three strata
Figure B.7 overlays the diagram of hypothesised retirement ages shown in Section B.5.4.7 by the 
actual ages recorded in the ELSA data set. The ELSA data are shown as a box plot. The vertical line 
within each box represents the median age of retirement, the boundaries of each box representing 
the upper and lower quartile range, and the horizontal line the range (excluding outliers).
For the higher managerial/professional strata, the relatively greater choice they enjoy over how 
and when to retire appears to be reflected in their relatively broader spread for age of retirement. 
A notable feature is the lower mean, relative to the other groups. For the low-income, low-skilled 
strata, there is a similar spread of ages but a higher average age of retirement. Intuitive hypotheses 
here relate to push factors, such as ill-health and enforced redundancy, leading to early withdrawal 
and pull factors, such as modest savings or pension provision. The middle strata exhibit a more 
restricted range and a higher mean age of retirement, close to SPA. The middle strata contains 
a high proportion of State sector employees, however, the ELSA data set cannot support an 
exploration of private versus public sector profiles.
B.6.4.1	 Predicting	age	of	retirement	by	social	grade
The focus here is on modelling reasons for retirement for the three social strata. The rationale 
here is that determining the relative impact of variables has implications for the scope, design and 
foreseeable impact of policy interventions aimed at different social grades.
51 There may be grounds for considering this to be a source of common error variance across all 
social strata.
(1) Higher managerial and professional
(2) Lower managerial and professional
(3) Intermediate occupations small employers 
 and own account 
(4) Small employers and own account workers
(5) Lower supervisory and technical
(6) Semi-routine occupations     
(7) Routine occupations
(2) Lower managerial and 
 professional intermediate 49%
(1) Higher managerial and professional 
 14%
(3) Lower support and technical, 
 semi and routine 37%
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This analysis was conducted by means of three multiple regressions, one for each social grade. The 
idea was to examine the influence each push/pull variable addressed in ELSA has on predicting the 
age of retirement, while holding the influence of all other variables constant. It also permitted an 
assessment of what proportion of the total variance in age of retirement the ELSA variables are 
able to predict. Table B.3 presents the results of this analysis. Each column contains standardised 
coefficients for each social strata. These indicate the independent effect of each variable, with 
numbers furthest away from zero denoting the strength of impact.
Table B.3 Self-reported main reason for retirement
Lower paid and skill
(%)
Malleable middle
(%)
Managerial(
%)
Reached retirement age 42.0 33.3 34.7
Own ill-health 15.1 13.0 6.7
Ill-health of a relative/
friend 2.8 8.9 7.3
Made redundant/
dismissed/had no choice 9.4 3.3 9.3
Could not find another 
job .9 .8 1.3
To spend more time with 
partner/family 8.0 12.2 11.3
To enjoy life while still 
young and fit enough 7.1 13.8 20.0
Fed up with job and 
wanted a change 7.5 4.9 5.3
To retire at same time as 
husband/wife/partner 5.7 5.7 2.0
To retire at a different 
time to husband/wife/
partner .5 .7
To give the young 
generation a chance .9 4.1 1.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Figure B.7 Hypothesised and actual ages of retirement for the three social strata
Table B.4 Predictors of age of retirement 
Regression – push/pull factors as predictors of age of retirement 
Variables 
Managers/
professionals
Middle 
income
Low income/
skill
Gender (male=1) .25* .19* .31*
Single reference reference reference
Coupled, partner working prior to retirement .09* .14* .21*
Coupled, partner not working prior to retirement -.06 -.03 -.22*
Health status while prior to retirement (longstanding illness 
= 1)
Caring responsibilities prior to retirement -.11* -.10* -.13*
Number of dependent children -.01 .03 .01
Value of Pension -.33* -.17* -.01
Value of assets -.26* -.16* -.05
Flexible working .18* .09* .09*
Satisfied in job .12* .07 .04
Made redundant (yes = 1) -.12* -.22* -.33*
Employer pressure to retire/employer support (yes = 1) -.06 -.00 -.10*
Low job quality (yes = 1) -.09* -.09 -.07*
R2 (variance explained) .27 .11 .31
Notes: Sample size = 1,417. Sample is all individuals retired at wave 4 but not retired at any one of 
the previous waves (see Appendix A). Values in the columns are standardised betas. * indicates the 
effect of the variable is significant at the 5% level or higher.
Routine and manual
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Intermediate
occupations
Managerial and
professional occupations
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You said earlier that you were (semi-) retired, at what age did you retire?
The 
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Interpretation
Senior managers/professionals – pension value, size of assets are the strongest predictor influences 
on early (pre-SPA) retirement. Conversely, job satisfaction, flexible working arrangements are 
associated with later retirement.
Middle income – beyond withdrawal from work due to enforced redundancy there appear to be no 
notable predictors of early retirement for this group, in terms of the variables addressed.
Low income/low-skilled – suffering ill-health, enforced redundancy and the (non-)working status of 
spouse are all predictors of early withdrawal.
The R2 value at the bottom of Table B.4 indicates the extent to which the variables included in the 
model explain the observed variation in retirement ages. For the managerial/professional and low-
paid/low-skilled groups, around a quarter to a third of the variation is explained. In statistical terms, 
this can be considered a respectable proportion, but does indicate that the majority of variation 
in the spread of retirement ages within each strata remains unexplained, i.e. it is attributable to 
variables not addressed within ELSA.
Of particular note is the low R2 (0.11) for the middle income strata. This indicates a poor fitting 
model and a poor ability to predict age of retirement. Looking at the individual variables, their effects 
tend to be weaker than for the other stratas. It is possible that the inclusion additional variables in 
ELSA would improve the fit of the model.
B.6.5 Conclusions
This analysis set out to examine the validity of the theoretical model advanced in Section B.5.4, in 
particular, differences in the relative influence of push and pull variables on retirement by social 
grade. It aimed to look at the prior role these factors had on retirement decisions rather than post-
hoc respondent accounts of the reasons for retirement. As with any analysis of secondary data, 
the ability to test theoretical constructs tends to be limited by the range of variables available 
and the way in which these were operationalised. Given these constraints, the following tentative 
conclusions can be made:
• the average age of retirement is highest amongst the middle strata. This strata also exhibits less 
variability in the range of retirement age than the other strata; 
• multivariate multiple-regression analyses showed that, to the limited extent that retirement ages 
can be predicted, the push/pull factors work differently for the different strata;
• possession of significant pension and asset values, perhaps unsurprisingly, appear to serve as an 
inducement to higher managerial/professional groups, suggesting that they are more likely to 
have chosen retirement; 
• for those on low income redundancy (implicitly no choice or employer incentivised) plays a 
dominant role;
• middle income groups appear to be less prone (at least to date) to enforced redundancy and are 
unlikely to possess sufficient pensions and saving assets for these to significantly incentivise early 
(pre-SPA) withdrawal from work.
These findings afford corroborative support for the theoretical model advanced in Section B.5.4. 
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B.7 Mental models of retirement pensions and extended  
working life
Key	findings
• There are significant gaps in people’s knowledge over key aspects such as the impact of EWL on 
pensions and other benefits, and they are apt to fall back on simple rules of thumb rather than 
engaging in a systematic evaluation of options. 
• People’s beliefs, substantially accurate or otherwise, impact on their behaviour. There is a need to 
reinforce accurate understandings and tailor messages to address misunderstandings and gaps in 
knowledge.
• Most people tend to react to EWL options presented to them (or not) rather than actively  
seeking options.
• Primary orientations to EWL relate to broader attitudinal perspectives.
• Effective communication requires going beyond the technical properties of options (over EWL and 
pensions) to consider cognitive filters, e.g. trust in stakeholders and affective elements,  
e.g. challenges to notions of social justice. 
• Engaging with public mental models requires consideration of five linked facets: cognitive 
orientation, emotional orientation, behavioural orientation (intentions), perceptions of 
stakeholders and structural factors.
• People view retirement as a just and deserved entitlement. Any erosion of this, particularly if it 
is interpreted as a forced option, is likely to meet with high levels of resistance and, potentially, 
outrage.
• Retirement is a period of uncertainty, particularly with respect to the spectre of age-related ill-
health and worries over the sufficiency of income. People desire certainty. Configuring structural 
arrangements and communications that increase perceptions of certainty over income levels 
are likely to be effective in motivating positive EWL/pensions behaviour than those that seek to 
provoke anxiety.
B.7.1 Role and context
This section extracts insights from the review evidence-base to characterise public mental models of 
retirement, pensions and EWL. In characterising orientations to retirement, pensions and EWL, five 
key variables are considered: cognitive orientation, emotional orientation, behavioural orientation 
(intentions), stakeholders and structural factors. These represent the range of intrinsic and extrinsic 
influences that may inhibit or facilitate decisions.
Cognitive orientation – knowledge, awareness and beliefs. A key consideration in relation to 
cognitive orientation is the high level of uncertainty associated with the pertinent issues, e.g. the 
widespread uncertainty that is apparent in relation to financial provision and employment options, 
as well as health and other personal constraints on capacity for employment in later life, such as 
care of dependants.
Affective orientation – concerns feelings towards retirement, pensions and work. For, example, a key 
aspect of emotional orientation that predominates in the literature concerns the issue of trust and 
more specifically, lack of trust in many of the stakeholders that have/might have a role in promoting 
the pensions and EWL agendas. The authors of DWP 557 highlight the importance of understanding 
affective orientation before engaging with the public on these issues: ‘...	it	seems	extremely	
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important	to	acknowledge	the	way	that	people	feel	already.	Relentlessly	upbeat	messages	that	come	
across	as	unrealistic	or	not	credible	seem	likely	to	be	rejected	and/or	resisted	–	and	might	seem	like	
propaganda	(“they	would	say	that”)’	(p.92).
Behavioural orientation (intention) – is influenced by both cognitive and affective orientations. 
Inertia appears to be the predominant feature of behavioural orientation in relation to retirement, 
pensions and employment, manifesting as a reluctance to seek information, make decisions or 
take action. This apparent apathy and disinterest appears to be exacerbated by the high levels of 
uncertainty over options and outcomes. It is worth noting that even where behavioural intentions 
are orientated in favour of saving for retirement and working longer, this does not mean that 
individuals will necessarily behave in line with their intentions (Wicker, 1969).
Social profile of key stakeholders – has implications for the extent to which they influence/
embody the potential to influence the public and their engagement with the relevant issues  
(the capacity to influence embodies both positive and negative potential to impact on public 
orientations and behaviour).
Structural factors – e.g. tax and benefit systems, availability of employment by type and region, 
impact on choices in relation to retirement, pensions and EWL. This includes the variety of personal, 
social, and cultural factors that may serve to facilitate or constrain decisions. ‘For	many	individuals	
decisions	about	these	issues	are	made	as	a	response	to	changing	circumstances	and	in	a	specific	
domestic	and	family	context.	In	sum,	many	of	these	decisions	are	not	in	this	sense	truly	‘individual’.’ 
(DWP 531, p.123).
Figure B.8 provides a global representation of the key influences on decisions in relation to 
retirement, pensions and work. The relationship between the different variables is broadly 
characterised as stakeholders and structural factors impacting (positively or negatively) on 
cognitive, affective and behavioural orientations.
B.7.2 Segmenting the population
The public is not an homogeneous entity, thus, there are different considerations for different sub-
groups. The main group difference for segmenting purposes appears to relate to occupation, which 
is also linked with educational attainment and socio-economic status (social class). Age is another 
potential source of difference regarding orientation, particularly with regard to pensions. Other 
potential segments, such as gender and ethnicity appear to be subsumed within difference by 
occupation type, employment sector, nature of employment contract (e.g. part-time or full-time) 
and educational attainment.
The literature highlights differences in the characteristics of the working population which broadly 
translate into three occupation-based groups along the lines of the three-category version of the 
current National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC):
Group 1 – Senior managerial and professional occupations – are more likely to be financially 
prepared for retirement, either through occupational or private pensions. Decisions to work up to 
or beyond SPA are likely to be strongly influenced by levels of intrinsic job satisfaction. Financial 
incentives appear to impact through fairly widespread awareness of the benefits of pension deferral.
Group 3 – Low and unskilled occupations – are likely to have a high reliance on the State Pension to 
fund their retirement as the nature of their employment means they are less likely to have access to 
employer pension schemes. They are less likely to be oriented towards private pension schemes due 
to issues of complexity, a culturally normed focus on ‘living for today’ and limited income. 
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Group 2 – Intermediate occupations – clerical, administrative, sales/service, technical and auxiliary 
workers. This is a broad grouping and, while considered distinct in terms of its orientation to EWL 
and pension investment, individuals at either extreme are likely to share characteristics with groups 
1 and 3.
Figure B.9 provides a characterisation of cognitive, affective and behavioural orientations to 
stakeholders. Orientations to an array of identified structural factors are incorporated across the 
different variables. Where there is evidence of sub-population (segment) differences these are 
highlighted. However, here and elsewhere, given the limitations of the base literature these should 
be treated broad-brush characterisations, rather than definitive. The following section distils this into 
three separate mental-models characterising public representations and orientation towards the 
three key issues: retirement, pensions and EWL.
B.7.2.1	 Mental	model	of	retirement	(Figure B.10)
Retirement appears to have much greater salience for the public than EWL. The literature highlights 
a number of common features of orientations to retirement that have direct relevance to the EWL 
agenda. A common feature of how individuals view retirement concerns the perception of it as an 
externally imposed end to their working life that occurs at a fixed point, generally referenced to SPA. 
This perspective is characterised by the authors of DWP 557 as the ‘cliff	edge’ view of retirement 
and is contrasted with an alternative, though less prevalent, view of retirement as a more flexible 
‘transitional	phase’ between full-time working and full-time retirement. The latter view appears 
to be most characteristic of Group 1. Although few readily identify with the concept of a phased 
retirement, a significant proportion appears to be attracted/receptive to flexible work (DWP 557).
The notion of choice in relation to the timing of retirement was not seen as relevant for many, 
particularly those in low or unskilled and low paying occupations (Group 3). There are fairly strong 
linkages between choice over the timing and nature of retirement and skill/social status. These 
individuals also tend to find work more intrinsically rewarding. ‘Although	there	is	a	consensus	about	
the	desirability	of	choice	as	to	when	to	retire	or	if	to	continue	working,	the	ability	to	exercise	choice	is	
unevenly	distributed.’ (DWP 531, p.10).
In a similar vein: ‘Many	of	our	low	income	respondents	expected	to	carry	on	working	to	SPA	and	
beyond,	or	were	at	least	resigned	to	the	idea	…	they	were	also	often	resentful	(and	even	angry).’		
(DWP 557, p.95).
Cultural expectations and norms are derived from a variety of sources, including, the State, 
employers, family and peers. The widespread perception of a ‘set retirement age’ appears to 
constrain active consideration by individuals over when to retire (DWP 673). For older women, 
employment patterns and early exit from work are more likely to be influenced by domestic 
relationships and commitments outside the workplace. There is also evidence that some women 
time their retirement to fit with their partner (Lissenburgh and Smeaton, 2003).
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Figure B.8 Key influences on retirement decisions
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Figure B.9 Cognitive, affective and behavioural orientations to stakeholders
Figure B.10 Mental model of retirement
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The view of retirement as a fixed event is reinforced by the influence of cultural expectations and 
norms from a variety of sources, including, the State, employers, family and peers. The widespread 
perception of a ‘set retirement age’ appears to constrain active consideration by individuals over 
when to retire (DWP 673). For older women, employment patterns and early exit from work are 
more likely to be influenced by domestic relationships and commitments outside the workplace. 
There is also evidence that some women time their retirement to fit with their partner (Lissenburgh 
and Smeaton, 2003). 
A strong theme in the literature is the perception of retirement as an entitlement and deserved 
reward for a long working life (DWP 531). The end of working life is regarded by many in positive 
terms as desirable, with early retirement or stopping work before SPA widely perceived as ‘good’ or 
a ‘bonus’. A survey of retired respondents identified the top three reasons for not wanting to work 
past statutory pension age as: ‘I	deserve	my	retirement’; ‘not	well	enough’ and ‘just	don’t	want	to	
work’	(EHRC 43, 2009, p.61). There was considerable agreement regarding the benefits of retirement, 
specifically, autonomy, choice and freedom from enforced routine. ‘Most	respondents	felt	that	the	
defining	characteristic	of	retirement	lies	(or	should	lie)	in	taking	control	of	their	own	life	and	choosing	
for	themselves	how	to	spend	their	time.’ (DWP 557, p.22).
It is apparent that aspirations to retire early (e.g. in their 50s) are based on the perception of early 
retirement as having become the norm. Conversely, working beyond SPA appears to be perceived 
as a ‘penalty’. A consistent theme in the literature concerns resistance to the notion of being made 
to work longer. Compulsory extensions to working age are viewed negatively either where there is 
an expectation of early retirement or retirement at a previously specified SPA. Such changes evoke 
feelings of outrage and being cheated compared to the previous generation (EHRC43, DWP 531, 
DWP 557). Those affected feel angry at the loss of the free time they feel entitled to. These negative 
sentiments were often directed at the Government and fuelled public cynicism and mistrust in 
relation to the Government’s motives for targeting retirement, pensions and EWL. ‘Blame	for	the	
prospect	of	having	to	delay	retirement	was	often	directed	at	the	Government	and	the	pensions	
industry.	Many	felt	disappointed,	angry	and	betrayed	–	and	cynical	about	communications	from	
Government	on	the	subject.’ (DWP 557, p.2).
The equalisation of SPA for men and women was perceived as being driven by a desire to get people 
to work for longer. Even though men tended to be more in favour on the basis of equity and fairness, 
the preferred option would have been to lower the SPA of men to match that of women (DWP 
531). Feelings of suspicion were also evident in relation to the removal of mandatory pension age, 
which was viewed in negative terms as an imposed change rather than a positive opportunity. This 
associated mistrust is likely to influence perceptions of any messages from g/Government on the 
subject of retirement, pensions and EWL.
The literature revealed some contradictions in perceptions of retirement. On the one hand 
retirement is highly valued for the freedom to pursue your own interests, on the other it embodies 
negative feelings of apprehension over the prospect of financing this and worries over health (DWP 
531, DWP 557). Notably, while many are unable to estimate how much income they will need to 
finance retirement, most harbour misgivings over the sufficiency of their arrangements. Although 
many individuals express a desire to retire before SPA, routinely they take very modest steps to plan 
for this financially. ‘Even	for	those	whose	financial	situation	and	health	status	was	not	currently	a	
worry,	the	risk	of	things	going	wrong	was	a	very	powerful	element	of	how	people	felt	about	work	and	
retirement.’ (DWP 531, p.80).
Uncertainty over future health status appears to fuel the desire to retire early and a common 
reason identified in the literature for intending to retire before SPA was in order to enjoy retirement 
while still in good health. ‘Individuals	cannot	be	certain	how	long	their	good	health	will	continue	and	
therefore	base	decisions,	such	as	early	retirement,	on	the	possibility	that	their	health	may	deteriorate.’ 
(EHRC43, p.77).
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Despite widespread evidence of increases in life expectancy at a population level, at an individual 
level there are widely held concerns about personal health and well-being post-SPA that favour 
an early exit from employment. The authors of DWP 557 advise caution when framing arguments 
about working longer in terms of longevity as although individuals appear to be aware of increasing 
longevity, they do not necessarily believe it will apply to them and the misfortune of others tends to 
be highly cognitively available. 
‘...	many	...	knew	someone	or	knew	someone	who	knew	someone	who	had	not	had	a	decent	
retirement	…	despite	acknowledgement	that	statistically	we	are	all	living	longer,	many	of	the	
respondents	held	pessimistic	views	about	life	expectancy	based	on	the	experiences	of	those	around	
them.’ (DWP 531, p.80)
Poor health is acknowledged as a factor influencing an early exit from the workplace, particularly 
for those in low-skilled occupations (Group 3). Men in lower paid manual work were less likely to be 
considering retirement before SPA but were the most worried about their physical health impacting 
on their ability to work and enforcing an early exit (DWP 557). ‘... there are often doubts about how 
long they would be able to cope with jobs as age increases – particularly where stress, physical 
labour and mental sharpness are involved.’ (DWP 557, p.37).
B.7.2.2	 Mental	model	of	pensions	(Figure B.11)
A number of studies claim that there is a widespread public acceptance of the need for financial 
provision for retirement, though there was some divergence of opinion as to whether this is the 
responsibility of individuals or g/Government (DWP 434). The former view is more prevalent amongst 
higher income respondents. There is considerable consensus over a widely held perspective that the 
State should provide a minimum subsistence level of financial provision in retirement. There also 
appears to be broad acceptance that the g/Government should encourage saving for retirement, 
though there was less agreement on the g/Government’s role in providing advice on how individuals 
should do this.
Pensions are widely regarded as the most effective way to save for retirement. However, there is 
notable pessimism over pensions providing sufficient income in retirement (NAPF, 2010). Levels of 
worry over retirement income are, unsurprisingly, higher amongst those out of work, older people, 
women and those on low income or with no pension provision, which is likely to reflect the fact 
these groups have least control over enhancing their retirement income. For women there are 
specific concerns about the impact of career breaks on their pension (DWP 557 and DWP 434).
There is widely cited evidence of an erosion of confidence in pensions (NAPF, 2010; DWP 557; DWP 
562). Of the range of available pension providers respondents were most confident in employer 
pension schemes, although there are substantial differences between public and private sector 
employees (DWP 434). Trust in pension providers is characterised in terms of competence and 
care. Whilst financial institutions are regarded as having greater financial competence, non-profit 
organisations, the Government and employers are more highly regarded in relation to care and 
security of investment (DWP 434).
Despite apparent worries over retirement income and rational arguments about why it makes sense 
to save for retirement, there is little evidence of any proactive financial planning for retirement and 
EWL. Widespread inertia has been characterised as a key feature of behaviour in relation to this 
issue as ‘…	estimates	show	that	seven	million	people	are	not	making	provision	for	retirement	that	
they,	themselves,	would	be	likely	to	consider	sufficient.’ (DWP 562, p.9). Younger respondents (under 
25 years) appear to regard retirement as too far off to even think about saving for it and expressed 
an expectation to retire later (DWP 434). The authors of DWP 557 suggest there is a sense of denial 
about the financial perils of under-financed retirement. The public are also characterised as reacting 
to events as they unfold in the context of incomplete knowledge or understanding of their own 
pension status and of the prevailing policy situation (DWP 531).
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Figure B.11 Mental model of pensions
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over future needs and how best to plan as much of the necessary information is unknown. This 
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likely	entitlements;	misgivings	about	what	they	will	get;	limited	understanding	of	how	things	work;	
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A further challenge to income smoothing, characterised by some commentators as ‘myopia’ 
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best course of action. This confusion and uncertainty appears to be a characteristic of both State 
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understanding of pensions products, combined with the unpredictability of future needs and 
resources have been identified as contributing to confusion, helplessness and inertia. ‘One	of	the	
most	prominent	and	consistent	themes	running	through	the	literature	on	pensions...	is	individuals’	lack	
of	understanding	of	pensions.’ (DWP 562, p.19).
The literature suggests that poor awareness and understanding of pension products combined with 
the unpredictability of future needs and resources leads to uncertainty, fuelling inertia and inaction 
(DWP 562). There is also uncertainty regarding potential returns from different savings or investment 
options and potential changes in Government policy. SPA was formerly viewed as fixed, but changes 
in recent years may have contributed to uncertainty, accompanied by feelings of helplessness and 
fatalism.
A further barrier concerns the apparent lack of widespread active consideration of the financial 
implications of working versus retirement. The option to defer receipt of a pension is relevant to EWL 
but understanding of pension deferral options, either State or private, and the associated taxation 
issues appear to be very limited (DWP 557). Beliefs about the impact on future taxable income and 
benefits appear to contribute to the view that it is not financially beneficial, leading to reluctance to 
take up this option. On balance, the evidence indicates that tax relief is not a significant motivator to 
invest in pensions (DWP 434; Blundell et al., 2006). The authors of DWP 557 recommend that any tax 
incentives designed to motivate individuals to invest in pensions or work longer need to be obvious 
and easy to understand.
Most people appear to have a poor understanding of financial issues relevant to pensions and 
saving for retirement. This includes basic financial concepts such as compound interest, resulting 
in erroneous assumptions that it is possible to compensate for low contributions made during 
the early part of their working life by paying more in the latter part (DWP 434). They are also 
likely to struggle to make sense of information regarding the financial benefits to be derived from 
working beyond the point at which they become eligible for pension payments (pension deferral). 
Differences in education level have some impact on perceived understanding of pensions but even 
a high proportion of those educated to degree level find it too complicated (DWP 492). ‘…	both	the	
behavioural	barriers	to	savings	and	the	costs	of	provision	have	been	made	worse	by	the	bewildering	
complexity	of	the	UK	pension	system,	state	and	private	combined.’ (Pensions Commission 2004, 
p.205).
The main objection to deferral was ‘…	based	mainly	on	the	belief	that	it	was	better	for	people	to	
take	the	pension	at	the	first	available	opportunity	as	the	future	was	uncertain.’ (DWP 531, p.7). Of 
those that thought that pension deferral was a good idea, in principle, the vast majority were not 
considering deferral for themselves (DWP 531). This highlights a caveat regarding responses to such 
hypothetical questions where respondents are positively disposed to certain options but will not 
necessarily take up these options themselves.
A number of potential sources of EWL/pensions information are identified in the literature including: 
g/Government; financial institutions; family and friends; advice agencies, employers; health 
professionals; trades unions; and the media. ‘Respondents’	evident	sense	of	having	been	misled	and	
let	down	over	pensions	by	both	the	Government	and	the	pensions	industry	is	a	thread	which	runs	
though	many	of	our	findings.’ (DWP 557, p.101)
The DWP is by and large trusted to provide technical information about State Pension entitlements, 
but it is not regarded as an impartial source in relation to advice and information over EWL (DWP 
557). There appears to be a general mistrust of financial institutions. Banks and building societies 
are not regarded as a trustworthy source of information due to perceived commercial motivations 
(DWP 557). ‘A	key	theme	to	emerge	was	a	legacy	of	bitterness	and	mistrust	over	pension	issues.	This	
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is	a	generation	that	has	experienced	some	of	the	worst	‘financial	scandals’	to	date	and	there	was	
considerable	uncertainty	and	anxiety	about	the	whole	issue	of	pensions.’ (DWP 531, p119).
The literature highlights conflicting findings regarding trust in IFAs. There is evidence from different 
sources that IFAs are trusted, even though only a small proportion of respondents had actually 
sought information from them (DWP 562 and DWP 434). It seems that the notion of IFAs as 
independent affords them higher status in terms of trust. In contrast, DWP 531 highlights scepticism 
targeted at financial advisers, pension providers and the g/Government.
Some regard employers as being able to contribute to employment options and retirement planning, 
however, this was not widespread. There are very few reports of employers offering pre-retirement 
planning advice. Trades unions appear to enjoy a positive trust profile in this domain, but do not 
appear to be seen as a primary source on the EWL issue. Advice agencies such as the Citizens 
Advice Bureau, age concern, disability groups, welfare rights and law centres, GPs and other health 
professionals all engender high trust, but have no discernible profile as a source of information and 
advice over EWL or pensions.
Despite widespread mistrust of mass-media sources, these remain a primary and influential 
information source. Respondents in DWP 438 cited the media as fuelling mistrust in private pensions, 
specifically media stories about failing pension funds. The more recent financial crisis associated with 
the banking sector may be expected to have undermined confidence in these institutions. Media, 
personal experiences and social networks have fuelled negativity and concerns over pensions including 
doubts that the State Pension would be maintained or at a worthwhile level. (DWP 557 and DWP 531).
B.7.2.3	 Mental	model	of	EWL	(Figure 6.5)
As noted elsewhere, the concept of EWL is not highly salient to most people and, consequently, is a 
topic on which few actively seek out information. ‘Our	respondents	did	not	generally	have	an	agenda	
for	getting	information	about	extending	their	working	lives,	so	that	any	information	the	Department	
puts	out	on	this	subject	will	not	find	an	audience	eagerly	waiting	to	collect	and	digest	it.’ (DWP 557, 
p.114). This poses a significant challenge to public policy communication interventions.
Beyond absolute necessity, financial incentives appear to have a modest motivational impact on 
orientation to EWL (DWP 531). Intrinsic satisfaction and social benefits seem to be more salient, 
or perhaps more accurately, it seems that financial incentives have a modest impact where the 
former are not positively framed (EHRC 43) and where work is made unattractive by its design 
and configuration, e.g. long hours, high job demands.	‘The	high	incidence	of	stress	reported	...	has	
significant	policy	implications	in	terms	of	the	extending	working	lives	agenda	...’	(EHRC 43, p.xi). Shift 
working is not regarded as desirable and appears to increase the desire to withdraw from work. 
‘There	was	a	reluctance	to	work	‘antisocial’	hours	in	part-time	jobs.’ (DWP 531, p.73).
The apparent attractiveness of flexible working does not just concern a reduction in working hours 
but also the distribution of hours. However, the prevailing view is that such opportunities are 
limited and, therefore, flexible working is not viewed as a viable proposition. Although a significant 
proportion of respondents in DWP 557 expressed interest in phased withdrawal from employment, 
few believed that their employers would offer this level of flexibility. This is consistent with findings 
from a number of studies that indicate general support for the idea of flexibility and choice in later 
working life, tempered by the perception that it is an option that is only open to a narrow band of 
employees, occupations and sectors (DWP 299, DWP 557).
Although there appears to be notable interest in the possibility of flexible working and gradual 
retirement, there appears to be limited knowledge of potential options available and employers 
do not appear forthcoming with information on this (DWP 531). ‘There	was	a	lot	of	interest	in	the	
Appendices – Improving communications about extending working life amongst 
individuals: learning from models of behavioural and attitudinal change
136
possibility	of	flexible	working	and	gradual	retirement	[but]	...	there	was	a	sense	that	employers	did	not	
provide	very	much	information	[on this]	...	hence	people	didn’t	know	whether	gradual	retirement	was	
available	to	them	or	not.’ (DWP 531, p.75).
Figure B.12 Mental model of extending working life
The literature also identifies a general reluctance on the part of older employees to approach 
employers about flexible options. For some this is characterised as a lack of confidence (EHRC 43). 
Others expressed concerns about how employers would perceive such an approach and whether 
expressing a desire for reduced hours or part-time working might be interpreted as a lack of 
commitment, which might then threaten their future job prospects/security (McNair, 2007).
DWP 299 concludes that ‘Access	to	training	and	continuing	education	remains	a	crucial	issue	for	
older	workers.’ (p.76). An apparent lack of engagement with training has been attributed to an 
absence of opportunities and a lack of willingness to engage with training (Newton, 2006; DWP 299; 
McNair, 2007). DWP 557 highlights a lack of orientation to education and training amongst older 
workers and a preference for utilising their existing skills rather than acquiring new ones. A lack of 
confidence and negative self-perception has also been identified as barriers to take-up (DWP 557). 
The perception of employers as unwilling to invest in training older workers is also identified as a 
challenge to skills enhancement for older workers (Taylor and Unwin, 2001). The literature is very 
limited on details regarding the actual nature of training options.
6.3 Conclusions
Decisions about whether to retire or extend working life beyond SPA are beset with multiple 
uncertainties, making predictions and planning difficult. This is exacerbated by a general lack of 
motivation for any kind of active and purposeful information-seeking in relation to retirement, 
pensions and extending working life. ‘...	few	people	use	information	gathering	routinely	or	
systematically	as	a	starting	point	for	planning	and	decision-making	–	certainly	[not]	in	relation	to	
broad	topics	like	extending	working	life,	which	is	an	amorphous	topic	that	people	typically	have	little	
motivation	to	explore.’ (DWP 557, p.99).
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Engagement with these issues can be characterised as a passive process of acquiring information 
in an ad hoc manner from different sources, including the mass media (DWP 557). However, the 
challenge in attempting to engage the public is not simply to provide correct factual information 
but to also address issues of salience and motivation. ‘… most admitted that they would not have 
sought out material on this subject in real life – or probably even read it if it had been handed to 
them or dropped through the letterbox.’ (DWP 557, p.112).
B.8 Cognitive and socio-cognitive behaviour change 
influence models
Key	findings
• The models have been most widely applied in public health contexts, particularly in the context of 
lifestyle (risk) choices.
• They focus on individuals at the unit of change, rather than the contextual (structural and socio-
cultural) elements. In this respect they contrast with the nudge perspective, but both could be 
used in a complementary manner.
• They are rooted in the rational choice perspective, i.e. the assumption that human behaviour is 
the product of a rational appraisal of the costs and benefits of different actions. 
• There is quite strong evidence that they can play a role in changing peoples’ orientations to issues, 
e.g. risks to their future well-being. However, their impact tends to be modest in the presence of 
strong structural and cultural counter-influences.
• Claims of their impact on behaviour are to be dominated by findings reporting rates of behaviour 
intention (rather than behaviour).
• Stages of change approaches have been widely adopted, however, there is limited evidence that a 
staged approach is superior to alternatives.
• There is potential utility in the use of the stages of change concept as a way of segmenting the 
population to provide a focus for policy thinking over intervention strategy.
B.8.1 Overview
Cognitive and socio-cognitive (psychology) behaviour change models can be traced back to the 
1970s and have been widely reviewed across Government departments over the last decade. Their 
attractiveness to policy-makers lies in the promise of migrating people along a pathway of change 
to more ‘desirable’ behaviour. They have been most widely applied within the public health domain, 
e.g. smoking cessation, healthy diet, reducing alcohol consumption, the context from which they 
emerged, but have been a feature of policy agendas in education, crime prevention, occupational 
health and elsewhere.
Here, we consider the scope for applying these models to EWL and pensions behaviour change 
agendas. The account offered here gives an overview of the most widely used models. For a detailed 
account of the perspective see the reviews conducted by the National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) (2007) and the Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL) (2005).
At their core is the premise that behaviour change is a product of the individual coming to recognise 
the risks to future well-being associated with certain behaviours, recognising that they need 
to change their behaviour to reduce the risk and take steps to achieve this (behaviour change). 
The models seek to find ways of motivating/supporting people though the change process. This 
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takes various forms, ranging from producing communication material, typically, designed to raise 
awareness of harm, routinely emphasising gains from reducing personal vulnerability to negative 
outcomes, to helping people to configure personal action plans.
They share a focus on individuals as the unit of change, i.e. they focus on motivating changing 
behaviour directly, rather than indirectly though changes to the context in which people operate. Here 
we can observe a key contrast with the more recent nudge perspective (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) 
which, beyond taking advantage of fallibilities in human decision-making highlights the role of the 
decision-making context, or architecture (see Section B.9). In the case of the latter, the emphasis is on 
configuring structural environmental variables to encourage people to behave in desired ways. In the 
context of nudge, the primary focus of the theory of change is on the decision-making context. From 
the socio-cognitive perspective, change in the individual represents the core focus.
It is important to keep in mind that while decisions over EWL and saving for retirement embody 
volitional elements, i.e. people have a degree of choice and options interact with an array of 
personal, circumstantial and structural factors.
B.8.2 Cognitive and socio-cognitive models of behaviour change
The behavioural sciences have produced an array of models and theories of behaviour change, with 
varying degrees of explanatory and predictive power.
Key distinctions relate to the: 
• weight they accord to rational as opposed to irrational factors; and 
• extent to which they focus on the role of free will or determinism as the driver of behaviour change.
B.8.2.1	 Rational	choice	theory
Underpinning all rational choice perspectives is the assumption that human behaviour is primarily 
determined by a rational appraisal of the costs and benefits of different actions, e.g. in a market 
consumers are expected make a rational trade-off between the utility of a commodity and its price. 
The assumption is that individuals will always choose to maximise their benefits and minimise their 
costs and that this trade-off can be modelled mathematically, to reveal which choice or behaviour 
will yield the maximum utility. However, a limitation of the approach is that it does not attempt to 
explain human motivations, beyond the relatively narrow parameters of financial costs and benefits.
This failure to explore why individuals vary in their ascriptions of utility, i.e. why they value outcomes 
differently, limits the predictive power of the approach and can make its logic rather circular. That 
is, if we claim that individuals take rational action to maximise the outcomes that they value, but 
that we can only know what they value by looking at the choices they have made, then it is not 
apparent how our understanding of their behaviour or our capacity to predict it has been enhanced. 
The approach has also been criticised for assuming that individuals have perfect knowledge of 
the consequences that will result from different choices, or the cognitive competence to compare 
relative costs and benefits. These criticisms have led to consideration of the constraints on rational 
choice (‘bounded rationality’), and behavioural economists have begun to use psychological insights 
into human motivations and behaviour to move beyond the assumptions embodied in rational 
choice theory.
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B.8.2.2	 Social	cognitive	theory
Socio-cognitive perspectives focus on the way in which people’s thoughts influence their behaviour, 
placing particular emphasis on the role of social learning. Through interaction with the material 
and social world individuals are held to develop personal characteristics, learn from the reactions of 
others to their behaviour and recognise which environmental constraints on their behaviour can be 
successfully challenged.
Central to the perspective is Bandura’s (1977) concept of self-efficacy, i.e. the individual’s subjective 
appraisal of their capacity to perform a particular behaviour or task, for example, to quit smoking 
or perform well in an exam. Beliefs about self-efficacy are said to be acquired through social 
experience, including reflecting on the consequences of our own attempts to behave in a particular 
way, and by observing the consequences of other people’s behaviour, (particularly if we identify 
strongly with the people we observe), i.e. modelling our behaviour on others.
The perspective holds that self-efficacy can be promoted and enhanced through intervention 
e.g. offering guidance and support. Socio-cognitive perspectives can be viewed as an advance on 
rational choice perspectives, in so far as they broaden the array of influences considered. However, 
they remain vulnerable to the core criticism of the former in restricting the focus to cognitive 
elements, i.e. there is limited consideration of social, cultural or structural influences on behaviour.
The most enduring legacy of this perspective is its incorporation into value expectancy and stages of 
change models.
Theory of planned behaviour and theory of reasoned action
The theory of planned behaviour ((TPB), Ajzen, 1985), while remaining an essentially cognitive model 
focused on the individual as the unit of change, lays claim to taking account of social, cultural and 
structural influences. The theory has its origins in the earlier theory of reasoned action ((TRA), Ajzen 
and Fishbein, 1980).
At the core of TPB is the premise that an individual’s motivation for behaviour change is a function 
of attitude (whether or not the individual evaluates the behaviour as positive) and subjective norms 
(whether the individual believes that significant others want them to perform the behaviour).
Central to Ajzen’s reformulation was the recognition of the role of self-efficacy and outcome 
expectancy, derived from socio-cognitive theory, i.e. the extent to which individuals believe that they 
are personally capable of achieving behaviour change and their belief in the likely outcome of their 
attempts to do so. Ajzen combines these concepts into perceived behavioural control. Figure B.13 
illustrates the relationships between the key concepts that comprise the TPB.
The theory is concerned with the relationship between an individual’s intentions and behaviour and 
the factors that combine to influence intentions. Within the model, factors assumed to influence 
behaviour are: 
• the individual’s attitude towards the behaviour, i.e. whether gains are perceived to outweigh the 
losses, weighted by the perceived likelihood of success or failure; 
• the presence of social pressure to perform (or not perform) the behaviour, i.e. does the behaviour 
meet with social approval? Ajzen describes this as subjective norms; and 
• perceived behavioural control, the extent to which the individual perceives that they have sufficient 
control over the internal and external factors that affect achievement of the behavioural goal.
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In this iteration of the model, perceived behavioural control is very close to Bandura’s notion of 
self-efficacy, i.e. it focuses on the individual’s belief in their ability to exercise control over internal 
and external factors and how this belief impacts on intent. However, in his 1985 paper Ajzen quite 
clearly states that these internal and external factors can directly constrain behaviour, not just by 
diminishing intent. This can be viewed as a significant advance, embodying the recognition that no 
matter what intentions or plans for behaviour the individual might subscribe to, there is potential for 
them be hijacked by factors that lie beyond the individual.
Many of the external factors that really do constrain individual volitional behaviour, e.g. institutions, 
laws, the distribution of resources, are themselves the product of human practical activity, albeit 
collective rather than individual, and as such are located within an historical process of reproduction 
and transformation. The TPB has nothing to say about this. Instead, it posits an asocial actor pursuing 
individual volitional plans within the constraints of a largely fixed and immutable external world.
Figure B.13 Theory of planned behaviour52
Ajzen also has little to say about the process of behaviour change, beyond stating that the 
relationship between planned behaviour and actual behaviour is likely to weaken as the lapsed-
time between them increases. Others have argued for a more sequential model of the process of 
behaviour change.
52 Source: http://johnnyholland.org/2011/01/24/the-a-b-c-of-behaviour/intent-behaviour/
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Transtheoretical model
The transtheoretical model ((TTM), Prochaska and DiClemente, 1977), so named because it draws 
upon a wide range of different psychosocial models, claims that the process of behaviour change 
can be conceptualised as five sequential stages (see Figure B.14): 
• Stage 1 Precontemplation – people have no plans to change their behaviour and may not feel the 
need to do so; 
• Stage 2 Contemplation – people are planning to change in the next six months and may be more 
aware of the benefits of changes; 
• Stage 3 Preparation – people are preparing to take action in the next 30 days and may be taking 
small steps towards change; 
• Stage 4 Action – people have changed their behaviour for up to six months and are trying to 
strengthen their commitment to the change; 
• Stage 5 Maintenance – people have changed their behaviour for at least six months and are 
engaged in strategies to avoid relapse.
Although fundamentally linear, the model is perhaps best viewed as iterative, where people can 
move forwards and backwards through the cycle by relapsing and re-entering the process at 
different stages. However, the core premise that people will eventually pass along a continuum 
remains open to question.
The approach benefits from a high intuitive appeal and is of good fit with a traditional individual 
treatment perspective, which may go some way towards explaining its popularity amongst public 
health policy-makers and practitioners. Its appeal is no doubt enhanced by the fact that its 
architects offer a model that goes beyond description that focuses on the processes of change, i.e. 
they claim that it offers insights into the strategies that people employ in order to progress from one 
stage to the next. It is these processes that have aroused interest in health policy delivery circles.
The model is said to be based upon the synthesis of 24 influential psychotherapy models (see 
Table B.5). It is worth taking a moment to contemplate this evidence base, as it firmly grounds the 
approach within the perspective that change is a product of focusing on the individual, rather than 
the context in which decision-making takes place, i.e. an extension of the traditional bio-medical 
treatment model. Here lies a key contrast with the nudge perspective.
As with the value expectancy models, self-efficacy is central to the TTM, because it pivots on the 
confidence that individuals have in their ability to resist temptation and relapse into unhealthy 
behaviour, e.g. smokers may find it difficult to resist cigarettes when they are socialising with friends. 
The different processes are essentially really just ways of strengthening self-efficacy by providing 
information to demonstrate that the pros of behaviour change outweigh the cons (decisional 
balance), coupled with social support and reinforcement to help maintain the change (essentially, 
an individual counselling perspective).
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Figure B.14 The stages of change concept53
However, the TTM has been widely criticised. Several meta-analyses have questioned the 
effectiveness of interventions based on the TTM, while others have questioned a number of its core 
assumptions.
The main criticisms surround:
• limited evidence that a stages approach is superior to alternatives;
• defining coherently the boundaries of the different stages can be problematic;
• the model assumes that individuals make coherent plans, it seems that many do not;
• limited evidence that people migrate from one stage to the next.
In his defence, Prochaska has argued that much of the empirical evidence against the TTM is 
methodologically weak and that there is a tendency to focus on the stages of change rather than 
linking this to the processes of change (see also Armitage et	al.,	2007). The TTM offers an intuitively 
appealing model for behaviour change, but there appears to be limited scope for translating this 
understanding into effective interventions.
The health action process approach
The Health Action Process Approach ((HAPA), Schwarzer, 2008) shares the core focus on self-
efficacy. A claimed strength of the HAPA is its capacity to conceptualise behaviour change as either 
a continuum or a series of stages.
53 Source: http://johnnyholland.org/2011/01/24/the-a-b-c-of-behaviour/intent-behaviour/
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The model holds that change rests with two self-regulatory processes: 
• a goal-setting (motivational) phase; and 
• a goal-pursuit (volitional) phase.
Table B.5 Stages of change – process model
Process Stage Description
Consciousness raising Pre-contemplation Increasing information about the 
problem
Dramatic relief and emotional 
arousal
Pre-contemplation Identifying and expressing 
emotions relevant to the problem
Environmental re-evaluation Pre-contemplation Assessing social and physical 
impacts of behaviour, e.g. through 
empathy
Self-re-evaluation Contemplation Appraising one’s values with 
regard to the behaviour and beliefs 
about the self
Self-liberation Preparation Assessing whether others (society) 
are supportive of health choices
Counter-conditioning Action Substituting thoughts, activities, 
etc. that stimulated the old 
behaviour with ones that support 
the new behaviour, e.g. relaxation, 
positive self-statements
Helping relationships Action/Maintenance Using social support to maintain 
commitments, provide feedback 
and emotional support
Reinforcement management Maintenance Using rewards to encourage 
maintenance
Stimulus control Maintenance Avoiding stimuli that triggered 
previous behaviour
The latter is sub-divided into:
• pre-action (where the individual is making plans to change; and 
• action (implementation/adoption).
The model typifies individuals in terms of their position on the pathway as:
• pre-intenders;
• intenders; and 
• actors.
Figure B.15 illustrates the factors held to influence these different phases.
As elsewhere, intention to change is viewed as a function of task self-efficacy, outcome 
expectancies and risk perception or concern. Risk perception is routinely considered to be the 
weakest of the three, although this depends on the nature of the target behaviour.
Within the model, the relationship between intention and action is held to be mediated by planning. 
Planning is described as a two-part process comprising both an action plan and strategies for coping 
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with factors that might impede the behaviour change. Essentially it is held that planning is not an 
abstract set of aspirations, but concrete and detailed strategies for bringing about change. Self-
efficacy is also important to planning, but the model distinguishes this as maintenance self-efficacy 
because it relates specifically to the perceived ability to implement plans and cope with hindrances.
Figure B.15 The health action process approach54
Throughout the process of change, from intention, through planning, to action, there is recognition 
that situational barriers and resources, such as the availability of social support, are likely to 
impact on success. Although cognition is central to the approach, there is recognition that people’s 
intentions, plans and efforts to change take place in an environment that can either hinder or 
support them.
In essence, the model proposes that behaviour change will occur when people intend to change 
their behaviour, have a realistic plan for doing so and have the capacity to put their plans into action, 
unless they encounter (external) barriers that prevent them from doing so.
B.8.3 Scope for application
Based upon what is almost certainly the most comprehensive appraisal of the evidence base 
(a meta-review of 87 systematic reviews) NICE has produced guidelines for policy-makers and 
practitioners on developing interventions based on socio-cognitive models (NICE, 2007). This 
54  Source: http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~health/hapa.htm
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meta-analytic review examined interventions aimed at individuals, communities and nationwide 
initiatives.
Meta-analytic findings need to be interpreted cautiously, as they tend to focus on outcomes 
alone, with limited attention to differences in the degree of sophistication/prowess with which 
interventions were operationalised. Conclusions that can be drawn are also restricted by the scope 
of the constituent models and underpinning theoretical perspectives.
Jepson’s ‘review-of-reviews’ (Jepson et	al.,	2006) suggests that behaviour change interventions 
can be effective at the individual, community or population levels. Rather than describing specific 
interventions, we offer more generic conclusions drawn from the review which maybe more useful in 
terms of designing EWL/pensions investment interventions.
The Jepson review categorised interventions according to whether they attempted to change 
knowledge, attitudes, or behaviour. Many of the interventions included in the review drew upon 
themes from the different models/theoretical approaches described above, but the evidence of 
the effectiveness of the models was found to be slim, leading the reviewers to conclude: ‘There	
was	a	lack	of	evidence	to	support	conclusions	regarding	the	efficacy	of	models	or	theories	related	to	
changing	knowledge,	attitudes	or	behaviour.’ A conclusion that might be drawn is not that theory is 
unimportant to intervention design, but that no individual theoretical approach appears to have a 
monopoly on effectiveness. Rather it seems that insights from different theoretical approaches can 
(should be?) be applied pragmatically in the development of interventions.
Drawing transferable conclusions from such a broad and complex evidence base is by no means 
straightforward, but there do appear to be tenets that are transferable to other (non-health) policy 
delivery domains:
• behaviour can be changed by interventions operating at the individual, community and  
population levels;
• success is far from assured; there is evidence of failed or ineffective behaviour change 
interventions and those which are effective in impacting on knowledge and/or attitudes may not 
result in behaviour change;
• selecting the target group can have a significant impact on effectiveness, for example, targeting 
individuals at key transition points in the life course can be a useful, effective strategy;
• it is not just the content or theoretical standpoint that determines the effectiveness of an 
intervention, but the way in which it is implemented.
B.8.4 Putting interventions into practice
The NICE guidance eschews the adoption of a particular theoretical standpoint in favour of a 
pragmatic approach drawing on key concepts from different theories, see Table B.6.
B.8.4.1	 The	utility	of	socio-cognitive	models	in	the	EWL	and	pensions	domain
Although widely applied within public health contexts, real questions surround the utility of socio-
cognitive models in the work and pensions context. There are important differences between the 
two policy domains not least with regard to the types of behaviour they seek to change and the 
scope for accessing target (sub-) populations.
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Conceptual insights
Saving for retirement and, to a lesser degree EWL, are not decisions to be made at a fixed point in 
time, they are processes of behaviour change that unfold over time and need to be sustained.
Table B.6 Health model concepts for developing behaviour  
 change interventions
Outcome expectancies Helping people to develop accurate knowledge about the health 
consequences of their behaviours.
Personal relevance Emphasising the personal salience of health behaviours.
Positive attitude Promoting positive feelings towards outcomes of behaviour 
change.
Self-efficacy Enhancing people’s belief in their ability to change.
Descriptive norms Promoting the visibility of positive health behaviours in people’s 
reference groups.
Subjective norms Enhancing social approval for positive health behaviours in 
significant others and reference groups.
Personal and moral norms Promoting personal and moral commitments to behaviour change
Intention formation and concrete plans Helping people to form plans and goals for changing behaviours, 
over time and in specific contexts.
Behavioural contracts Asking people to share their plans and goals with others.
Relapse prevention Helping people to develop skills to cope with difficult situations 
and conflicting goals.
• Demonstrating that it is financially rational to invest in pensions or EWL, is likely to have a modest 
influence on behaviour, and given the universal recognition of the need to save for retirement, 
i.e. failure to save is not the product of ignorance. However, there is widespread uncertainty and 
suspicion over how best to save.
• The complexity of options (particularly pensions) and uncertainty over outcomes (income and 
health, etc.) will tend to erode self-efficacy. There is scope for supportive interventions to increase 
self-efficacy.
• Where pension investment and/or EWL occur there is a need to provide support to sustain this 
behaviour, e.g. pension savings drawn down to cope with short-term financial pressures need to 
be restored, similarly the onset of ill-health may challenge sustained EWL.
Development and design of interventions
• Population-based mass media campaigns may be effective in communicating information about 
pension reform or policies relating to EWL and possibly to encourage normative shift in attitudes 
to EWL. However, it is unlikely that such an approach on its own will be sufficient to generate 
significant metrics of behaviour change.
• Where interventions can be configured that focus on structural, climate and cultural influences 
(barriers) to change these are likely to deliver higher metrics of impact.
• Interventions are more likely to be effective if they are segmented, targeted at specific groups and 
tailored to meet their specific informational needs and orientations. 
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• The stages of change concept can be extended, from a tool to locate individuals on the 
pathway, to a means of segmenting the target population(s), e.g. 50% pre-contemplative, 30% 
contemplative, 20% engaged, etc. That is, there may be benefit from configuring interventions to 
meet the need of groups at different points in the change pathway. However, it is important to 
bear in mind critiques of the implicit assumption that all individuals (and groups) are in transit – it 
is entirely possible that a significant proportion of the pre-contemplative group may never migrate 
to the next stage.
• Using the stages concept to segment the population offers utility via conceptualising the 
information and support needs of constituent sub-populations, e.g. awareness raising activity, 
such as case studies of fellow workers’ EWL might be appropriate for pre-intenders, whereas 
intenders may benefit from support in EWL/retirement planning to enhance self-efficacy. 
Segmenting the target group in this way is potentially of utility for both direct (DWP) and indirect 
(intermediaries/partners) intervention, e.g. there is scope for employers to ‘triage’ employees in 
terms of their position on change pathway and configure an intervention strategy informed by this 
insight.
• There is evidence of gain in pension investment behaviour from aligning interventions with 
significant life events, e.g. birth of a child, change of job, etc. There, scope for gaining access to 
target groups is likely greater via the employer route.
• The time lapse between awareness raising and behaviour can influence the likelihood of change. 
There would be benefit from establishing the optimum time/life course point at which to deploy 
EWL interventions to maximise behavioural impact.
• Interventions appear to be more effective if they entail personalised support for the individual 
throughout the different stages of change, for example through ongoing guidance or counselling 
sessions. This might entail individual (or possibly group) meetings in the workplace, to assess 
where individuals are on the pathway to change and deliver appropriate support to facilitate 
change, for example, information on pensions and EWL options, generating normative change 
in the workforce; compiling individual action plans and offering support to maintain behaviour 
change and avoid relapse.
B.8.5 Conclusions
Socio-cognitive models of behaviour change have enjoyed notable popularity in public health 
contexts and have been applied to a lesser degree elsewhere
The principal limitations of the perspective rest with the focus on cognitive elements and 
underpinning assumptions over attitude-behaviour relationships combined a core focus on the 
individual as the unit of change. While certain models take some account of cultural and other 
contextual influences on behaviour, the approach remains fundamentally orientated around the 
individual and enhancing their self-efficacy to overcome external barriers to change, rather than 
focusing on more fundamental changes to contextual influences.
In many respects, the models are a product of the context in which they were conceived, i.e. public 
health, and the cognitive paradigm within the discipline of psychology. In essence, they constitute 
an extension of traditional biomedical perspectives, rooted in the treatment of individuals.
There is quite strong evidence that they can play a role in changing peoples’ orientations to issues, in 
particular risks to their future well-being. However, their impact tends to be modest in the presence 
of strong structural and cultural counter-influences. They are predicated on the basis that change 
rests with the individual and finding ways to enhance their volition to overcome barriers to change. 
This can at best offer a partial solution in the context of work and pensions, particularly regarding 
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EWL, where a strong positive orientation may do little to counter shortages in post-SPA employment 
opportunities, part-time work, or employer policies that discriminate against older people.
There is potential utility in the use of the stages of change concept as a way of segmenting target 
groups, at least in so far as it may help to provide a focus for policy thinking over intervention 
strategy. In this respect there is potential utility in the content of both direct (DWP led) and indirect 
interventions, in particular via the employer. There is also scope, again particularly for employers, to 
use the stages concept to configure bespoke support packages for their employees. 
B.9 Designing policy to nudge people to work longer and save 
for retirement
Key	findings
• The choices people make are often sensitive to whether options are framed as gains or losses. In 
many instances people are loss-averse.
• If individuals are to be successfully nudged to extend their working life it is important to change 
the perception that they are entitled to retire at 65.
• The endowment effect implies that individuals will need to be offered significant compensation to 
give up their ‘entitlement’ to retire. Framing options as avoiding financial penalties are likely to be 
more effective than a focus on portraying gains. 
• There is strong evidence of higher pension take-up where the default is an ‘opt-in’.
• Status quo bias – people tend to shrink from changing investment choices for fear that they may 
make the wrong choice, i.e. the avoidance of regret. They make mistakes because they are afraid 
to make mistakes. 
• When an increase in choice increases complexity, individuals are more likely to procrastinate. One 
way to nudge individuals is to reduce ‘choice overload’, possibly through channelling choice.
• Setting deadlines over EWL and pensions investment options can go some way to ameliorate 
inertia and status quo bias.
• Individuals behave as if they assign money to different ‘mental accounts’. There is scope to take 
advantage of mental accounting when setting incentives.
• Paternalists set out to do what is ‘best’ for individuals, but the experts do not always agree on 
what is ‘best’. There is also the presumption that the experts are a disinterested party. Defining 
the ‘best’ choice that individuals should make can be problematic. 
• Policy-makers may claim that they nudge individuals in a very general way, e.g. to save, diet and 
exercise, but effective policy nudges must be more specific than this.
• There is evidence that policy nudges may advantage different groups differently. It is important to 
recognise that nudge may have very little impact on those who have little autonomy and choice 
over their access to work and working arrangements.
B.9.1 Policy objectives
Life expectancy is increasing. Increases in longevity (and decreases in fertility) have increased the 
fraction of the population aged 65 and over. Figure B.16 illustrates the increase in the number of 
years that men and women live beyond the age of 65. In 1841, a 65-year-old man could expect to 
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live for another ten years. In 1961, a 65 year-old man could look forward to another 12 years. By 
2001, a 65-year-old man could look forward to another 16 years.
Over a 40-year period, men have gained a 33% increase in their expected life after the age of 65. 
Figure B.16 also illustrates the increase that women have gained in their life expectancy after the 
age of 65. By 2032 there will be more than 16 million people aged over 65 in the UK and this group 
will account for almost a quarter of the population (ONS 2008).
One implication is that the share of a lifetime spent at work has fallen. The proportion spent at work 
has also fallen because the age at which individuals finish full-time education has increased. There 
is concern that individuals are retiring too early and that they are not making adequate provision for 
retirement. In 2007/08 almost a quarter (23%) of pensioners were living in households with lower 
than 60% of median income for the UK as a whole (compared with 15% of those at working age, 
Brown, 2010). The ‘economic dependency’ ratio is increasing (the ‘economic dependency’ ratio is the 
ratio of dependent to economically productive individuals).
Figure B.16 Life expectancy at the age of 65 (England and Wales)
The problem of increasing dependency has been exacerbated by the post-war ‘baby boom’. This 
legacy has left the UK with a comparatively large proportion of the population currently at working age 
and it was able to avoid a significant increase in the dependency ratio between 1980 and 2010. But 
now the UK is experiencing a rise in the economic dependency ratio. The percentage of the population 
over 65 to those over 20-64 is likely to increase from 27% in 2000 to 47% in 2050 (Hills, 2000).
Source: Banks (2006).
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One solution is to encourage individuals to extend their working life. It is important to recognise 
that many considerations are relevant but the amount that an individual has saved for retirement 
is a very important consideration. Workers may be more willing to extend working life if they feel 
that they have not saved sufficiently for their retirement (e.g. Mitchell and Fields, 1984). This report 
focuses on the ‘behavioural anomalies’ that influence willingness to extend working lives but it 
also considers the impact of behavioural anomalies that influence individuals’ decision to save for 
retirement.
The usual (economic) rationale for government intervention in a market is that the market has 
failed. Barr and Diamond (2006) describe this rationale when they consider government intervention 
in the market for pensions. The market ‘fails’ when relative prices and regulatory constraints distort 
choice. In the UK steps have been taken to correct distortions (by changing price and regulatory 
constraints). In 1995 eligibility for disability benefits was tightened. In 2002 in-work benefits were 
targeted on the 50+ unemployed. In October 2006 mandatory early retirement was abolished 
and measures were taken to address age discrimination. These reforms have already influenced 
decisions (Banks and Blundell, 2005). Brown (2010) reports that, in 1994, 64% of males aged 50-64 
were in employment, but by 2008 this proportion was 73%. It is also the case that, while 60% of 
those aged 50-59 were employed in 1994, 70% were employed in 2008.
This report focuses on a different rationale for g/Government intervention. In recent years, 
governments have considered policy proposals based on insights drawn from behavioural 
economics. These insights question the extent to which individuals are able to make rational 
decisions even if markets are working perfectly. The rationale for intervention is based on ‘individual 
failure’ (Jones and Cullis, 2000), rather than on ‘market failure’. Individuals do not behave as 
‘rationally’ as homo economicus, individuals make ‘mistakes’.
Individuals are inconsistent. They make decisions they regret in later life. In behavioural experiments 
and in everyday life individuals are very sensitive to loss. Behavioural economics highlights the 
importance of contextual (or ‘framing’) effects. There is evidence that ‘behavioural anomalies’ are 
systematic and, if behavioural anomalies are systematic, it is possible to design policy to correct 
mistakes.
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2008) advocate ‘libertarian	paternalism’ (and insist that this is not 
an oxymoron). The rationale for policy reforms is paternalistic (to stop individuals making mistakes) 
but reforms are libertarian (they do not force individuals to make the correct choice – they nudge 
individuals to make the correct choice). Key questions surround: Can individuals be nudged to extend 
their working life? Can individuals be nudged to make adequate provision for retirement? Later tracts 
of this section focus on behavioural anomalies that are relevant when designing policy to encourage 
individuals to extend their working lives. The objective is to consider policy measures that nudge 
individuals to make correct decisions.
B.9.2 The rationale for policy designed to nudge
Thaler and Sunstein distinguish between Humans and Econs. They compare the choice a Human 
makes with the choice that an instrumentally rational Econ would make. Behavioural anomalies are 
ubiquitous (Thaler, 1994) but measures can be taken to nudge individuals to make the decisions 
that Econs would make, i.e. to make the choices they would make if only they were rational and able 
to exercise self-control.
Policy-makers must act as choice architects. Just as architects are often aware that their clients do 
not know precisely what they want, policy-makers must be aware that individuals do not always 
know what they want. Policy-makers must assume ‘…	responsibility	for	organizing	the	context	in	
Appendices – Improving communications about extending working life amongst 
individuals: learning from models of behavioural and attitudinal change
151
which	people	make	decisions.’ (2008:5). Thaler and Sunstein argue that policy should be framed to 
‘… make	choosers	better	off,	as	judged	by	themselves	…’ (2008: 5, italics in original). Individuals must 
always be free to make their own choice but choice is malleable. Policy-makers are able to frame 
choices to nudge individuals toward options that serve their best interests.
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) present the rationale for intervention. They argue that, as framing 
is inevitable (pp. 84-88), it is better to frame individuals’ choices to increase individuals’ welfare. 
One of Thaler and Sunstein’s favourite examples is the way that the director of a cafeteria frames 
choice by displaying food to customers (as customers move towards the checkout). The director is 
able to display items to nudge customers, but customers are always free to choose whatever they 
want. The way food is arranged influences choice. This ‘framing effect’ could be used to encourage 
customers to eat more healthily (pp.1-2). More generally, choice can be framed to nudge individuals 
toward the outcomes that are ‘best’ for them (pp. 4-11). When focusing on retirement, Banks 
(2006:3) calls for policy designed ‘…	to	help	people	make	the	‘right’	choice.’
In the next section the objective is to consider the behavioural anomalies that influence individuals’ 
decisions to retire. As this choice depends on individuals’ preparation for retirement, the report 
also considers individuals’ decisions to save for retirement. The rationale for policy reform is that 
individuals make mistakes (and that they know they make ‘mistakes’). When Thaler and Sunstein 
(2008:116) consider the decision to save for retirement they ‘…	can	say	for	sure	that	some	people	
in	our	society	are	definitely	saving	too	little	–	namely	those	employees	who	are	not	participating	at	
all	in	their	retirement	pension	or	are	saving	a	low	percentage	of	their	income	after	having	reached	
their	forties	…’. They refer to a questionnaire survey in which ‘...	68%	of	participants	in	a	defined	
contribution	saving	plan	said	that	their	saving	rate	was	‘too	low’,	31%	said	that	their	saving	rate	was	
‘about	right’	and	only	1%	said	that	their	saving	rate	was	‘too	high’.’ (p.116). 
B.9.3 The relevance of behavioural anomalies
Neoclassical economists argue that individuals attempt to maximise utility over their life cycle. 
When deciding how long to work and how much to save for retirement, they rely on the life cycle 
model, e.g. Modigliani and Brumberg (1954). Individuals attempt to stabilise consumption across 
each period of their lifetime because they experience diminishing utility of consumption. Individuals 
decide how much of their life to devote to acquiring skills (when they are young they borrow to pay 
for consumption and to invest in education). They decide how long to work (and while they are at 
work they save for their retirement). When they are at work they are net savers (repaying debt and 
purchasing financial assets for the future). In their old age they call on their savings (a pension fund) 
to stabilise consumption. Thaler (1990, 193-4) describes ‘…	the	essence	of	the	life	cycle	theory.’ He 
argues that when you rely on the life cycle model, you ‘…	compute	the	present	value	of	your	wealth	
including	current	income,	net	assets	and	future	income;	figure	out	the	level	of	annuity	you	could	
purchase	with	that	money;	then	consume	the	amount	you	would	receive	if	you	in	fact	owned	such	an	
annuity.’
Broadly speaking, there is evidence that is consistent with the proposition that individuals rely on a 
life cycle model. The young have more debt. Savings increase with age and with income. Individuals 
rely on financial assets when they retire. But Humans are not able to make decisions as well as 
Econs. The evidence is that ‘…	households	do	not	smooth	consumption	much	over	the	life	cycle	…’ 
(Lusardi, 1999:83). The evidence is that consumption drops sharply when individuals retire (Banks et	
al.,	1998).
Humans make mistakes (Thaler 1994) but if policy focuses on the following anomalies it is possible 
to design policy to correct mistakes:
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B.9.3.1	 Loss	aversion
Individuals attach far greater weight to a potential loss than they attach to a potential gain, e.g. see 
Kahneman and Tversky 1984. They are risk averse when they focus on gains (preferring the certainty of 
£50 to a 50% chance of £100). But they are risk seeking when they focus on losses (preferring a 50% 
chance of losing $100 to the certainty of a loss of £50). This means that choice is sensitive to the way 
options are framed (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). De Martino et	al. (2006) describe an experiment in 
which individuals (with $50) were offered the choice of keeping $20 or taking a gamble with a one-
third chance of keeping all $50 and a two-third chance of keeping nothing. Most chose to keep the 
$20. However, when the same choice was framed as losing $30 or taking a gamble with a one-third 
chance of keeping all $50 and a two-third chance of losing it all, individuals usually took the gamble. 
How relevant is loss aversion? Consider the impact of loss aversion on the mistakes that individuals 
are likely to make: 
Loss aversion and cognitive dissonance 
Loss aversion might be so extreme that individuals prefer to persuade themselves that they will 
never experience a loss. If individuals were to optimise over their life cycle they would be forced to 
contemplate their mortality. If they were to focus on the final stage of their life, they would have 
to confront their mortality. In practice the evidence is that they behave as if they will always be of 
working age (always able to work). Parker and Clarke (1997, 1998) identify cognitive dissonance 
when they analyse questionnaire responses. They refer to ‘…	the	difficulty	that	younger	people	have	
in	imagining	that	they	will	get	old.’ (Parker and Clarke, 1997, p.129). Individuals tend to postpone 
choices. They are ill-prepared for the future. By the time they focus on retirement, they are at the 
age at which private insurance schemes are no longer viable.55 Parker and Clarke (1997, p.131) refer 
to respondents’ ‘…	regret	at	not	feeling	adequately	protected	for	….	forthcoming	old	age	…’. 
Merrill (1992) also reports evidence of cognitive dissonance in the USA. Individuals are reluctant 
to buy insurance ‘…	because	they	either	view	such	future	benefits	as	theoretical	or	simply	deny	the	
ageing	process	…’ (p.179). Weber (2003) argues that individuals avoid retirement-related decisions 
because this inherently involves contemplating unpleasant future events (including the negative 
implications of ageing and death). 
The first implication is that, if individuals are to be nudged, they are more likely to be responsive if 
they are asked to focus on earlier stages of their life cycle. If they are offered financial advantages 
to extend their working life (e.g. tax relief, or government schemes to match saving), they are more 
likely to respond if the benefits of schemes appear relevant at earlier life stages. 
A second implication is that policy must treat individuals close to retirement as ‘younger’ members 
of society. The Turner Report (Pensions Commission, 2005) was critical that government training 
schemes had been skewed away from older people. The report recommended that public training 
schemes should not be age-specific. The policy signal must be that it is always worth investing in 
training (because there has been an increase in longevity). 
Loss aversion and endowment effects 
One implication of loss aversion is that individuals value the commodities they possess far more 
than ‘financially equivalent’ commodities they do not posses (Thaler, 1980). The sum of money they 
are ‘willing to accept’ to relinquish a commodity (or an entitlement) is much greater than the sum 
55 Lusardi (1999:82) reports that contrary to the assumption of the life cycle model ‘…	as	many	as	
one	third	of	people	aged	51-61	have	not	begun	to	think	about	retirement	…’.
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they are ‘willing to pay’ to acquire financially-equivalent commodities (or entitlements). This is the 
endowment effect. 
The evidence is that individuals feel that they are entitled to retire (Tausch et	al.,	2010). Workers 
have protested in street riots in some European countries when governments have increased their 
age of retirement, e.g. Economist (2010b). If individuals are to be nudged to extend their working life 
it is important to change the perception that they are entitled to retire at 65. 
At present, in the UK the importance of the entitlement to retire is magnified because ‘…	for	the	
great	majority	of	people,	retirement	is	not	a	gradual	process	of	labour-market	withdrawal,	but	instead	
involves	a	fairly	abrupt	transition	from	full-time	employment	to	zero	hours.’ (Banks and Smith, 
2006:46). However, policy can be designed to change this perception. Policy can be designed to alter 
the perception that retirement is indivisible and irreversible if policy facilitates the possibility of part-
time employment after retirement. Individuals are likely to relinquish their perceived entitlement 
if the magnitude of what is involved is reduced, e.g. by encouraging work for part of the years that 
follow retirement and receipt of a pension. 
The endowment effect also implies that individuals must be offered significant compensation to 
relinquish their ‘entitlement’ to retire. The Turner Report (Pensions Commission, 2005) recommended 
that the government should reduce (or eliminate) employers’ National Insurance contributions for 
workers over the age of 65. Financial inducements may need to be substantial (given the difference 
between the amount that individuals are ‘willing to pay’ for entitlements and the amount they are 
‘willing to accept’ to relinquish an entitlement). 
Loss aversion and framing 
If individuals are to be nudged to work longer by offering financial incentives, how are financial 
incentives to be offered? The literature on loss aversion reports far greater sensitivity to ‘penalties’ 
than to ‘gains’. If policy is to nudge individuals to extend their working lives, inducements must be 
framed as avoiding financial penalties (rather than securing equivalent financial gains). 
Fethersonhaugh and Ross (1999) tested the relevance of framing in the USA. Here, the default 
retirement age was 65 but workers were permitted to claim reduced social security benefits if they 
retired before 65 (and nearly two-thirds chose to do this). The alternative was to work beyond 
65 to gain further financial benefits, i.e. increased social security and increased private pensions. 
Fethersonhaugh and Ross (1999) offered respondents two questionnaire options. These were 
described as:
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Option I
Under the current social security system the average male American worker who is choosing to 
retire either at age 65 or 68 would have the following two choices:
A. He could retire at age 65 and begin receiving a social security pension of $10,000 a year. 
or
B. He could retire later, at age 68 instead of 65, and begin receiving a social security pension 
of $12,500 a year, which is equal to $10,000 a year plus a credit of £2,500 a year for delaying 
retirement.
Given the two options above which would you prefer?
In this question, respondents are offered a gain if they extend their working life, but in the second 
question they are offered the opportunity to avoid a penalty by extending their working life.
Option II
Under the current social security system the average male American worker who is choosing to 
retire either at age 65 or 68 would have the following two choices:
A. He could retire at age 68 and begin receiving a social security pension of $12,500 a year. 
or
B. He could retire earlier at age 65 instead of 68, and begin receiving a social security pension of 
$10,000 a year, which is equal to $12,500 a year minus a penalty of £2,500 a year for retiring 
early.
Given the two options above, which would you prefer? 
The authors reported that when ‘…	a	reward	is	offered	for	retiring	later,	only	38%	of	respondents	
chose	the	later	of	the	two	retirement	ages,	that	is	age	68.	When	a	penalty	is	imposed	for	retiring	
earlier,	fully	57%	chose	that	…’ (p.198). They also reported that, for respondents older than 47 years, 
37% preferred to retire at 68 when this option was described as a gain but 63% preferred to retire at 
68 when the options were described ‘in	terms	of	a	prospective	loss	for	early	retirement’ (p.198). 
When the perception is that there is a penalty if individuals do not continue to work (rather than a 
reward if they continue work) there is greater willingness to continue working. Individuals who feel 
that they might lose out by retiring earlier are more likely to continue working (even if there is no real 
loss in financial terms).
In 1983 the US Congress voted to increase the age at which unreduced pension benefits were paid 
from 65 to 67. The change was to be implemented gradually from 2001 to 2022. Workers who 
claimed benefits between the age of 65 and 67 would face reductions in monthly benefits relative 
to the (new) age 67 reference point. Fethersonhaugh and Ross (1999: 206) note that the manner 
in which this policy is presented is important because ‘…	matters	of	framing	are	likely	to	exert	a	
significant	impact	on	the	retirement	decisions	…’.
A second conclusion related to the form that financial rewards should take (if a financial inducement 
is offered to continue to work). Fethersonhaugh and Ross focused on two alternatives. First, 
respondents were offered a social security pension of $10,500 (available if they retired at 65) and 
a credit of $2,500 per annum if they deferred retirement to 68. In the second scenario they were 
offered the pension of $10,000 (available if they retired at 65) and a ‘one time bonus’ of $25,000 if 
they continued to work until 68. 
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The $25,000 payable at 68, together with the annuity of $10,000 a year had a present value 
(discounted at a 2.8% real interest rate to age 80) of $125,740. The annuity of $12,500 a year at 
age 68 had a higher present discounted value of $125,925. Fethersonhaugh and Ross reported that: 
‘Nevertheless	76%	of	our	survey	participants	chose	the	$25,000	bonus	and	$10,000	annuity,	while	
only	24%	chose	the	$12,500	annuity.’ (p.203). 
Fethersonhaugh and Ross (1999:207) concluded that ‘…	payment	of	a	lump	sum	for	deferring	
retirement	has	considerable	attraction	provided	that	public	policy	aims	to	encourage	later	retirement	…’. 
Of course, they also noted that (with moral hazard) a lump sum might attract workers who believe 
they will enjoy a shorter life. They also noted that ‘…	the	lump	sum	would	most	likely	increase	the	
chance	that	retirees	who	may	supplement	their	pension	with	part-time	work	will	find	themselves	with	
inadequate	income	at	some	future	date	…’ (p.207).
Loss aversion and the default rule 
One implication of ‘loss aversion’ is that individuals procrastinate. With inertia, individuals make 
mistakes (by postponing decision-making). In these circumstances the selection of a default rule is 
important.
To begin, consider individuals’ decision to save for a pension. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) highlight 
individuals’ failure to make ‘good use’ of tax relief. They state that, surely, individuals are	‘foolish	
beyond	doubt?’ (pp.103-7). If individuals procrastinate they can be nudged by changing the 
default rule. When considering pension plans, Thaler and Sunstein recommend a default rule that 
automatically enrols new employees into a saving plan (while allowing individuals to opt out if they 
prefer).
How important is the default rule? Changing the default rule increases participation rates. Madrian 
and Shea (2001) analyse a case study. When the default required new employees to opt-in, barely 
20% had joined after three months of employment (and, over three years, the participation rate 
only gradually increased to 65%). When the default was that new employees were automatically 
enrolled (but able to opt-out), enrolment of new employees rose to 90% immediately (and this 
increased over the following three years). 
Orszag (2008) refers to a study in which only 45% of newly hired workers participated in a 
401(k) plan in the USA when they were required to opt in, but rose to 86.5% when enrolment 
was automatic. This was particularly important for low paid employees (less than $30,000p.a), 
participation rates rising from 25% to 77% following the introduction of automatic enrollment. 
The question is whether this is sufficient. Critics argue that changing the default rule to automatic 
enrolment may not necessarily increase total planned savings (Choi et	al.,	2001b). The evidence 
is that, after automatic enrolment, individuals who might have voluntarily enrolled at higher 
contribution rates (or chosen a more aggressive investment) stay with the low saving rate and 
conservative investment options set by their employer. In Madrian and Shea’s (2001) analysis of 
automatic enrolment, most participants remained at the default savings and the conservative 
investment choices set for them by their employer.
The case for automatic enrolment has been accepted in the UK. The Turner Report (Pensions 
Commission, 2005), in which people who do not belong to a workplace pension scheme would 
automatically be enrolled into the NPSS. Employers would be compelled to contribute to their 
workers’ NPSS. Under the NPSS, employees would contribute 4% of their salary, employers 3% and 
the Government 1%. But people would remain free to opt out of the NPSS. 
The Pensions Act of 2008 introduced a number of measures to ensure that, from 2012, all eligible 
workers who were not already in a good quality workplace would automatically be enrolled into a 
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qualifying pension scheme. Employers would have a duty to automatically enroll eligible workers 
between the ages of 22 and SPA into a qualifying workplace pension scheme. Automatic enrolment 
means that, instead of choosing whether to join a workplace pension scheme, all eligible workers 
will have to actively decide not to join (if, for any reason, they feel this is not a suitable scheme).
When focusing on the decision to retire, the same behavioural anomaly is important. A mandatory 
retirement age is a default rule. The removal of the UK mandatory retirement age in April 2011 
means that individuals will feel that they must now choose to opt out of the labour force to retire.
Loss aversion and portfolio management
Loss aversion is also relevant when individuals have discretion to manage their pension fund. 
Neoclassical economists assume that individuals manage their finances to maximise expected 
utility. They anticipate that individuals will trade off the increased risk associated with some of 
their investments for the increased income that these assets offer. However, studies in behavioural 
finance call in to question individuals’ ability to make these decisions.
Behavioural studies report evidence of a disposition bias. While share traders are prepared to hold 
on to poorly performing stocks to avoid realising a loss they are ready to sell rising stocks to realise 
a gain (Schefrin and Statman, 1985; Shapira and Venezia, 2001). While individuals are likely to take 
more responsibility for managing their financial portfolios in direct contribution pension schemes, 
there is evidence of a bias in favour of the status quo. In 2005 ‘super choice’ allowed workers in 
Australia the opportunity to switch their retirement funds between investment managers. The 
expectation was that many would take this option but the reality was that few took advantage of 
the option (Fear and Pace, 2008). 
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) consider the status quo bias. Individuals behave as if they 
are afraid of incurring a loss (in a new fund relative to the previous one) and this weighs more 
heavily than the potential for gains (even when gains are considered more likely). Individuals 
appear reluctant to make decisions if they feel they do not have full information, even when the 
information they lack is not actually relevant to the decision (Shafir et	al., 1993). Benartzi and Thaler 
(2007) argue that individuals fail to rebalance their pension portfolios (that there is inertia in asset 
allocation) because they fear the regret they might experience (if they reallocate their portfolio and 
observe that their new investments do not perform as well as their original investments). They make 
mistakes because they are afraid to make mistakes. 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) explain the existence of a status quo bias with reference to 
systematic mistakes that are made when contemplating change. They argue that, when individuals 
consider moving a sum of money from a low interest account to a high interest account, they 
believe that the costs of making the transactions on any day are high while the benefits of not 
moving the funds for that day are low (because over just one day differences in returns will be 
negligible). They repeat this assessment every day and this explains why they retain the status quo. 
One way to correct these ‘mistakes’ is to introduce strict deadlines. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) 
focus on this strategy when analysing individuals’ reluctance to make financial decisions. They argue 
that governments must reduce the number of transaction dates, e.g. if governments offer tax relief 
for certain forms of saving, they should impose deadlines beyond which such tax relief will no longer 
be available. 
The same strategy might be applied when nudging individuals to extend their working lives. 
If individuals are offered financial incentives (as described above), it might be worth setting a 
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‘transaction time’, e.g. age 60, at which individuals must commit to extend their working life if they are 
to receive financial incentives. The proposition is that deadlines correct inertia and status quo bias.
B.9.3.2	 Hyperbolic	discounting:	the	absence	of	self–control
Economists argue that ‘rational’ individuals will discount future costs and benefits because they 
occur in the future and that they will discount future costs and benefits at a constant rate over time. 
Behavioural studies indicate that individuals discount future costs and benefits at a much higher 
rate in the short run than in the long run. For example, an individual might prefer to receive £100 
now over £200 next year and (at the same time) the individual might prefer £200 in three years’ 
time over £100 in two years. 
Behavioural studies suggest that individuals rely on hyperbolic discounting (Ainslie, 1975). This 
implies that individuals are likely to consume more in the short-term than they believe to be in 
their long-term interests. They behave as if they have time-inconsistent preferences. Ainslie and 
Haslam (1992) report the results of an experiment in which a majority of subjects said that they 
would prefer to have a prize of a $100 certified check available immediately, as compared with a 
$200 certified check that could not be cashed for two years. The same people did not prefer a $100 
certified check that could be cashed in six years to a $200 certified check that could be cashed in 8 
years. While they preferred to wait for the larger amount in eight years, some time later (within the 
next six years) their preference switched to preferring to receive the smaller amount sooner. 
The preference for consumption in the short run (and the change in preference as time proceeds) 
means that individuals behave as if they lack self-control. When focussing on pensions, Choi et	al.	
(2001a) illustrate the difference between ‘desire’ and ‘action’. After a financial seminar, all workers 
who were not participating in a firm’s 401(k) plan immediately indicated that they would join the 
plan. However, over the next six months only 14% did so. 
The implication is that, even if individuals recognise that they should save, they are likely to put off 
the sacrifice that is required. One policy option is to encourage individuals to make commitments to 
save (and to increase their saving in the future) and to rely on individuals’ inertia to ensure that they 
will correct the mistakes that are attributed to hyperbolic discounting.
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) report the results experienced when the Save	More	Tomorrow pension 
plan was introduced. In the Save	More	Tomorrow plan individuals were invited to commit themselves 
in advance. They were invited to increase their saving contribution as time went on, and to 
increase their saving as their pay increased. The plan was first implemented in 1998. About 90% 
of employees met with a financial consultant. The consultant suggested that they increase their 
savings by five percentage points of their pay and about 25% agreed. The rest were offered the 
Save	More	Tomorrow programme. They were offered a plan that would increase their saving by 3 
percentage points every time they received a pay rise. Seventy-eight per cent of this group agreed. 
When comparing the savings of these groups, the group that chose not to meet the consultant saved 
about 6% of income at the beginning of the programme and that percentage did not change over 
the next three years. The second group (who accepted the advice to increase their savings rates 
by five percentage points), increased their savings from just over 4% to just over 9% (and this rate 
remained constant over the next few years). The third group (that joined the Save	More	Tomorrow 
plan) started with the lowest saving rate of the three groups (around 3.5% of income). However, with 
this programme, their savings increased. Three and a half years (and four pay raises) later their savings 
rate had almost quadrupled to 13.6%. This was much higher than the 9% savings rate for those who 
had accepted the consultant’s initial recommendation to increase savings by five percentage points.
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The same analysis also suggests that if individuals are to be nudged to work longer they must 
be encouraged to commit to contractual arrangements in their late middle-age (contractual 
agreements that require them to extend their working life).
B.9.3.3	 Mental	accounting
Neoclassical economists assume that money is fungible, (i.e. that one pound is interchangeable with 
another). Behavioural economists question this assumption. Individuals behave as if they assign 
money to different ‘mental accounts’, e.g. to pay for housing, for groceries and for leisure. This 
explains why individuals appear to make inconsistent financial decisions. They may take great care 
to save a few pounds on grocery expenditures (or on transport expenditures) but appear profligate 
when they spend from other accounts, e.g. when they spend money on their holidays (see Thaler, 
1999 and Cheema and Soman, 2006).
Mental accounts are important when considering the choices individuals might make to optimise 
over a life cycle model. Individuals’ willingness to save for the future depends on the way they 
assign income to different mental accounts. Sheffrin and Thaler (1988) describe a behavioural life 
cycle model. In this model individuals appear to be aware that they must exercise self-control (to 
smooth their consumption stream) but appear to behave as if they have a preference for immediate 
gratification. Sheffrin and Thaler refer to an internal conflict between two mutually inconsistent 
personalities. The first of these is the ‘planner’ (concerned with the long run). The second is the 
‘doer’ (concerned with the short run). Will power is important but will power is exercised by relying 
on ‘rules of thumb’ and mental accounts. Individuals are tempted to spend if income is assigned to 
particular mental accounts. 
Individuals’ propensity to consume from income depends on the way they assign income to mental 
accounts. If windfall income is mentally assigned to a wealth account an individual’s propensity to 
consume windfall income is lower than if it is assigned to a present income account. Shefrin and Thaler 
(1988) argue that a lump sum bonus is treated quite differently to an increase in regular income. 
The amount individuals save for the future depends on the way they allocate increments in wealth. 
The way that accounts (and saving accounts) are labelled is important. Shefrin and Thaler (1988) 
report the results of the following experiment. Participants were offered: (i) an increase in regular 
payments ($2,000 in 12 months); (ii) a lump sum payment ($24,000) and (iii) a future payment 
($2,400 plus interest in five years). The total payment was identical but subjects consumed more if 
they received the regular payments than if they received the lump sum payment. The explanation 
is that individuals assigned these payments to different mental accounts and individuals have 
different propensities to consume from different mental accounts. Levin (1998) considered this 
analysis when analysing responses from a ‘retirement history’ survey. 
Policy that favours specific mental accounts can be used to encourage self-control and to increase 
savings. If governments rely on financial incentives, a lump sum payment may increase savings 
more than benefits received as a higher regular wage payment. In the behavioural life cycle model 
individuals rely on mental accounts to lock themselves into specific savings schemes.
8.3.4	 Herding
Individuals appear to be influenced by the choices that others make. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) 
refer to individuals’ tendency to follow the behaviour of others. They argue that: ‘The	general	lesson	
is	clear	if	choice	architects	want	to	shift	behaviour	and	to	so	do	with	a	nudge,	they	might	simply	
inform	people	about	what	other	people	are	doing.’ (p.65).
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There is evidence of ‘herding bias’. Orszag (2008) focused on workers’ decisions to retire before 65 in 
the USA. While social security payments were lower when individuals retired before 65, the financial 
adjustment was actuarially ‘fair’. On average, the typical person who retired received roughly the 
same amount of benefits (in net present value terms) regardless of when benefits were first claimed. 
There was nothing ‘special’ about the full benefit age that explained why a disproportionate number 
of people chose to first claim benefits at this age (rather than at, say, 63 or 68). Orszag (2008:3) 
argued that there was nothing to explain why ‘…	a	substantial	number	wait	to	receive	benefits	until	
they	reach	the	age	at	which	they	qualify	for	full	benefits.’
Aaron (1999) attempted to model the sensitivity of choice to the choices made by others. He 
focused on a payoff matrix in which individuals’ payoffs also depend on a ‘gloat factor’ (this is the 
payoff that a retired worker experiences when others work). He demonstrated that there were 
particular constellations of payoffs that would explain why a ‘…	nearly	everybody-works-equilibrium	
may	be	fragile,	or	may	cease	to	be	an	equilibrium	even	if	welfare	with	continued	work	by	all	averaged	
over	the	group	would	be	higher	than	it	is	with	all	retired	…’ (p.62).
If there is a herding bias (or, more generally, collective response) the question is what informs this 
collective response. The SPA may be the age at which individuals anticipate that others in the ‘herd’ 
will retire. In the UK the SPA has been 65 and the average retirement age is close to 65 (63 for men 
and 61 for women, Brown, 2010).
The impact of changing a mandatory retirement age and implications for changing an SPA might be 
analysed by considering the impact of changes in other countries. The USA prohibited a mandatory 
age of 70 for retirement in 1978, and in 1986 abolished the mandatory age all together. Some 
states chose to raise, or abolish, mandatory retirement ages ahead of the federal government and 
empirical studies have commented on the implications, e.g. Neumark and Stock (1999) concluded 
that abolition raised employment rates among affected older workers by seven percentage points. 
It is difficult to rely entirely on US experience to estimate the impact of abolishing mandatory 
retirement in the UK because ‘…	employment	rates	of	older	workers	are	typically	lower	than	…	in	
the	USA	when	mandatory	employment	was	abolished	…’ and ‘…	few	people	appear	to	be	genuinely	
constrained	by	mandatory	early	retirement	…’ (Banks, 2006: 50). Some argue that a mandatory 
retirement age provides positive advantages. It has been argued that one benefit is greater flexibility 
when negotiating long-term work contracts. Lazear (1979) argued that long-term contracts 
between employers and employees allow employers to pay employees more than their marginal 
product in their later years. Yet, while it has been argued that individuals’ marginal product falls 
markedly at the age of 65, this is questionable. Meadows (2003) surveyed studies that question the 
argument that workers’ marginal products fall much lower than their wage. The positive effect of 
experience offsets any loss of speed, or loss of strength. Banks (2006: 51) argues that there is ‘…	little	
reason	not	to	abolish	early	mandatory	retirement’. 
In the UK, the Turner Report (Pensions Commission, 2005) recommended that the SPA for men 
and women should rise to age 66 by 2030, to age 67 by 2040 and to age 68 by 2050. It also 
recommended that the Government should take measures to publicise the already existing option 
for people to defer taking their State Pension. The Labour Government decided to increase the SPA to 
68 by 2046 (Economist, 2010a).
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B.9.4 Heuristics: relying on ‘rules of thumb’
Decisions can be very complex (Garey and Johnson, 1979).56 Individuals may feel unequal to the 
task. Instead, they may prefer to rely on heuristics (‘rules of thumb’) to deal with complexity. 
Simon (1965, 1966) referred to ‘bounded rationality’. The question is whether it is possible to rely 
on evidence of rules of thumb to nudge individuals to increase their retirement age and to increase 
their savings for retirement?
When considering the age to retire, it is easier to rely on a rule of thumb, e.g. that 65 years of age is 
the age to retire. If there is a recognised SPA this may serve as a rule of thumb. The signal is that this 
is the best age to retire. One way to nudge individuals (to work beyond the age of 65) is to increase 
the SPA. An increase in the SPA is a signal that the best option is to work beyond the age of 65 years. 
The default retirement age was abolished in 2011. When it was abolished individuals may still have 
attached significance to the age at which they received their State Pension. The Labour Government 
decided to increase the State Pension age to 68 by 2046 (Economist, 2010a). The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, George Osborne, has announced that it will rise to 66 by 2020.57 
B.9.4.1	 Effects	of	complexity	on	retirement	decision-making
Pensions and related financial products are becoming more and more complicated. As individuals 
move to DC private pension plans they are required to make more choices (as compared to the 
experience they would have had with a DB private pension plan). With a DC plan, individuals may have 
to decide which assets to hold in their pension portfolio, as well as when to annuitise their fund and 
what kind of annuity to take out. Of course, their task is made even more complex when they try to 
optimise overall sources of income, because they must also anticipate changes in social security and 
public health provision (Mitchell and Fields, 1984).
No wonder individuals rely on rules of thumb. Benartzi and Thaler (2001) argue that individuals rely 
on a 1/nth strategy (and other naive diversification strategies) when deciding how to divide assets in 
different funds. Are they really equipped when they are asked to make financial decisions? Surveys 
indicate that fewer than one-fifth of investors in stocks, bonds, funds or other securities can be 
described as financially literate (Alexander et	al.,	1998) and similar assessments have been made 
when assessing individuals’ understanding of their pension plans (Schultz, 1995). Gustmann et	al.	
(2009) note individuals’ confusion in the USA as to whether their pension plans were DB or DC. 
Differences in financial acumen become evident at an early age and have long-lasting effects. 
Empirical studies argue that different levels of financial literacy explain patterns of savings, portfolio 
choice and wealth accumulation (Lusardi, 2008). Banks and Oldfield (2007) argue that financial 
acumen is lowest when individuals’ numeracy is low. They are also concerned that individuals make 
more mistakes as their cognitive skills decline, e.g. after the age of 50. The evidence is that older 
beneficiaries are more likely to be unaware of the kind of pensions they hold and of the mix of stocks 
and bonds they hold. Some studies suggest that individuals are even less aware when governments 
assume greater responsibility. Jappelli (2010) considers panel data for 55 countries between 1995 
and 2008 to show that inhabitants of countries with generous public pensions (and lower need for 
private savings) have lower levels of financial literacy (other things being equal).
56 Some argue that it is ‘rational’ to rely on heuristics to reduce transactions costs (e.g. Gigerenzer 
and Goldstein, 1996; Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002).
57 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12674194?print=true
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Can measures be taken to develop basic skills and prevent cognitive decline? Thaler and Sunstein 
(2008:112) are far from optimistic that training can reduce mistakes. They report the results of a 
case study in which an employer offered training and then tested its impact. It was the case that 
‘…	before	the	education,	the	average	score	of	employees	was	54;	after	the	education,	the	average	
score	crept	up	to	55.’ (p. 112). They conclude that ‘teaching	is	hard!’ (p.112). They also question the 
commitment that individuals are likely to make to training schemes for (as already noted): ‘One	
study	found	that	at	the	seminar	everyone	expressed	an	interest	in	saving	more,	but	only	14%	actually	
joined	the	savings	plan.	This	was	an	improvement,	but	not	a	large	one,	over	the	7%	of	comparable	
employees	who	did	not	attend	a	seminar	and	joined	the	saving	plan.’ (p.112) 
In the UK the pension system is poorly understood; ‘…	in	2000	only	53%	of	the	population	reported	
at	least	a	‘reasonable,	basic’	knowledge	of	pensions,	but	by	2005	this	has	fallen	to	47%	…’ (quoted 
in Hills, 2006:123). In a survey reported by Clery et	al.	(2007) only 5% claimed to have a good 
knowledge of pensions and a quarter claimed to know little or nothing about pensions. Individuals 
also have very little understanding of how their decisions might affect their position because 
they cannot forecast the Government’s position. Government changes to means-testing make it 
difficult for many individuals to have confidence in how their own decisions are likely to affect their 
retirement income (Hills, 2006). 
In March 2011 the Government indicated that there would be a move towards a flat-rate State 
Pension and the removal of top-up payments for lower earners who do not save. The speculation is 
that the basic rate of pension will be £140 a week. These reforms will reduce the complexity of the 
decision to save for the future. It will also simplify the decision to save by removing the disincentive 
that is created by means-testing for top-up payments. 
B.9.5 Nudges that channel choice
Neoclassical economists argue that an increase in choice will increase welfare. Behavioural 
economists have reservations. When an increase in choice increases complexity, individuals are 
more likely to procrastinate (Tversky and Shafir, 1992; Shafir et	al., 1993). They are more likely to 
keep doing what they are currently doing (Heiner, 1983). One explanation is that they are concerned 
that they might overlook the ‘best’ option. 
In one experiment subjects were presented with a display of either six or 24 fruit jams inside a food 
shop. While subjects were more likely to approach the display with 24 jams, they were less likely to 
make a purchase. In a different experiment in which participants selected a chocolate from either six 
or 30 options, subjects with a more limited choice were more satisfied with their decision than those 
who faced more extensive choice. In a third experiment, students were more likely to complete a 
voluntary assignment if they were offered a choice of six possible topics than if they were offered a 
choice of 30 (and those with more extensive choice also wrote poorer essays). Iyengar and Lepper 
(2000) demonstrate that people are less likely to come to a decision if there is a large variety of choice. 
In the Swiss health insurance market individuals were less likely to change funds and more likely to 
retain the status quo the greater the choice of funds (Frank and Lamiraud, 2009).
Studies suggest that enrolment in US pension plans is higher if employees are given fewer options 
(Sethi-Iyengar et	al., 2004). Iyengar et	al.	(2003) found that participation rates in United States 
401(k) pension plans peaked at 75% when individuals had only two options (this ratio fell to 60% 
when the number of options approached 60). Bertrand et al. (2006) considered responses in South 
Africa to letters that offered large, short-term loans at random interest rates. Letters offered either 
one, or four, examples of loan sizes and terms (along with the respective monthly repayments). 
More people took up the offer when they received the single-option letter (rather than the four-
option letter) and the difference in take-up was equivalent to reducing the interest rate by 2%. 
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This literature suggests that one way to nudge individuals is to reduce ‘choice overload’. Thaler and 
Sunstein (2008:130) considered nudging savers by offering a limited number of portfolios (designed 
by experts). Plans might be designed to match specific planned retirement dates and particular 
lifestyles. Plans can be conservative, or aggressive, as far as risk is concerned. Plans can be presented 
as alternative defaults (from which savers can opt out if they prefer different portfolios).
Beshears et	al.	(2006) analyse responses to a plan called Quick	Enrolment. The plan offered new 
employees a choice between the status quo and a predetermined option of 3% of pre-tax salary 
invested in a mutual fund. New employees were able to tick the appropriate box next to their preferred 
option. If they wanted more control of their investment they could still access other options. While 
participation rates were higher when individuals were offered the Quick	Enrolment plan, there was 
evidence of procrastination when these responses were compared with responses that were made 
to a more simple default enrolment strategy. The Quick	Enrolment programme appeared a helpful 
guide for asset allocation decisions. However, individuals under-diversified (when they held stocks 
and bonds) and their asset allocations were static over time. Employers helped employees by offering 
asset allocation bundles categorised by risk preference. For example, a 401(k) plan could be designed 
to enable an employee to invest in: (i) a bond fund; (ii) an equity plan; and (iii) an international equity 
fund. Plans might offer investments labelled ‘conservative’ or investments labelled ‘aggressive growth’. 
In this way portfolio bundles could be offered to individuals in an easy way. 
When focusing on the decision to extend a working life the value of channelling choice is also 
relevant. If individuals are able to continue in their familiar place of work (in one, or two, full-time or 
part-time roles) the number of choices is constrained and the likelihood that individuals will extend 
their working lives might increase. On the other hand, if there are a plethora of different (new) 
options individuals may not investigate any of them (and simply retire). 
While policy can be designed to nudge, a number of questions should be addressed before setting 
out to nudge.
B.9.5.1	 How	possible	is	it	to	determine	the	‘best	choice’?
Paternalists set out to do what is ‘best’ for individuals, but they do not always agree on what is best. 
Thaler and Sunstein are clear that the best choice is the choice individuals would make if they: (i) 
had perfect information; (ii) were able to assess information rationally; and (iii) were able to practice 
complete self-control. The problem is that, because there are behavioural anomalies, this choice is 
not observable.
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) describe the conditions in which policy should ‘nudge’ individuals. 
They argue that nudge is required when: (i) decisions are difficult; (ii) decisions are infrequent; (iii) 
feedback to individuals is poor; (iv) policy-makers have greater expertise than individuals; and (v) 
differences in ‘tastes	and	needs’ between individuals are small and ‘easily…	detected’ (pp.72-6). 
However, this is a long way from specifying the best choice that individuals should make.
Thaler and Sunstein are confident that individuals make mistakes because individuals say that they 
make mistakes. Focusing on the low rate of saving in the USA, Thaler and Sunstein (2008:103-7) say 
that: ‘...	it	seems	clear	that	the	costs	of	saving	too	little	are	greater	than	the	costs	of	saving	too	much’ 
(pp 103-7). In questionnaires individuals state that they have made mistakes. However questionnaire 
responses are difficult to interpret. Questionnaire responses can be unreliable. Respondents may 
furnish the answers they think they are expected to provide. Their responses may be statements of 
what they believe to be the ‘right’ response (rather than statements that describe their preferences). 
There are also reasons to doubt responses because there are behavioural anomalies. If there is 
hyperbolic discounting (and an absence of self-control) these responses may be as reliable as the 
statements individuals make when they declare ‘…	new	year	resolutions.’ (Sugden, 2008).
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If policy is to be premised on individuals’ recognition that they have made mistakes, how significant 
are these mistakes? Stutzer and Frey (2006) refer to many mistakes that do not require correction. 
They argue that people who watch a lot of television often regret the time they waste. They argue 
that individuals who commute long distances to work in order to live in better houses further out 
of town often underestimate the burden of the commute. However, these are not a ‘…	cause	for	
immediate	government	intervention.’ (Stutzer and Frey, 2006: 21). When focusing on the adequacy 
of income in retirement, Loewenstein et	al.	(1999:243) question the argument that provision for 
retirement is as important as has been suggested. They estimate the determinants of happiness in 
retirement and conclude that ‘…	the	furore	over	the	adequacy	of	retirement	savings	might	possibly	
be	exaggerated	…’. Analysing the responses in their sample, they indicate that the retired were less 
likely than the not-yet-retired to agree with the statement: ‘I	should	have	calculated	how	much	
money	I	would	need	to	save	in	order	to	have	an	adequate	retirement	income.’ (p.243).58
While it is possible to describe the conditions in which nudge might be required, it is difficult to know 
the extent to which individuals should be nudged. This difficulty explains why Thaler and Sunstein 
often abandon the objective of designing policy to increase welfare in terms of individuals’ own 
perception of welfare. Instead, they define the ‘best’ choice as the choice that individuals would 
make if individuals’ only concern was to maximise their health or, more generally, to maximise their 
capabilities. Thaler and Sunstein (2008) use these criteria to justify intervention to mitigate the costs 
of obesity-inducing diets, smoking and drinking. They refer to health risks. They argue that: ‘With	
respect	to	diet,	smoking,	and	drinking,	people’s	current	choices	cannot	reasonably	be	claimed	to	be	
the	best	means	of	promoting	their	well-being.’ (p. 7). The problem is that individuals may prefer a 
less than perfectly healthy life (in terms of diet and in terms of exercise). They might prefer to drink 
alcohol and to smoke, even when they are fully informed about the attendant risks to their health. 
The ‘libertarian paternalist’ approach is to intervene to maximise welfare as judged by others.
B.9.5.2	 Are	there	obligations	if	governments	assume	responsibility?
A second problem is whether governments can be comfortable with the responsibility they assume 
when they nudge individuals. The Nobel Laureate, Daniel Kahneman (1999), noted: ‘…	in	the	context	
of	choices	that	are	offered	by	a	benevolent	agency,	the	default	is	likely	to	be	perceived	as	an	implicit	
recommendation	about	what	is	best	for	most	people	…’ (p. 211). He added that ‘…	the	inevitability	of	
framing	effects	raises	subtle	and	difficult	ethical	issues	for	the	implementation	of	policy	…’ (p. 212). 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) are confident that it is the right thing to do because they are confident 
that outcomes will be improvements. When they advocate policy to nudge individuals to increase 
investment in equities they argue that ‘…	over	a	twenty-year	period,	stocks	are	almost	certain	to	
go	up.’ (p.121). They are confident that it is always a mistake to hold assets that are less risky. But 
there is no guarantee that experience in the past will be repeated in the future. It is possible that 
governments, themselves, may make mistakes? 
There is evidence that a nudge is interpreted as an endorsement. When commenting on saving 
for retirement, Armour and Daly (2008:2) indicate that: ‘Data	suggest	that	even	when	no	explicit	
guidance	is	provided,	employees	infer	that	their	employer’s	default	contribution	rate	of	investment	
fund	choices	is	‘safe’,	suggested	and	optimal’. The problem is particularly important when focusing 
on long-term commitments and long-term expectations. Governments can make the disclaimer 
that they nudge individuals in a very general way (e.g. to save, diet and exercise) but for policy to be 
effective nudge must be more specific. There may be ethical and legal implications if intervention is 
based on over-confidence.
58 The authors consider the determinants of happiness and they argue that: ‘In	addition	to	
policies	that	maintain	income,	other	effective	policies	might	seek	to	improve	the	quality	of	
leisure	directly.’ (p.244), e.g. provision of libraries and other leisure services.
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B.9.5.3	 How	are	different	group	interests	to	be	taken	into	consideration?
If policy is designed to nudge, some groups may benefit more than others:
• Nudge may be more significant for some individuals than for others. Consider the responsibility 
policy-makers assume when they design a default option to encourage workers to save for a 
pension. A default might influence the choice of two groups. In the first group, workers may feel 
that they do not have the commitment to manage their own portfolio. In the second group, 
workers may feel that they have the commitment to manage their own fund portfolio but that 
they have insufficient knowledge. How should the default be introduced? Whose preferences 
assume greater importance?
 There is evidence that nudge may advantage different groups differently. Tapia and Yermo (2007) 
argue that in Australia the default has been designed to minimise employers’ costs. In Latin 
American countries policy has been designed to follow the life cycle profile by moving from lower 
to riskier funds as savers get older.
• A different conflict of interest arises when policy is designed to respond to the political pressures 
that are exerted by producers in the economy. Producers have their own interest in lobbying 
governments to nudge. Producers (e.g. of pension funds, or of exercise machines) are likely to 
press governments to nudge individuals to consume more of their products. Producer groups 
already spend to advertise their products and to nudge individuals to consume more of their 
products. The question is where to draw the line between the nudges individuals experience from 
extensive private sector advertising campaigns and the nudges that come from government. 
 The distinction is important because there is evidence that producers exploit behavioural 
anomalies, e.g. loss aversion, to encourage individuals to ‘over consume’ their products. When 
book clubs offer ‘free trials’ they are designed to exploit the endowment effect (the more that 
individuals feel attached to the books they receive – an endowment effect – the more they are 
reluctant to part with them). The response of governments is to protect consumers. Governments 
usually use legislation to mitigate the producers’ exploitation of behavioural anomalies, e.g. 
legislating that consumers can return unsolicited items at no cost (and that they can rely on 
‘cooling off’ periods to mitigate the mistakes they may make). Cullis and Jones (2008) describe 
the importance of public policies that mitigate producer exploitation of behavioural anomalies. 
The danger is that producers may also exploit situations if governments fail to assess the extent 
to which policies ‘should’ be designed to nudge. 
8.5.4	 How	are	the	impacts	of	nudge	to	be	estimated	and	monitored?
Policy designed to nudge different individuals will have different impacts. Lusardi (1999) notes that: 
‘Poorly	educated	workers,	those	in	bad	health,	and	those	who	worked	less	than	thirty	weeks	in	the	
previous	year	…	are	likely	both	to	expect	to	retire	relatively	young	and	to	have	little	wealth	…’ (p.96). 
As their decision is based on other considerations, e.g. poor health, nudge is likely to have less 
impact on this group than on better educated, self-employed professionals who enjoy better health.
There is a U-shaped pattern of inactivity related to wealth in the UK. Those in the middle of the 
wealth distribution are less likely to be in work well before the SPA. For further analysis see Banks 
(2006). If the intention is to nudge these individuals, it is important to recognise that nudge may 
have very little impact at the bottom of the wealth distribution (where individuals are inactive 
because they have poor health and disability). If policy is to focus on low-income individuals who 
are inactive in their 50s, policy may need to be designed specifically to motivate this group (as 
compared with policy designed to motivate higher-income individuals who are still working at the 
age of 65 years).
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If there is a case for comparing the impact that nudge might produce on different groups in the 
community, there is also a case for monitoring the impact that nudge is likely to exert over time.  
If it is difficult to nudge some individuals because the physical demand of their work are particularly 
demanding, this distinction is changing over time. Burtless (1999:39), states that (in the USA) there 
is ‘… no convincing evidence that the health of 62-year-olds or 65-year olds has been declining over 
the period in which their labor force participation rates have fallen …’ (p.39) and he argues that  
‘…	the	physical	demands	of	work	are	now	easier	to	meet	than	they	were	in	the	past	…’ (p.39).
With evidence that ubiquitous behavioural anomalies are systematic, policy can be designed 
to correct ‘individual failure’. But if it is possible to design policies to change behaviour, it is also 
important to be aware of all of the implications of policies that are designed to nudge. 
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This report summarises empirical findings on drivers and barriers to motivating extending 
working life and broader aspects of retirement planning. It comprises:
• a review and distillation of established research evidence on variables impacting on 
people’s orientations to work in later life and retirement planning behaviour;
• interpretation of the above, with reference to the social science evidence base on 
motivating behavioural change;
• theoretically informed recommendations for public policy intervention strategy.
A significant proportion of individuals are disposed to extend their working lives, but many 
desire a change in working hours and place a high value on choice and flexibility over 
hours worked. 
Higher rates of behaviour change are likely to result from a primary intervention emphasis 
on aspects that relate to the decision architecture. The role played by employers in 
configuring the options available to employees is key.
A bespoke approach to intervention is needed that takes account of different employment 
arrangements, practices and personnel profiles in different employment sectors. 
A mental models approach is recommended to enhance the content of communication 
material and aspects relating to its transmission. 
If you would like to know more about DWP research, please contact: 
Carol Beattie, Central Analysis Division, Department for Work and Pensions,  
Upper Ground Floor, Steel City House, West Street, Sheffield, S1 2GQ.
http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rrs-index.asp
Published by the 
Department for Work and Pensions
September 2012
www.dwp.gov.uk
Research report no. 809 
ISBN 978-1-908523-87-7 
